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Human migrations are an imperishable phenomenon: the reasons to migrate are, and will be in 
the future, numerous and variegated.  
Over the past two decades, migration has increased rapidly (Frattini, 2017) and in 2019, the 
number of international migrants reached 272 million of people, up from 153 million in 1990 
(UN DESA, 2019).  
Avoiding or completely preventing human flows is impossible and migrants’ integration and 
inclusion is a key police objective, even if challenging (OECD, 2020). From one side, the need 
of integrating migrants comes from states’ commitments in taking care of people migrating out 
of desperation (UNGA, 2017). From the other, policy intervention is necessary to avoid 
economic and social costs connected with a failed integration. Moreover, a proper social and 
economic inclusion of migrants could bring positive returns to the country that will host them.  
Despite these reasons, the long history of migrations, and the surge in migrant inflows in recent 
years, countries still struggle in managing the phenomenon. All over the world, movements of 
people are often considered as an emergency and legislation and policy lack a structured 
framework. From an overview of the main integration measures adopted in the countries 
involved by migration flows, emerges a scattered patchwork of actions undertaken at the local, 
national or international level, without proper planning, coordination and collaboration. 
Moreover, there is also a lack of data and information to evaluate the measures adopted and 
their casual effects on policy outcomes (Martin et al., 2016; OECD, 2019).  
 
These problematics appear even more urgent considering that governments worldwide, even if 
unaware of the effectiveness of their integration policy, are already destining public resources 
to integration. An inefficient use of resources is detrimental both for migrants and residents 
people and aggravates the already high level of public concern for the effects in the short and 
long run of migrations (OECD, 2020).  
In this work, we will try to address the problems that governments face in allocating resource 
to migrants. Our focus will be on the design of measures responding to specific migrants’ needs 
and according to individual characteristics. The literature on migration seems to agree that 
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tailored approaches can be the key to efficiency: governments could save important resources 
if migrants were helped in reaching their full potential.  
The main problem of individual’s characteristics-policy based, is that usually many of them are 
unobservable to the public planner. As the literature show, trying to detect migrants’ abilities 
based on their reasons to migrate or their geographical origin is not easy neither completely 
possible. Consequently, a problem of adverse selection arise that could be addressed through 
the creation of an incentive mechanism of revelation. In the final part of this work, we will try 
to design such mechanism in the context of migrants’ integration and to derive some 
conclusions.  
The following work is structured as follow: in the first chapter, we will present an overview of 
the main integration problems and measures experienced in western countries. The second 
chapter is dedicated to a literature review on migrants’ self-selection. In the third and last 
chapter, a tentative model of migration policy as an incentive mechanism is presented. Finally 
























CHAPTER ONE: INTEGRATION POLICY MEASURES  
 
1.1. Some Definitions  
 
Before understanding if, why, and how governments deal with migrants’ integration, it is 
important to have clear in mind who migrants are.  
According to the IOM, “migrant” is an umbrella term, which is not defined under international 
law and of which no universally accepted definition exists. As a generic term it reflects “the 
common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual 
residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or 
permanently, and for a variety of reasons” (IOM, 2019, p.132-133).  
For the purpose of our analysis, the focus is on international migrants: individuals willing or 
forced to leave their country of origin. More specifically, we will concentrate on international 
migrants headed to western, industrialized countries. We will often refer interchangeably to the 
latter as ‘destination’ or ‘host’ or ‘receiving’ countries, while the countries from which migrants 
are leaving are named as ‘source’ or ‘origin’ countries.  
 
The term ‘international migrant’ comprehends in itself a number of well-defined legal 
categories of people, or ‘types’ of migrants.  
The main three categories analysed in the literature and based on migrants’ reasons to leave are: 
humanitarian migrants, economic (or labour) migrants and family migrants.  
 
The first category refers to people who have successfully applied for asylum in a country and 
consequently have been granted some sort of protection. Refugee, for example, belong to this 
categories; but different form or status of protection exist. At the same time, the term 
“humanitarian migrants” includes also migrants resettled through humanitarian programmes 
with UNCHR or other private sponsorship (OECD, 2016).  
 
Economic migrants, instead, are “persons who leave their countries of origin purely for 
economic reasons not in any way related to the refugee definition, or in order to seek material 




Finally, with the term family migrants the literature refers to migrants admitted in a foreign 
country thanks to a family reunification process. Family reunification is “the right of non-
nationals to enter into and reside in a country where their family members reside lawfully or of 
which they have the nationality in order to preserve the family unit” (IOM, 2019, p.72). 
 
Clearly, in reality it is often difficult to understand the ultimate reason why a person decided to 
leave his/her own country and the categories defined above are not so tight and often they mixed 
up together. This leads to a series of problems both in everyday life when managing the 
integration processes, and in the literature when conducting an accurate theoretical or empirical 
analysis.  
1.2. Why integration? 
Despite the type, migration has been and, we can say with almost certainty, will be a 
phenomenon connatural of human activity. Migrant flows are hard to die. Over the past two 
decades migration has increased rapidly (Frattini, 2017), and according to OECD projections, 
flows from developing countries to the developed ones will increase, or at least remain constant, 
in the future. It is important to analyse migrants’ pull and push factors and to forecast possible 
global migration scenarios if not to stop flows, to be better prepared in dealing with them 
(OECD, 2009).  
 
Governments of western countries have alternated their effort between preventing migration 
and managing migrants’ integration because for what the first policies cannot reach, the second 
need to be addressed. Even if preventing and mitigating the forces that drive large movements 
of people is useful, governments have also to recognize their duty to assist those who migrate 
out of desperation (UNGA, 2017). 
 
Above all, migrants’ integration is a moral imperative: not all migrants are refugees, but all 
refugees are migrants. In 1951, 196 states entered the Geneva Convention, recognizing their 
duty to admit all the individuals that enter their borders “unable or unwilling to return to their 
country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion” (UNGA, 1951). In 
that occasion was also defined the principle of non-refoulement such that no country could 
expel or return a refugee against his or her will to a territory where he or she fears threats to life 




States’ commitment in taking care of humanitarian migrants does not end with the Geneva 
Convention. Multiple declarations and agreements have been signed to protect and assist 
humanitarian migrants (UNGA, 2017).1  
Moreover, the question of integration has recently appeared on the international policy agenda 
as never before. To make some example: in 2016 was held in Istanbul the World Humanitarian 
Summit, organised by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(UN OCHA); at the European Union level, many coordinated actions have been undertaken to 
respond to the increase in international migration; integration appeared more prominently also 
in the work of the G20 (OECD, 2019). 
Nonetheless, in recent years states have gradually drift away from their commitments, making 
it more difficult for migrants to successfully apply as refugees.  
The reason of such trend has to be found in the constant increase of another type of migration, 
the economic one. Since 1951, due to the growth of welfare states, the increase in inequality 
worldwide and the reduction of migration costs, people willing to migrate in search of better 
economic prospects have increased. As mentioned above, unfortunately is not always easy to 
understand who migrate in search of better opportunity and who migrate out of desperation. 
This gives economic migrants an opportunity to mimic asylum seekers and it presents 
governments with a serious screening problem. The easiest solution to it is to reinforce border 
policies and to augment the burden of proof to obtain refugee status, at the expenses of the most 
vulnerable. The failure of industrialized countries in assisting refugees resides in the very nature 
of international protection. Hospitality is a public good: everyone is better off with a refugee 
protection scheme in place, but the burden of cost is beard only by the host state (Bubb, Kremer, 
Levine, 2011).  
 
The desire to curb migrations comes from the fear of its negative impact on the economy and 
the society of receiving countries. Migration is certainly a challenge and represents a substantial 
financial cost for governments. However, managing migrants’ integration is not only a costly 
                                                             
1 See for example: “the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Human Rights 
Council on the compendium of principles, good practices and policies on safe, orderly and regular migration in 
line with international human rights law (A/HRC/36/42); the 2013 High-level dialogue on International 
Migration and Development; the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030; the New Urban Agenda; the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development; the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants; and the Sustainable Development Goals“ 




activity, but host states are more hesitant about its possible positive contribution to the local 
economy (Backman, Lopez, Rowe, 2020). 
 
Beyond international obligations, migration could be an asset for western states. A rich body of 
literature in economics (micro and macro) investigates theoretically and empirically the impact 
of migration on the host country’s economy (especially for what concern the labour market) 
and society. There is no unanimous consensus on the effects, however, many works stress the 
beneficial impact of migration in the long-run. In particular, immigration can be a key 
component of human capital to address labour and skills shortages, especially for those states 
facing ageing process and falls in the fertility rate (Backman, Lopez, Rowe, 2020).  
 
Also Storesletten (see Bratsber, Raaum and Røed, 2017, p.3) suggests how migration could be 
a solution to the demographic and fiscal challenges faced by European countries due to ageing 
populations.  
Migrants are mainly in their working age, meaning that they usually contribute the host state’ 
finances more than the cost of services they receive. They inject around 85% of their earnings 
into the economies of host societies (UNGA, 2017).  
In many OECD countries actually there is a demand “to replace the declining numbers of young 
workers, replenish retirement funds and raise productivity, as well as demand for caregivers to 
look after the elderly” (OECD, 2009, p.10). For this reason, many countries are actually 
attempting to attract more foreign students in order to successively integrate them into the 
workforce (ibidem).  
 
Not to mention that migrants can fill jobs that natives do not want to do, boosting economic 
activity, and they could also offer expertise and entrepreneurship benefiting the host country 
innovation process (ONU, 2017).  
More in general, since in the world there are countries with large productivity differences, 
unrestricted migrations of people could bring economic gains (Clemens, 2011).  
However, as we will explain, for migration to have positive effects on the receiving countries’ 
economies, a successful integration is crucial, especially in the labour market. Depressing 
effects on the natives’ wages in low-skilled jobs and in the short run, represent one of the 
principal objections to immigration. However, to have a complete evaluation of migrants’ 
performance and contribution, all the potentially productive years spent in the host country 
should be considered. “Simple cross‐sectional comparisons of, say, employment rates between 
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immigrants and natives may not be informative about the ultimate economic consequences of 
immigration” (Bratsber, Raaum and Røed, 2017, p.3).  
 
As mentioned, the debate on migration’s impact in the short and long run is rich and complex. 
It is far from the purpose of this analysis to investigate it. We are more interested in the 
integration challenge that governments has to face, more or less willingly.  
Before providing a general overview of the main integration measures and policies 
implemented nowadays, it is important to reflect on the nature and meaning of integration.  
 
1.3. What is integration?  
 
What does integration mean? What is the objective governments should tend to, and how can 
we measure the progresses or regressions of governments’ policies in reaching it? 
Unfortunately, there is no easy and unique answers to these questions, because “the concept of 
integration with respect to immigrants can take on a number of meanings” (Lemaître, 2007, 
p.10).  
 
Lemaître (2007) explains how from one side we can think at integration simply in terms of 
socio-economic convergence between immigrant and native population. In this case, we are 
interested in the efficacy and efficiency of policies in eliminating or at least reducing the gap 
between the two groups, and the evaluation concerns some key statistical measures such as the 
employment rate, the earnings, the education level, the poverty rate, etc.  
Otherwise, we can think at integration in a broader way as assimilation: “acceptance of, and 
behaviour in accordance with, host countries values and beliefs, including similarity of 
economic and social outcomes” (Lemaître, 2007, p.10).  
In this sense, integration is even more complex since it should arrive to the complete cultural 
adaptation, meaning that the migrant has to abandon its own culture and beliefs. Between these 
two visions of integration, a wide spectrum of interpretations are possible.  
 
The works of Robinson and Castles et al. (see Ager and Strang, 2008, p. 167) also stress how 
integration is a very chaotic concept, which varies by context and of which no commonly 




Not only the definition of integration is contextual, but also the idea of who are the actors 
involved in the integration process has changed over time. At the beginning of integration 
studies, classical theories defined settlement as a linear process: immigrants had to change in 
order to fit with the mainstream culture and society. The process was though as an individual 
one, in which the only actor involved was the migrant. The length of the integration depended 
then on the individual characteristics of the migrant, like for example cultural distance (Garcés-
Mascareñas and Penninx, 2016).  
Successively this view was broadly criticised moving towards a “two-way process of 
integration” in which also the receiving society had to play a major role. The process of 
integration was now an active one, with two distinct actors involved: the migrant and the 
country of his/her destination (Unterreiner, Weinar, 2014).  
This shift is clear also in the empirical research. Before the 1980s, the focus was only at the 
micro-level of individual migrants. It was after the 1990s that research switched also to the 
macro-level analysis of organizations and structural factors. In particular, cross-country 
comparisons of the same immigrant group gave the possibility to examine the contextual factors 
of destination countries (Pennix, 2013; Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx, 2016).  
Finally, even more recently, the approach to integration has changed to the transnationalism 
and development framework. Both theories have brought into the picture a third paramount 
actor: the sending country, even if they have not been able to research its role in the integration 
process (Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx, 2016).  
Even if now the there is a more comprehensive picture of all the actors involved in integration, 
still a unique definition of the concept lacks. The problem is that integration is more than a 
concept, is a policy goal and a target. For this reason, it is important to develop at least an 
operational definition of it, such that is possible to evaluate and range the measures of 
integration adopted by governments (Ager and Strang, 2008).  
 
1.4. Integration measures worldwide  
Shifting from the theoretical debate to the practise, policy makers usually struggle to design 
effective and efficient policy guidelines and strategies for integration. The existing literature 
laments the lack of benchmark integration models and stress the need for further research and 




This lack of benchmark models becomes clear when looking at an overview of the integration 
measures developed in different host countries. For example, Martin et al. (2016) maps the 
different types of labour market integration support measures for refugees in nine EU countries 
(Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom). Although differences across countries, the first problem they highlight, common to 
every state, is the absence of data and information. The solution should be surveys that follow 
migrants over time in order to proper evaluate the integration measures implemented and to 
reflect on impacts and causality. It would mean switching from simply descriptive studies, to 
quantitative ones. The need of quantitative studies investigating causal relationships between 
integration measures and their effects is compelling: governments already spend resources for 
integration; if they operate without the necessary planning or knowledge of the measures’ 
effectiveness, it is detrimental for everyone, migrants and native citizens (Martin et al., 2016; 
OECD, 2019).  
 
Another gap in the literature, is the absence of a proper analysis of the programmes 
implemented. Even if integration measures are designed after a proper evaluation of goals, 
means, benefits and costs, once implemented there is no explanation of “the mechanisms 
through which the designed activities lead to better labour market integration” (Martin et. al, 
2016, p.19). To add complexity, migrants are usually part of “multi-component programmes” 
(ibidem) and it is difficult to evaluate the impact of a single measure. Finally, the optimal 
mechanism design is challenging because of a lack of external validity of the measures already 
undertaken: single policies or experimental measures are often implemented with a very low 
number of beneficiaries, leaving out any possibility of further analysis.   
Absent any benchmark model and taking into account that immigration has always been 
considered by many European countries has an emergency, there is not a clear and unique policy 
of integration, and also countries’ legislation lacks a structured framework.  
The problem is that in receiving countries we assist at many different actions undertaken at the 
local, regional or national level, without any coordination. This leads to a patchwork of 
measures missing any strategy or coherence (Martin et al., 2016).  
For this reason there is an urgent need of coordination across government levels and between 
the various actors involved, such that common minimum standards, at least in the same country, 





1.5. Integration in and through the labour market  
Despite the debate on the nature of integration, surely the success in the labour market is one 
of the most important and investigated aspect of migrants’ inclusion. It is possible to affirm that  
without integration in the labour market, it is extremely difficult for migrants to blend in any 
other aspect of the host country’s society. The literature stresses how the sooner is the access 
to the labour market, the easier the process of integration (see for example Lemaitre 2007; Ayer 
et al, 2016; OECD, 2016). 
Moreover, labour market integration can be the key to unleash migrants’ full potential, to make 
them self-reliant and productive citizens, with positive effects on the local economic 
productivity. This success in the labour market cannot happen and it is not beneficial if not 
coordinated with a serious investment in migrant’s education and human capital formation 
(Backman, Lopez, Rowe, 2020).  
However, the labour market participation in itself can be an optimal way to prevent the 
depreciation of the human capital migrants are already in possess of. Not to mention that 
through the labour market success, migrants become less reliant on the welfare state (Fasani, 
Frattini, Minale, 2018).  
In this sense, an early entry in the labour market, upon arriving in the country, is beneficial also 
for the host country: migrants lower their welfare dependency and are not forced to join the 
informal labour market, incrementing a vicious circle of exploitation and criminality (Aiyar et 
al. 2016).  
Finally, integration into the labour market is also crucial for the host country citizens’ 
predisposition to accept immigrants since it seems to depend on migrants’ potential economic 
contribution (Bansak et al. 2016).  
 
Naturally, migrants’ success in the labour market bring along also perverse effects on the native 
population, especially in the short run. As we mentioned, if large numbers of migrants rapidly 
enter a labour market, they can have a destabilizing impact on jobs and wages (UNGA, 2017). 
In particular, the competitive pressure is on low-earning workers.  
However, it is not the purpose of this analysis to investigate these effects since they belong to 
the issue of whether migration should be contrasted. We are interested in finding an efficient 
way to manage migrants’ integration, given that they already are in a country and governments 
need to deal with them, if not with the hope of profitable gains, at least to avoid the costs of 




Given the importance assigned to the labour market, among the first policies to be inquired in 
order to find an efficient model of integration there are labour market ones. How to build a 
system of incentives for migrants to integrate in the host country’s labour market and for natives 
to help that process?  
 
Before analysing the most common policies that have been enforced in western countries to 
facilitate the economic assimilation of migrants, it is important to understand the legal 
framework with whom immigrants have to confront and its implication for the integration 
process. Do migrants have full access to the labour market of the host country? At which 
conditions? How they can operate in it? How all these affect their incentives to integrate? 
Not to all types of migrants is granted full access to the labour market (often there are legal 
barriers that make them turn into informal jobs). The situation is particularly critical for 
migrants who require asylum. In almost all OECD countries they cannot access immediately 
the labour market during the pendency of their asylum procedure (OECD, 2016). The times for 
processing a request of asylum vary from country to country, but it can arrive to last even an 
entire year. The European Union with Directive 2013/33/EU on Reception Condition of 
humanitarian migrants has fixed the limit of nine months, after which, even if the application 
is still ongoing, the asylum seeker can enter the labour market.  
Beyond waiting periods, it is also common that the right to work is granted only after having 
met certain conditions (e.g. labour market tests, restriction to certain sectors, wage and priority 
check, no self-employment). It is quite clear the reason behind these restrictions: granting an 
unconditional access to labour market for asylum seekers would “leave the asylum channel 
prone to abuse by those seeking a job rather than international protection” (OECD, 2016, p.18). 
The consequences on the employment of the domestic workforce could be too negative.  
 
Contrary to its major purpose, in some countries the labour market access is used as an incentive 
for asylum seekers to co-operate in their application procedure. In Norway and Sweden for 
example, labour market access is granted if asylum seekers actively assist in the procedure for 
obtaining valid documents (OECD, 2016).  
More in general the legal framework for accessing the labour market is crucial for all the 
categories of migrants: not only it influence the incentives to integrate, but also determine the 
level of uncertainty with whom migrants have to cope. The idea behind temporary protection 
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is that it may facilitate returns to the origin country once the conditions improve. However, “it 
conveys the message that migrants are not expected to stay” (OECD, 2016, p.8).  
It creates a situation of uncertainty, detrimental for taking on any activity: the incentives to 
invest in host country-specific human capital and to socially integrate are reduced (Adda, 
Dustmann, Gorlach, 2014). The uncertainty itself can be psychological distracting (Brell, 
Dustmann, Preston 2020). Most importantly, uncertainty deters also employers from hiring and 
training migrants.  
 
Despite the legal framework, what are the labour market integration policy measures 
implemented by industrialized countries? 
For what concerns European policies, despite differences across countries (social contexts, 
labour market structures, support measures), a sort of standard package of measures is often 
implemented. The four key elements of this package are: early skills assessment; introduction 
programmes including general cultural orientation, socio-professional one and even some 
training; language courses; access to job intermediation services (Martin et al., 2016).  
 
1.5.1.  Early skills assessment 
 
This measure is often implemented and analysed also in countries outside of Europe. It is one 
of the main challenges and good policy practises to support the lasting integration of immigrants 
in all OECD countries: it is essential for a better integration to assess promptly foreign 
qualifications and individual skills and to take stock of them (OECD, 2016).  
As one can imagine, assessing foreign qualification is a phenomenon involving the majority of 
immigrants: OECD-wide, almost two out of three immigrants have obtained their qualifications 
abroad (OECD, 2020).  
The latter are broadly discounted in the labour market because of informational asymmetries. 
Since local employers’ unfamiliarity with foreign education systems and skills assessments, 
foreign credentials do not send the same positive signal as domestic qualification. The 
consequences of this problem of adverse selection for immigrants are a higher risk of 
unemployment, of lower wages and of over-qualification (OECD, 2019). Over-qualification 
occurs when individuals work in occupations that do not match their skill levels. Since the main 
measure of skills is usually education, the literature recognizes as measure of over-qualification 
a measure of over-education that compare the worker’s educational attainment to his/her 
occupation. In particular, migrants’ educational level is compared with the mean or median one 
in the native population for a given occupation (Damas de Matos, 2014).  
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For these reasons, skills assessment is a key measure of interest if governments want to support 
the economic assimilation of migrants. However, the assessments should regard not only the 
formal recognition of foreign qualification (to reduce the risk of over-qualification), but also all 
the informal skills and previous job experiences. An instrument adopted in many OECD 
countries is the recognition of prior learning which can be a signal used to reduce uncertainties 
among employers in valuing qualifications. This method can vary by country, but usually 
involve interviews or aptitude tests and practical demonstrations in the workplace or in 
simulated scenarios. It is fundamental for grasping migrants’ professional skills and 
experiences and present them to employers (OECD, 2016).   
The recognition of prior learning helps migrant to enter the labour market and it is also a “quick, 
cost-effective mean to identify needs for further training and to prevent the duplication of 
training content for migrants whose foreign qualifications are not found to be equivalent to 
domestic ones” (OECD, 2016, p.31). 
The duplication of training content is a major problem in migrants’ integration. Courses and 
workshop are almost never designed according to individual needs and stock of abilities. In this 
way it is quite common that the immigrant spends time and resources on developing 
competencies (s)he already has and (s)he should only translate in order to better fit the 
peculiarity of the host country labour market. A cost-effective solution to this problem is 
bridging courses that enable immigrants to fill their specific gaps (OECD, 2016).  
Offering tailored courses is difficult and expensive, but divide them in modules and exploit 
distance-learning programmes could be a solution. The latter in particular may help labour 
migrants to prepare for the receiving country’ s labour market even before the departure, so that 
they could be immediately active at the arrival. It is crucial if recruitment of foreign workers is 
to play a role in responding to skills shortages needs of domestic employers (OECD, 2020).  
More than migrants themselves, crucial stakeholders to consider when designing early skills 
assessments measures are employers. Employers know the skills they need and the specific 
pieces of information they are looking for when assessing credentials and they can provide 
valuable feedback for improving the procedures. If employers are consulted during this process, 
the risks of designing inefficient or unnecessary measures is reduced and it is easier to meet 
everyone’s needs. Alongside OECD countries, there are good examples of engagement of 
employers in the process of recognition. For example, in Austria the Chamber of Commerce is 
involved in skills assessments and mentorship programs. In Sweden, both employers and unions 




Important is also sharing information: create platforms with publicly available information 
concerning foreign qualifications and how to value them, can help employers in the decision of 
hiring migrants (OECD, 2016; OECD 2019).  
 
Unfortunately, it is not always the case that the recognition of qualifications speeds up the 
labour market integration. Correa-Velez et al. (2013) states that (see Martin et al., p. 18) per se 
it could not help employers to overcome their doubts on foreign education. Moreover, migrants 
with recognised qualification might delay their entrance in the labour market because they are 
focused on finding a job in line with their qualifications and home country experiences. 
Employers on the other side reward host country work experience and this postpones migrants 
employment at least in the short run.  
1.5.2. Introduction Programmes and Language Courses 
All migrants should acquire the basic knowledge and skills necessary to find and maintain a job 
in the long run in the host country. Introduction programmes consisting of language courses, 
civic orientation courses and general overview of the host country labour market’s rules and 
practises are one of the main instruments used by countries to help the process of integration 
(OECD, 2016).  
According to the literature, the knowledge of the host country’s language is crucial: it is 
associated with higher attainments in the labour market and so it may be important to support 
the process of economic assimilation (Dustmann and Fabbri, 2003).  
The same consideration has emerged during an online survey conducted by the OECD, the 
German Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the association of German Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry concerning the labour market integration of migrants. Over 2000 
German employers participated to the survey in 2017 whose main finding was that, regardless 
the company size and the type of work, employers consider a good knowledge of German 
language a fundamental competence, also for low-skilled jobs (OECD, 2017a). It seems to be 
the most important skill migrants need to acquire as soon as possible. From the same survey, 
insufficient language skills were shown to be the most frequently stated reason for not hiring 
refugees and asylum seekers (OECD, 2017a).  
At the same time, also from the side of migrants, language difficulties are cited as the principal 
obstacle to employability (Fasani, Frattini, Minale, 2018).  
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In Europe, publicly financed language programmes are common practise and there is consensus 
on their benefits. However, they are not free from some downturns. The heart of the debate 
concern the slowness of theoretical studies and the benefits of learning by doing. If it is true 
that employment is in itself a way to acquire the language, all the formal requirements of a 
certain level of language, simply prevent migrants from getting a job. The question is then “if 
integration is powered by language acquisition or if it is the language acquisition a consequence 
of integration” (Martin et al., p.46). The same reasoning can be applied to introduction 
programmes: “as a kind of waiting period, they might contribute to delaying the integration of 
beneficiaries into the labour market rather than facilitating it” (ibid). Lemaitre in his work 
(2007) points out the same concern: since a long absence from work is associated with human 
capital depreciation, language instruction completed over a relatively short period of time has 
to be preferred.  
 
Another solution to this problem could be language programmes alternated to workplace 
experience (see Lemaitre, 2007; OECD, 2016). The advantage of this type of programs is that 
migrants can have real-life language practise becoming familiar with work-related terms, while 
building relationships useful for finding a job. It is also a way to acquire the missing skills to 
obtain full recognition of job qualifications, as we have seen before (Martin et al, 2016). From 
this example is once again clear that co-operation with employer is crucial for developing highly 
effective measures.  
 
New technologies can be a fundamental tool to increase the cost-effectiveness of courses for 
migrants. First of all, they have the advantage, with respect to face-to-face learning, of reaching 
everyone, even if in the most remote place. Moreover, they can be used pre-departure, 
anticipating the acquisition of the additional skills specific to the host-country human capital 
and they ease the design of more targeted contents.  
Most importantly, technologies allow continuous learning, helping migrants to maintain skills 
in the long-run. This is crucial, because to equip migrants with the basic skills necessary in the 
host country labour market and society, multi-years investment in training and education are 
needed. The latter are costly, and they pay off only in the long-run. For this reason, learning 
should be continuous, but immigrants are usually underrepresented in adult education and 





1.5.3. Job intermediation services 
Job intermediation services can be helpful in alleviating labour market frictions typical of 
migrants’ experience: lack of information of the host country labour market, limited social 
networks, uncertainty about residence status, legal barriers, etc (Battisti, Giesing, Laurentsyeva, 
2019).  
 
In European countries, there is a clear tendency to extend to migrants those job services offered 
to the general population, instead of setting up specific services (Martin et al., 2016).  
There is no doubt that a customised approach is beneficial for an effective labour market 
integration and not only (Hagelund, 2005). Government policies should go in the direction of 
specific, individually tailored integration pathways (OECD, 2016).  
However, it is often difficult for the public employment services, often already overwhelmed 
by high level of unemployment, to provide customised services for the specific needs of 
immigrants (Martin et al., 2016).  
1.5.4. The role of employers  
Of course, a key figure in the process of integration are employers. As mentioned, they are in a 
better position with respect to the government to value which foreign qualifications and work 
experiences are more useful. They are precious in designing what content should go into 
bridging programmes or vocational training (OECD, 2016).  
Simultaneously they are key actors in the social-cultural integration of migrants and in their life 
beyond the labour market. For this reason, it is important to try to align their incentives with 
the ones of the integration policies and reduce the perceived higher costs that discourage them 
from hiring migrants (OECD, 20016; OECD, 2019).  
According with certain studies, subsidise private sector employment with wage subsidy 
increase the employment probability. At the same time, other studies look at the effectiveness 
of wage subsidies as a signal that high entry wages are a significant barrier to immigrant 
integration: targeted and temporal exemptions from minimum wages may help at the beginning 
to reduce the disadvantages migrants face in the labour market (Ayer et al., 2016).   
1.5.5. The role of labour market demand  
No need to say that the basis for labour market integration is the labour demand in the host 
country. This can explain why labour market integration seems more difficult in Southern 
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European countries with respect to the Nordic ones, where actually also native workers emigrate 
in search of better employment opportunities. Already in 2014, an OECD study on labour 
market integration in Italy showed how unemployment rate for immigrants were quite high, but 
at the same time in line with the ones of native-born. This condition questions integration 
policy, if also natives are facing difficulties in integrating in the labour market. It may be useful 
to investigate transversal policies: think at solutions for both categories or design measures in 
which integration is not only a goal, but becomes a tool to solve long lasting problems of the 
host country (OECD, 2014).  
The reflection on labour market demand opens up considerations on the geographical 
distribution of migrants across countries and within the same country. If labour market 
conditions influence the process of integration, the distribution of migrants along the country 
should reflect the distribution of the labour demand. It would be helpful granting them freedom 
of movement, not only within the country, but even in the European Union (Martin et al., 2016).  
According to Ayer et al. (2016), geographical mobility by migrants is useful to balance eventual 
asymmetric shocks in the labour market and by so contributing to the growth of the host 
country. Reducing restrictions on their geographical mobility would allow them to move to 
where labour demand is high.  
The problem gets even more complicated when considering refugees. As already mention, 
hosting refugees can be considered as having the characteristics of a public good since the 
humanitarian benefit is non-rival and non-excludable (Hatton, 2016). Refugees in fact are 
admitted to satisfy basic humanitarian motives. Consequently, when a country hosts a refugee 
it is the only to bear the economic and social costs of this action, but also residents of another 
country benefit since refugees have been hosted. For this reason European countries struggle in 
distributing evenly refugees. Hatton (2016) suggest to create a market for tradable refugee 
quotas so that the costs of each state are taken into account.  
 
The same happens also within a single country. Many governments want to distribute refugees 
and asylum seekers evenly across the country in order to share costs and avoid segregation 
(OECD, 2016). If these dispersal policies do not take into account labour market conditions and 
the so called “secondary migration” is not allowed, it can be quite detrimental on migrants’ 
outcome.  
 
At the same time, freedom of movement has some downturns. There can be concentration of 
migrants where housing is cheaper or where other migrants of the same nationality are already 
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located. This aggravated the problems of segregation, of uneven conditions of centres and 
peripheries and of anti-migration views (Darling, 2016; OECD, 2018; OECD, 2019).  
1.6.  Integration in and through social networks 
“Without civil society organizations, a welcoming business environment and the support of 
local communities, integration policies are likely to be ineffective” (OECD, 2016, p.49).  
The host society must be involved in the process of integration, or the latter is never going to 
happen and despite the effort, policies would be ineffective. From the mapping of good practises 
alongside OECD countries, it seems that a cost-effective way of promoting integration and 
together increasing interactions between immigrants and citizens could be mentorship 
programmes. They bring closer locals and migrants while helping the latter preparing for the 
labour market (OECD, 2016).  
More in general all the activities that bring together locals and migrants are beneficial in the 
integration process. Galera, Giannetto, Noya (2018) analyse four different integration pathways 
developed by third sector organisations in four European countries, that had beneficial impact 
not only on the recipients, but also on the host community.  
In all four cases, it has been crucial the creation of meetings and opportunity of cooperation 
between migrants and locals. Thanks to this collaboration, often locals change their mind-set 
towards immigrants. Moreover, since their local nature, these models of integration are often 
able to benefit the host territory with profits redistribution and to revitalise activities and places 
that were dying. The key to succeed is to engage the community in the design and management 
of the integration process, so that the integration policy is incorporated with the  others 
territorial, educational, social, housing policies. This is helpful because allows to respond 
simultaneously to multiple challenges and migrants are usually empowered thanks to the fact 
that are not segregated with their problems (Galera, Giannetto, Noya, 2018).  
 
Furthermore, volunteer initiatives help migrants entering the labour market because they are a 
boost for learning the host country language and strengthening social networks’ formation 
(OECD, 2019).  
 
Moreover, these organizations are usually able to find new approaches or innovative tools in 
the integration process: they are not mere implementer of public policies, but they are also able 
to identify the specific needs of migrants and local communities (Galera, Giannetto, Noya, 
2018).  Sometimes their ideas contribute to shape future policy measures: they are in the perfect 
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position to valuate whether policies work and they can give precious feedbacks on how 
integration measures should be adapted to better address migrants’ needs. Migrants association 
should be a key interlocutor for policy makers so that policies would be designed not only for 
migrants, but also with them (OECD, 2019).  
 
These experiences are not free from problematic issues. Third sector organizations and 
volunteers can play a positive role in a community. However, at the same time, they aggravate 
the already huge problem of coordination and fragmentation in managing migrants’ integration. 
For this reason, they should be a precious instrument for governments to provide welfare, but 
should not be independent organizers. Governments should ex ante design the policy objective 
function, and then in it consider the role that NGOs can play locally. There is a need of tailored 
regulations and a deeper exploration and study of public-private partnership: they can have a 
big potential, but also become ineffective tools (Martin et al., 2016).  
 
Moreover, it has to be considered that often these experiences born because of the inability of 
the State to quickly respond to pressing problems in local communities. “Expecting volunteers 
to take over tasks that are the responsibility of the state is not going to be viable in the medium 
or long run. […] Investing in the capacity of volunteers is therefore important, but the right 
balance must be found between supporting volunteers and continuing to offer professional, 

















Migrant integration is a complex subject: too many factors and variables take a role and too 
little is known about policies’ effectiveness. In the literature, many studies have tried to analyse 
the phenomenon of integration from each possible angle. Governments and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) deal with this challenge and have to face and manage migration flows 
often unpredictable.  
 
Even if no golden rules or perfect schemes have been found to tackle the question, the literature 
seems to agree that the key to a successful integration is to personalize the path of integration. 
It is vital to implement policy measures designed in accordance with individual characteristics 
and abilities (see for example Aiyar et al., 2016; Brell et al., 2020; OECD 2019; OECD 2020).  
The first thing governments have to do is to understand the characteristics of the migrants 
knocking at the doors of their countries. Knowing migrants’ skills and motivations gives the 
possibility to assign them to the more adapted integration programme, allowing a more efficient 
use of resources and a more successful process of integration.  
Moreover, understanding how to detect migrants’ abilities and motivations is crucial for 
governments wanting to attract, through their immigration policies, high-skill individuals. The 
reasoning behind such a consideration is quite simple: the higher the individual’s skills, the 
higher the probability of employment, the larger migrants’ net fiscal contribution and so the 
less negative is the sentiment of natives towards immigration (Boeri, 2010).  
Also Cobb-Clark (2004) stresses the role of selection policy in influencing the formation of 
attitudes towards immigrants, and she also notes that by altering the skills of the migration 
flows, these policy can affect macroeconomic variables such as employment and wages 
(because they change the complementarity/substitutability of immigrants and natives).  
Finally investigating migrant selection is fundamental in the discussion on brain drain. Increase 
in migration has given rise to concerns about countries with high emigration rates, especially 
developing ones: if only the more skilled and able individuals leaves for a better life, then their 
home country will face greater difficulties in developing and growing (Belot, Hatton, 2012). 
The same argument stands for countries generating high numbers of refugees: if the latter have 
better skills, once the country enters the reconstruction stage, it will be harder for it to regain 
prosperity and stability (Aksoy and Poutvaara, 2019).   
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These considerations lead the literature to argue in terms of determinants of migration, 
individual choices and human capital theory. What economic considerations affect the 
individual’s decision to move? Are there personal characteristics that influence differently the 
costs and benefits of leaving a country?  
If it is true that individual characteristics affect the migrating decision, then migrants are not a 
random sample of the population in their origin country, but they are systematically self-
selected along certain characteristics, some observables and others not. Western countries are 
particularly interested in the analysis of migrant self-selection along the dimension of ability: 
are they high or low skilled? In other words, countries receiving migrants witness a 
phenomenon of positive or negative selection? Positive selectivity occurs when migrants 
entering a host state come from the upper skills distribution in their country of origin‘s 
population. The reverse is true for negative selectivity.  
Despite the relevance of the subject, unfortunately “migrants’ self-selection has been one of the 
most controversial topics in the migration literature” (Fernandez-Huertas, 2011, p.73).  
2.2. Asymmetry of information and patterns of selectivity  
 
At the very beginning of this stream of literature, Kwok and Leland (1982) introduced the 
debate on selectivity developing a model of asymmetric information to investigate the problem 
of brain drain in less developed countries (in particular, they looked at high-skilled colleges 
graduates who left their country for advanced studies in the Western countries).  
Their focus is Taiwan’s situation, where “more than 50,000 college graduates left the country 
for advanced studies overseas during the period from 1960 to 1979, but only 6,000 of them 
returned” (Kwow and Leland, 1982, p. 91). Since the economic conditions in Taiwan are far 
from justify this exodus, neither individual preferences can explain such high flows, Kwok and 
Leland (1982) suggests that the cause of these high numbers of migrants who do not return, is 
the presence of asymmetric information in the labour market.  
 
In particular, in order to explain migration, they place the asymmetry in Taiwan. How to justify 
such a phenomenon? They imagine employers in the destination country (USA) are familiar 
with their national education system (where Taiwanese high skilled individuals are studying) 
and they already have experiences with foreign workers. These facts translate in a better 
knowledge of potential employees’ abilities (which instead are not so clear for Taiwanese 
employers, mainly because its young trained abroad). Consequently, only foreign employers 
are able to offer a wage in line with the true productivity of the individual, while in the home 
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country employers have to base their wages on average productivity, meaning that their wage 
offers will be higher than true productivity for someone and lower for others. In particular, best 
workers who could aspire at higher wages, they would prefer not to come back. That is how the 
brain drain problem is generated and how western countries experience positive selectivity 
among migrants.  
Interestingly Kwok and Leland (1982) underline the fact that market imperfection may drive 
individuals to leave their country even if originally they did not want to. This happens even 
when individuals face competitive wages in the two countries and have preferences for working 
home rather than abroad.  
 
Few years later the publication of this paper, Katz and Stark (1984) commented it, underlining 
the fact that this positive selectivity is one of the possible equilibria with asymmetric of 
information. It could also happen that low skills individual migrate abroad. Crucial in 
determining the type of selectivity experienced is the location of the asymmetry of information: 
there is no reason why only Taiwanese employers should not be able to detect individuals’ true 




Figure 2.1. Source: Katz and Stark (1984), p. 534. 
In this figure it is represented the productivity (𝜃) of the individual on the horizontal axis, while 
in the vertical axis it is pictured the wage (W) they can gain. Productivity is distributed on the 
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interval [0, 1] with distribution functions 𝐹𝑈𝑆(𝜃) and 𝐹𝑇(𝜃). 𝑊𝑈𝑆(𝜃) and 𝑊𝑇(𝜃) are wages paid 
to workers of productivity 𝜃 respectively in the Unites States and in Taiwan. However, these 
two are not the wages the individual compare when deciding where to live. Katz and Stark 
(1984), as in Kwow and Leland (1982), assume individuals have a preference for their home 
country, meaning that they discount US wages by a parameter k<1. When making migration 
decision, they compare 𝑘𝑊𝑈𝑆(𝜃) to 𝑊𝑇(𝜃). Furthermore, they assume that in a given 
occupation the wage differential between the two states does not vary with the productivity. 
Two cases can be distinguished.  
Looking at the graph it is clear that if the difference between the U.S. and Taiwanese wage is 
sufficiently large, so that the 𝑘𝑊𝑈𝑆(𝜃) line lies above the 𝑊𝑇(𝜃) line, with perfect information 
all individuals will move to the USA. The situation, however, could change considering the 
effect of information asymmetry. If USA employers cannot perfectly detect 𝜃, they could only 
offer wages equal to the average productivity: 𝑊𝑈𝑆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜃). Then, comparing 𝑊𝑇(𝜃) to 𝑊𝑈𝑆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜃), 
only the less skilled individuals with 𝜃<𝜃1 migrate. If however, also in Taiwan the true 
productivity is not observable, Taiwan employers are forced to offer an average wage 𝑊𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜃) 
and the situation would come back to a complete exodus.  
A different scenario is depicted when the difference between the U.S. and Taiwanese wage is 
small so that the 𝑘𝑊𝑈𝑆(𝜃) line lies below the 𝑊𝑇(𝜃) line, as it can be seen in this second figure.  
 
Figure 1.2. Source: Katz and Stark (1984), p. 534. 
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The notation is the same as Figure 1, and it is possible to observe that now, in the scenario with 
perfect information 𝑊𝑇(𝜃) is always higher than 𝑘𝑊𝑈𝑆(𝜃), meaning that migration does not 
occur. The same it is true if we compare 𝑘𝑊𝑈𝑆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜃) to 𝑊𝑇(𝜃) when there is asymmetry of 
information in the USA. When instead also Taiwanese employers offer the average wage 
𝑊𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜃), there is migration for the high skilled individuals, the one with 𝜃>𝜃2. This is actually 
the case described by Kwow and Leland (1982), but it is only one of the possible scenarios.  
The concept that Katz and Stark (1984) want to stress is that several situations can verify, and 
the critical point is to understand if and especially where asymmetries of information are 
present. They claim that the pattern of labour migration with asymmetries differs substantially 
from the perfect information and interesting paths can rise.  
After this first short analysis, born as a comment on Kwow and Leland (1982), Katz and Stark 
(1987) developed their own model of international migration under asymmetric information, 
maintaining Kwok and Leland (1982)’s framework. The main results of the model are that 
several scenarios of migrant selection are possible and asymmetric information tends to reduce 
the skill level of migrants. However, they introduce also the possibility for workers to signal 
their ability. In this case, a U shaped pattern of migration can be an equilibrium: individuals 
both from the top and the bottom of the skill distribution may migrate, while individuals from 
the middle part of the distribution stay in the home country.  
Finally, Katz and Stark (1987) underline how risk aversion of employers or of employees could 
also be a critical factor in determining the migration equilibria. It is a topic that should be further 
explored, together with the role of government in migration policy, which could be crucial for 
the different equilibrium patterns and should be incorporated in the model.  
2.3. Migration as investment decision 
 
Another strand of literature models migration as an investment decision, following the seminal 
contribution of Sjaasstad (1962) who introduced the human capital approach in the migration 
framework. Income-maximizing individuals compare the expected utilities they can reach 
worldwide and decide to move wherever their utility is higher. Since earnings and costs 
expectations depend on individual characteristics, the latter play a key role in migration choice 
and consequently in migrant selectivity: only individuals with higher returns to migration will 
migrate, considering their observable and unobservable characteristics. Therefore, in order to 




A milestone in this strand of literature is Borjas (1987)’s model, developed looking at Roy 
(1951)’s model on occupational decisions.  
His analysis starts from the weakness of what he defines the “first generation” studies of the 
literature on migrant selection (Chiswick, 1978; Carliner, 1980; De- Freitas, 1980).  
These papers concentrated their reasoning on the fact that the age-earnings profile of 
immigrants is steeper than the one of natives, so that after an initial period of adaptation, 
immigrant earnings overtake the earnings of comparable natives. The explanation behind these 
results, according to them, can be discovered looking at the human capital theory: earnings of 
immigrant grow faster because migrants have stronger investment incentives. Chiswick (1978) 
states that migrants are actually a self-selected group and so immigrants may be more able and 
highly motivated.  
Borjas (1987) challenges these results: they come from the use of a single cross-section dataset, 
which cannot allow for the distinctive identification of aging effects and cohort effects. 
Consequently, a series of questions remains unsolved: are cohort quality and immigrants self-
selection related? Is there positive or negative selection among migrants? If the selection 
mechanism changes over time, what is the reason behind it? 
Borjas (1987) tries to answer these questions through the construction of a theoretical model in 
which individuals decide if to migrate looking at income differential in alternative countries, 
net of the migration costs. The characteristics of income distribution determine the type of 
selection that arises when individuals maximize their utility.  
In the model citizens of country 0 choose whether to migrate to country 1 on the basis of the 
wages they can earn in each respective country. Earnings are distributed as ln𝑤0 = 𝜇0 + 0 in 
country 0 and as ln𝑤1 = 𝜇1 + 1 in country 1. So individual earnings are in both cases 
decomposed in a part of observables socioeconomic variables (𝜇0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜇1) and a part of 
unobserved characteristics ( 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 1). The latter variables are distributed as a normal with 
zero mean and variance 𝜎0
2 and 𝜎1
2 respectively.  
The individual decides to migrate when the index function 𝐼 =  ln
𝑤1
(𝑤0+𝐶)
 is positive (C stands 
for the mobility costs). The latter can be rewritten as: (𝜇1 − 𝜇0 − 𝜋) + ( 1 − 0) , where 𝜋 
represents the “time-equivalent” measure of migration costs, defined as 𝜋 = 𝐶 𝑤0⁄ .  𝜋 is 
constant across all individuals in the country of origin, since it express a fraction of the home 
forgone earnings, and it represents the cost of the time spent migrating.  
From this simple model, Borjas (1987) draws the conclusion that the selection of migrants 
depends entirely on the ratio of variances in the income distributions of the country of origin 
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and destinations, while differences in mean incomes, or migration costs do not affect it. 
Particularly:  
 If income is more dispersed in the country of origin (𝜎0
2 > 𝜎1
2), it is as if the destination 
country “insures low-income workers against poor labour market outcomes while taxing 
high-income workers (relative to the country of origin)” (Borjas 1987, p. 534). This 
leads to negative selectivity, since the low-income workers have greater incentives to 
migrate;  
 On the contrary, if income distribution is more unequal in the destination country, 
positive selectivity happens.  
Since, according to Borjas (1987), income is more unequally distributed in the large number of 
Third World countries, income-maximizing behaviour is inconsistent with the positive selection 
of migrants.  
Borjas (1987) is a seminal contribution of the literature on migrant selectivity and has been 
questioned and tested from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view by several 
subsequent papers.   
Chiswick (1999), for example, harshly criticize Borjas (1987). His model amends Borjas’ and 
reaches the exactly opposite conclusion on selectivity.  





where 𝑊𝑏represents earnings in the destination and 𝑊𝑎  in the origin. 𝐶𝑑 are the direct costs of 
migration, which include not only the cost of the journey, but also the cost of relocating once 
arrived (cost of adjusting consumption and work to the new destination). 𝐶𝑓 represents the cost 
of foregone earnings, a sort of opportunity cost of migration: it is the money the individual 
could have gained remaining in his/her country during the period of migration. It is composed 
of the value of time in the origin country (the wage) multiplied by the time units necessary for 
the migration (which includes also the adjustment period). 
The individual migrates “if the rate of return from the investment in migration (𝑟) is greater 
than the interest cost of funds for investment in human capital. The interest cost of fund is lower, 
the greater the person’s wealth and access to the capital market” (Chiswick, 1999, p. 181).  
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In the first place, Chiswick (1999) assumes that there are two categories of individuals: high 
skilled (h) and low skilled (l), and that both the individuals and the employers know these 
abilities; hence, there is no asymmetric information. He also assumes that wages in the origin 
and destination countries for the high skilled workers are a fixed multiple of wages of low-
skilled workers: 
𝑊𝑏,ℎ = (1 + 𝑘)𝑊𝑏,𝑙 
𝑊𝑎,ℎ = (1 + 𝑘)𝑊𝑎,𝑙 
It follows that the gain/loss of wages when moving to the destination country is always (1+k) 
and is independent of the level of ability. Contrary to Borjas (1987), there are no differences 
between low and high skilled in income dispersion between origin and destination country.   
For what concerns costs, Chiswick (1999) first assumes that the direct ones do not varies with 
ability. He also assumes that there are no differences in managing the costs between high and 
low skilled individuals, meaning that abilities do not affect in efficiency the whole migration 
and adaptation processes. However, even if ability does not directly affect the costs, the latter 
variate among the two types of individuals. The reason is that the costs of foregone earnings 
(𝐶𝑓) are higher for the high skilled individuals. Since wages of high skilled are higher than the 
wages of low skilled, and 𝐶𝑓 is computed as the individual’s wage multiplied by the time units 
of the migration period, it follows that 𝐶𝑓,ℎ is higher than 𝐶𝑓,𝑙. More specifically, 𝐶𝑓,ℎ = (1 +
𝑘)𝐶𝑓,𝑙.  
The rates of return are:  
𝑟ℎ =
(1 + 𝑘)𝑊𝑏,𝑙 − (1 + 𝑘)𝑊𝑎,𝑙











Thus, 𝑟ℎ > 𝑟𝑙 (implying positive self-selection), as long as earnings increase with ability (k>0) 
and there are positive direct costs of migration (𝐶𝑑 > 0). If there are no direct costs or there is 
no labour market premium for higher abilities, there would not be selectivity in migration, since 
return would be equal for high and low skilled. High direct costs reduce the overall incentive 
to migrate, but they increase the probability of positive selection: high-skilled workers have 
larger margins to compensate migration costs, because of their greater earnings.  
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However, it is not reasonable to assume that abilities do not affect efficiency. As high-skilled 
individuals are more productive in the labour market (for which they are compensated with 
higher wages), it is reasonable to assume, according to Chiswick (1999), that they are more 
efficient also in migration, in the investment in human capital. There are several reasons to 
justify such an assumption, for example the investment in migration requires less time for abler 
individuals, or direct costs for them are lower.  
In the first example, the effect of greater abilities operates through the opportunity cost of 
migration. As already seen, 𝐶𝑓 is equal to the wage in the origin country multiplied by the time 
units (t) necessary for migrating. If high skilled individuals have a shorter migration period, 
they have a lower t (𝑡ℎ < 𝑡𝑙), and it follows that their opportunity cost is lower. 𝐶𝑓,𝑙 and 𝐶𝑓,ℎ 
can be written as:   
 
𝐶𝑓,𝑙 = 𝑡𝑙𝑊𝑎,𝑙 
𝐶𝑓,ℎ = 𝑡ℎ𝑊𝑎,ℎ = 𝑡ℎ(1 + 𝑘)𝑊𝑎,𝑙 
 
Due to this difference in the value of t, migrants would be positive selected even in the absence 
of direct cost. If then it is also assumed that migrants with greater abilities are more efficient in 
travelling or in relocating once arrived in a new country (𝐶𝑑,ℎ < 𝐶𝑑,𝑙), the difference in rate of 
return among high and low skilled is even greater. Assuming a direct cost efficiency parameter 
𝜆<0 , which differentiates 𝐶𝑑,ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑑,𝑙 such that 𝐶𝑑,ℎ = (1 + 𝜆)𝐶𝑑,𝑙, the rate of return for high 








Meaning that the higher the efficiency in handling direct costs (higher lambda in absolute 
value), the larger the return for the high skilled with respect to the low skilled.  
As mentioned before, Chiswick (1999)’s model differs from Borjas (1987) since it assumes that 
the distribution of wages is equal in the origin and destination countries (the ratio of variances 
in the income distribution is always equal to one). The model can be extended in order to 
consider that different countries have different wages differentials relative to abilities.  
To align perfectly to Borjas (1987) framework, Chiswick (1999) also refrains momentarily from 
considering efficiency in migration.  























Under these assumptions, the driver of migration incentives is the ratio of wages in destination 
and origin countries and so results similar to Borjas (1987) are reached. However, Chiswick 
(2000) underlines that if the ratio of wages is greater for low skilled, positive selectivity will be 
less intense, but not absent. He in fact imagines that in reality efficiency in migration is present, 
meaning that greater income inequalities in the country of origin determines no positive 
selection only if this effect offsets the effect of efficiency in costs. In this framework huge wage 
differentials across countries between high and low skilled are requested to have negative 
selection.  
Chiswick (1999) is important also because introduces the problem in selectivity across migrant 
categories. A rich field of the self-selection’s literature discusses the distributions of abilities 
among migrants belonging to different categories (mainly economic and humanitarian 
migrants). However, this line of discrimination does not seem to better enlighten the problem 
and no consensus is found.  
Chiswick (1999)’s model described above, explains the behaviour of economic migrants who 
base their decision to migrate on measured returns; it is not suitable for migrants that leave for 
non-economic reasons. For them “the favourable self-selectivity for labour market success 
would be expected to be less intense” (Chiswick, 1999, p. 184). Nations can affect migrants’ 
self-selectivity through their immigration policies. Screening can be made dependent on skills 
or not (as for refugees) and depending on the criteria that are used, the pool of immigrants 
arriving in a country will be more or less educated.  
These early studies highlight that the theoretical prediction about the type of selectivity 
(positive or negative) depends ultimately on the assumptions made and the way in which 
migration costs are designed plays a central role. For example, Borjas (1987) arrives to the 
conclusion that selectivity depends on the dispersion of wages in the countries. This result 
derives from the fact that wages depend on an unobservable component with a certain variance 
and from his assumption of constant migration costs. Chiswick (1999) instead thinks migration 
costs as different among individuals and shows how huge wage differentials among countries 
are required in order to witness negative selection. Both models have reasonable assumptions 
and that is the reason why Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2011) affirms: “studying the selection 
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of migrants thus becomes an empirical question” (ibid, p.73). Unfortunately, the problem is not 
solved through the use of data; it is actually magnified: since Borjas (1987) there has been many 
studies that using different (or even the same) datasets reached very different results.  
Several papers have focused on the controversial issue of migration flows from Mexico to the 
United States. According to Borjas (1987) theory (and empirics), migrants from Mexico should 
be negatively selected. However, many empirical studies found the opposite results, for 
example Chiquiar and Hanson (2002) and Orrenius and Zavodny (2005). While Ibarraran and 
Lubotsky (2007) found negative selection.  
In a later paper, McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) claim that these contrasting results can be 
explained through the role of migration networks that can alter substantially the pattern of self-
selection. Communities in which migration networks (number of individuals who already 
migrated) are weak favour migration of higher skilled workers and vice versa for communities 
with strong migration networks. This element has not been usually considered in empirical 
models; consequently, such models suffer of a relevant omitted variable problem, which 
explains why different datasets yield different results on the sign of selectivity.  
The role of migration networks directly descends from the interpretation of migration costs. As 
seen in Borjas (1987), and in many interpretations of this model, costs are proportional to wages 
at home, but there is no efficiency in migrating; costs are assumed to be decreasing in skills in 
Chiswick (1999). According to McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) migration is costly, involving 
not only upfront monetary costs, but also search and information and psychological costs. All 
these costs varies with education level (fixed costs can be met by high skilled individuals with 
less hours of work or with lower borrowing costs; collect information is easier for more 
educated) and if they are large enough (and credit constraints binding), positive selection should 
emerge. The focus of all the debate on self-selection should then be on determining the 
migration costs of given “communities”. In this sense, networks play a role: they diminish 
migration costs since they provide information (on border crossing, smugglers, etc.), they 
provide housing services or help relaxing the credit constraints. According to the authors, these 
effects are more beneficial to low-skilled individuals, leading to a negative selection wherever 
these networks are particularly strong.   
They develop their intuition first through the design of a theoretical model, which is based on 
Chiquiar and Hanson (2002), to allow for network effects. Then, they empirically test the model 
using survey data from Mexico. Their work suggests that negative selection is more probable 
where there are stronger networks effect, in line with the hypothesis that a critical factor in 
determining who migrate is high costs of migration.  
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The crucial role of networks in migration decision is stressed also by Hatton (2020). He 
concentrates on asylum migration to the developed world and he finds that “the most powerful 
single variable influencing asylum-seeker flows to a country is the stock of previous migrants 
from the same origin” (Hatton, 2020, p. 85).  
These findings help in part to reconcile the conflicting results about Mexicans’ selection found 
in the literature and at the same time suggests that the more migration, the more negatively 
selected migrants are.  
Another effort to address conflicting results on migrant selectivity was made by Grogger and 
Hanson (2011). They aim at reconciling all the empirical findings of the literature on migrant 
selectivity with the Roy’s income maximization framework. According to them the key is 
focusing on absolute wage differences, consistent with linear utility, rather than on the relative 
ones, consistent with log utility.  
Since Borjas (1987) migrants’ self-selection has been explained looking at the variances in 
income distributions across countries. No role is played by differences in mean incomes. And 
as Borjas (1987) correctly pointed out, usually in less developed countries wage differentials 
by skill level are higher than in developed countries. Only individuals at the bottom of skills 
distribution are encouraged to migrate, while the incentive for high skilled individuals is not so 
strong.  
Grogger and Hanson (2011), testing empirically different model specifications, find that the 
data reject log utility, suggesting migration actually responds to absolute rewards to skill. Since 
absolute skill-related earning differences are instead much larger in destination than in source 
countries, positive selection of migrants is a rational outcome. Through this specification is 
possible to reconcile the Roy model with strong positive selectivity. Moreover, Grogger and 
Hanson (2011) stress that many factors can affect the selection of migrants and that could be 
the reason of the divergence in the empirical findings. 
 
Their work is not limited to the analysis of migrant selectivity, but it explores also the scale of 
migration, and the phenomenon of positive sorting (i.e., migrants are more likely to settle in 
destination countries with high reward to skills). This interest comes from the simple 
observation of data on OECD migration flows: US and Canada, although receive 51.4% of 
OECD’s immigrants, attract the 65.5% of those with tertiary schooling (more than 13 years of 
education). On the contrary, Europe is able to attract only the 23.6% of tertiary-educated OECD 
immigrants, on a total percentage of 38.4 OECD immigrants. 
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Both positive selection and positive sorting, according to Grogger and Hanson (2011), can be 
explained by a simple model of income maximization.  
Individuals compare wage differentials in order to decide whether to migrate. Differently from 
Borjas (1987) the wage depends entirely on the return on education investment- primary (𝜇ℎ), 
secondary (𝛿ℎ
2), or tertiary (𝛿ℎ
3)- and there is no room for the unobserved characteristics of the 
individual. According to this framework, the individual i with skill level j migrating to 
destination country h from the source country s, gain: 
 𝑊𝑖𝑠ℎ
𝑗








 is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual has schooling level j.  
The individual also faces migration costs: 
 𝐶𝑖𝑠ℎ
𝑗









The authors assume that costs have two components: a fixed one, 𝑓𝑠ℎ  (cost of moving), and one 
that varies by skill level, 𝑔𝑠ℎ
𝑗
 (we can think about costs influenced by linguistic and geographic 
proximity among the countries or by the destination country’s immigration policies) which can 
both be positive or negative. 
The model uses a linear utility function dependent on the difference between wages and 
migration costs and also on an unobserved idiosyncratic term ( 𝑖𝑠ℎ
𝑗
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(2.3) 
Assuming individuals choose whether and where to migrate maximizing their utility, it is 



















is the population share of education group j in s that migrate to h, while 𝐸𝑠
𝑗
 the one 
that reamins. Already from this equation it is possible to see that the skill group-specific log 
odds of migrating should depend positively on the wage difference in skill-specific wages and 
negatively on costs. To understand emigrant selection the authors look at the difference of this 
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(2.5) 
On the left side of equation (2.5) there is the difference in skill mix between migrants and non-
migrants: if it is positive, then there is positive selectivity. Since 𝛼 >0, this happens if the wage 
difference between the source and destination, net of skill varying migration costs, is greater 
for high-skill workers.  
To investigate instead migrants’ sorting across destinations, it is sufficiently to collect the terms 


















Equation (2.6) shows that migrants sort themselves across destinations on the basis of skill 
rewards, meaning that if a country h has higher return to skills than country k, it will have more 
skilled migrants with respect to the mix of country k.  
Equations (2.4), (2.5) and (2.6) highlight the role of fixed costs and absolute wage differences 
in driving the pattern of selectivity. Since Borjas (1987) much of the literature looks instead at 
relative returns and costs proportional to income. As if, individuals look at the variances and 
not at the means of income distributions across skill levels, when deciding if and where to 
migrate. Moreover, costs are interpreted as opportunity ones, meaning that migration is more 
expensive for individuals with higher skills.  
To compare the two settings, Grogger and Hanson (2011) adapt their model using logarithmic 
utility and an error term that is proportional and not additive. To test their model with linear 
utility and the one with relative returns to skills, they use the data collected by Docquier, Lowell 
and Marfouk (2009) from the national statistical offices of OECD countries.  
In line with their theory they find positive and significant coefficient for the selection and 
sorting of migrants, showing that absolute wage gap can be higher for skilled emigrants, even 
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if the relative gap is not. This is particularly true when considering the post-tax wages, which 
can also contribute to explain the great attractiveness of North America: not only these countries 
have relatively large pre-tax skill-related wages difference, but also the tax systems are less 
progressive. 
According to Grogger and Hanson (2011) absolute wage differences are a better predictor of 
migration pattern because linear utility model is free from the restriction that the decreasing 
marginal returns to income are comparable among source-destination countries. It is unlikely 
that they “matter equally when comparing incomes of $3000 a year in Ecuador to $15,000 a 
year in Spain as when comparing $8000 a year in Turkey to $40,000 a year in Germany, yet 
log-linear requires that they do” (Grogger and Hanson, 2011, p. 45). Using linear utility 
marginal returns are not considered at all. However, given that among the analysed countries 
there are huge differences in income, Grogger and Hanson (2011) believe their restriction 
abuses the reality less than the strong curvature required by logarithmic utility.  
Grogger and Hanson (2011) recognize that numerous other factors can influence selectivity and 
sorting, e.g., geographic, linguistic, and political relationships between countries. Testing for 
these “exogenous” factors they find that:  
 English-speaking countries receive more migrants than others, ceteris paribus, and that 
their migrants are also better educated. At the same time, given a certain country of 
origin, its migrants are higher in destination countries that share with it a common 
language. These migrants are also better educated than non-migrants of the same origin 
country and also than migrants from the same source country leaning towards other 
destinations. This phenomenon seems to suggest that migrants are aware of language 
being a strategical tool to gain higher rewards to skill.  
 Contiguity increases the scale of migration, but reduces the skills of migrants. The 
interpretation of this fact, according to Grogger and Hanson (2011)’s conjecture, may 
be that migrating is easier between neighbouring, especially the illegal one.  
 A negative effect characterises also countries with colonial past. Recent literature 
(Pedersen et.al, 2004; Mayda, 2010) points out the role of the economic and social 
networks between a country and its former colonies in increasing bilateral migration 
flows. The results found “are consistent with these linkages disproportionately affecting 
migration of the less-skilled” (Grogger and Hanson, 2011 p.51).  
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In their study, Grogger and Hanson (2011) focus on the question of if migrants are more skilled 
than the population remaining in its origin country. They do not investigate if different types of 
migrants (economic and humanitarian ones), presents systematic differences in their skill levels.  
However, in the empirical analysis they find an important role of immigration policy in 
affecting selectivity. Generous asylum policies seem to reduce immigrants’ skills with respect 
to the rest of the population remaining in its home country (non-migrants). Moreover, a 
generous asylum policy in a certain host country reduces the skills of migrants in that country 
with respect to migrants directed towards other destinations. Grogger and Hanson (2011) 
explain this finding suggesting that destinations that allocate higher share of visas to refugees 
may limit opportunities to entry to more skilled migrants. However, they are not able to provide 
a deeper and more complete analysis due to the absence of data.   
All the results described above derive from the model with linear utility (absolute wage 
differences).Testing the same regressions on the basis of the log-utility model brings to different 
results.  
 
Belot and Hatton (2012) use the same dataset of Grogger and Hanson (2011) for the empirical 
estimation, and build on the Roy-Borjas model, focusing on why the education content of 
emigrants to OECD countries differs so much among countries of origin. The migration 
literature has deeply discussed the mechanisms involved in the self-selection of migrants, 
especially looking at the economic incentives and constraints of individuals. However, still few 
has been said on why the selection of migrants is so different from source country to source 
country. 
 
According to Belot and Hatton (2012) a simple glimpse at OECD data on the stock of foreign-
born in 2001 can explain the interest in exploring migrants’ selection from such an angle.  
The percentage of highly educated migrants by country of origin varies consistently across 
regions. If for many countries in Asia and Africa the high-educated share among migrants is far 
higher than the one of the overall population in the country of origin (positive educational 
selection), for many others in Central America, Southern Europe and North America, the gap 
is much smaller.    
This variance is present also looking at the different destination countries: the percentage of 
highly educated foreign-born in each OECD country differs considerably. As already pointed 
out by Grogger and Hanson (2011), there are huge variations across countries and not in line 
with their migrant quotas. Canada, for example, which is a country with a highly selective 
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immigration policy (point system mechanism), has a population of foreign born that for the 
almost 60% is highly educated; in many European countries it does not reach 20%.  
 
Since Borjas (1987), migrants’ self-selection has been explained resorting to the diverse 
distributions of income between different countries. Even if it is true that differences in returns 
to skills between source and destination countries affect the individual’s decision to migrate 
and have a role in migrants’ self-selection, according to Belot and Hatton (2012) many other 
factors, that could also vary by skill levels, affect the decision to migrate. To cite some of these 
factors: the individual’s home country bias, the costs of gaining admission in a country (which 
could vary by individuals and skill levels) and the poverty constraints which allow only the 
richer to migrate. The presence of these other factors could explain the huge variations in skilled 
content by countries of origin outlined above. Moreover, according to Belot and Hatton (2012), 
it is responsible of the contrasting results found by migrants’ selection literature.   
This statement can easily be explained by the following figure, which captures the essence of 
Roy model:  
 
Figure 2.2: Destination and origin wage-by-skill schedules. 
Source: Belot and Hatton (2012), p. 1107. 
Here 𝑤(𝑦) is the destination-country wage schedule, whose slope represents the return on 
education, while 𝑤(𝑥)1 and 𝑤(𝑥)2 are two possible wage schedules in the country of origin. In 
the first case, there is positive selection: only individuals with education level higher than 𝑠1 
have an incentive to migrate. On the contrary, if the wage schedule of the country of origin is 
designed as 𝑤(𝑥)2, there will be negative selection since only those with education level below 
𝑠2 have an incentive to leave.  
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The real problem, according to Belot and Hatton (2012), is the identification of home country’s 
wage schedule. Its position depends on several factors, many of which can differ across 
individuals (e.g., individual’s preferences for home country, credit constraints, direct and 
indirect costs of migration, etc.). This introduces even greater heterogeneity in the selection 
such that the wage schedule in itself might not be a good predictor of the skill selectivity of 
migrants. That is the reason why so many studies in the literature have found contrasting results 
even if referring to the same framework (Roy-Borjas model).  
It is important to focus on the driver of selectivity and “on what explains the educational 
selectivity of outmigration across source countries and what combination of incentives and 
policy determines the skill content of immigration among the main destinations” (Belot and 
Hutton, 2012, p. 1106). As a result, they will stress the role of credit constraints: despite skill 
returns, migrants from poor countries are positive selected because the low-skill individuals are 
incapacitated to leave.  
Belot and Hatton (2012)’s theoretical model starts from the usual characterization of wages in 
source (x) and destination (y) countries for individual i.  
Wages in the origin country (𝑤𝑥𝑖) depend on the return to education 𝛼1 (𝑠𝑖 is individual i’s 
education level) and on a random unobserved productivity component with zero mean and 
uncorrelated with the individual’s preference for migration ( 𝑥𝑖).  
ln𝑤𝑥𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑠𝑖 + 𝑥𝑖 
In the destination country, wages (𝑤𝑦𝑖) depend once again on the return of education and the 
unobserved productivity (respectively 𝛽1𝑠𝑖  and 𝑦𝑖), but also on the cultural distance between 
the origin and destination country (𝑢) which affects the transferability of educational skills. 
This term is related to the human capital of the individual in two different ways. From one side 
the higher the education, the easier for the individual to overcome the cultural difference; for 
this reason the term 𝛽3𝑠𝑖 reduce the negative effect of cultural difference. On the other side, 
cultural differences can have smaller effects on productivity for jobs that require lower skills, 
where little human capital has to be transferred; this effect is captured by the term 𝛽2.  
ln𝑤𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑖 − 𝑢(𝛽2 − 𝛽3𝑠𝑖) + 𝑦𝑖  
The incentive for the individual to migrate is the difference in earnings between destination and 
origin country, net of direct migration costs (c) and net of the individual’s non-economic 
preferences (𝑧𝑖 which is a random variable with mean greater than zero such that the average 
preference for the country of origin is positive).  
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𝐼𝑖 = ln𝑤𝑦𝑖 − ln(𝑤𝑥𝑖 + 𝑐) − 𝑧𝑖 
The direct migration costs can be better specified as 𝑑(1 − 𝛾𝑠𝑖). d is a measure of the direct 
costs and is inversely related to the educational level, as previously suggested by Chiswick 
(1999). However, direct costs are not the only one affecting the individual’s decision to leave. 
Other factors can increase the costs of migrating. For example immigration policy, can make it 
difficult for migrants to enter quickly in the destination country. For this reason Belot and 
Hatton (2012) add to the index function also a variable of individual policy cost, 𝑃𝑖. It can be 
written as 𝑃𝑖 = 𝛿0 − 𝛿1𝑠𝑖, where the second term captures the possibility for immigrant policy 
to be skill-selective (as for example in Canada). Finally, since the authors guess that credit 
constraints are a key element in explaining selection across countries, the term 𝑅𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖𝑟(1 −
𝑠𝑖) is inserted. 𝐶𝑖  represents the total cost of migration (both the direct and the policy one) and 
𝑟 is the general poverty rate. The poverty constraint is then proportional to the total costs, and 
again varies by skill-level. Substituting in 𝐶𝑖 the definition of direct and policy costs, 𝑅𝑖  
becomes equal to: 𝑅𝑖 = [𝑑 + 𝛿0 − (𝑑𝛾 + 𝛿1)𝑠𝑖]𝑟(1 − 𝑠𝑖).  
Combining the incentive to migrate with the various cost items described above, the following 
probability to migrate (for individual i) is obtained:  
Pr(𝑚𝑖 = 1) = 𝑃𝑟{𝛽0 − 𝛼0 − 𝑑 − 𝛿0 − 𝛽2𝑢 + (𝛽1 − 𝛼1 + 𝛽3𝑢 + 𝑑𝛾 + 𝛿1)𝑠𝑖
− [𝑑 + 𝛿0 + (𝑑𝛾 + 𝛿1)𝑠𝑖]𝑟(1 − 𝑠𝑖) > 𝑧𝑖 + 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖} 
Assuming that there are two education level (high educated with 𝑠𝑖=1 and low educated with 
𝑠𝑖=0), they write the migration rate for high-educated (H) and low educated (L) as: 
𝑀𝐻
𝑁𝐻
= 𝛽0 − 𝛼0 − 𝑑 − 𝛿0 − 𝛽2𝑢 + 𝛽1 − 𝛼1 + 𝛽3𝑢 + 𝑑𝛾 + 𝛿1 − 𝑧̅ 
𝑀𝐿
𝑁𝐿
= 𝛽0 − 𝛼0 − 𝑑 − 𝛿0 − 𝛽2𝑢 − (𝑑 + 𝛿0)𝑟 − 𝑧̅ 






= 𝛽1 − 𝛼1 + 𝛽3𝑢 + 𝑑𝛾 + 𝛿1 + (𝑑 + 𝛿0)𝑟 
Looking at the first two terms of this equation, we can appreciate the same result of Roy’s 
model: an increase in the return to skills in the destination country, relative to the home one, 
increases positive selection. However, many other variables are present: cultural distance can 
affect selection, even if its sign is not known; direct costs of migration and policy selectivity 
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modify migrants’ abilities. Finally, it is reasonable to think that the degree of poverty, r, reduces 
unskilled migration, affecting selection directly and through the interaction with migration 
costs. 
Belot and Hatton (2012) test their model empirically through regression equations. The dataset 
used is the same of Grogger and Hanson (2011), which in turn is the same of Docquier et al. 
(2009). However, the specification of the model is different since they use logarithmic utility. 
Successively, they also test linear utility, adapting their model to the framework of Grogger and 
Hanson (2011). With this specification they find that absolute wage differences indeed induce 
positive selection, but only when omitting the liquidity constraints. If the credit constraint 
variable is inserted, the latter is still significant and positive, while the coefficient of the absolute 
wage gap becomes negative.  
Besides the comparison of models, interesting results are found.  
First of all, it seems that poverty constraint is a key variable in explaining selectivity: when 
excluded from the model the effect of the wage premium is negative and insignificant; 
considering instead also the poverty trap, results turn in line with the Roy-Borjas model.   
In the second place Belot and Hatton (2012) tests many factors for sorting, that we have already 
seen also in Grogger and Hanson (2011). They analyse cultural distance finding a positive effect 
on selection, and the presence of colonial history, which instead increase the number of low 
skilled. Contrary to Grogger and Hanson (2011) they do not find a clear positive effect of 
language proximity, suggesting that linguistic distance may be less of a barrier for lower 
educated, whose jobs require less transferability of human capital.  
Overall, it seems that costs and constraints are important in shaping the selectivity of migration.  
An important factor they inquire is the effect of immigration policy in the destination country. 
Not only as we have seen, screening mechanism at the border can have an effect on the costs 
of migration, differentiating them by skill level, but also behind-border policies can affect self-
selection. In particular, Belot and Hatton (2012) presume that some factors are crucial, such as 
the generosity of the welfare state, the flexibility towards foreigners in the labour market and 
the ease of recognition of foreign qualification to work in the labour market. The latter actually 
seems to be the most important effect, both in magnitude and significance. The generosity of 




This analysis, differently from Grogger and Hanson (2011), leaves out policy towards asylum 
seekers and family reunification migrants, which actually could have a large effect on selection.  
2.4. Selectivity differences and migrants’ classes  
 
A study specifically focused on the differences in selectivity between classes of migrants is 
carried out by Aksoy and Poutvaara (2019), who investigate the self-selection of refugees and 
irregular migrants arrived in Europe in 2015 and 2016.  
Borjas (1987) already investigated the case of self-selection among refugees in his model. 
However, it was a peculiar case of sorting for “countries that have recently experienced a 
Communist takeover” (Borjas, 1987, p. 534). The idea was that the regime change from the 
market economy to Communism would have brought changes in income distribution among 
the individuals, especially for entrepreneurs’ wealth. Migrant escaping from that regime would 
have been persons unable to match with the new political structure, but not necessarily low –
income or low-skill individuals. In the new regime, with the new income distribution, they 
would have been low-income individuals, figuring as below-average immigrants in terms of the 
country of origin. However, they would outperform the average U.S. native worker, fitting well 
in a market economy.  
Aksoy and Poutvaara (2019) also start from the Roy-Borjas model of self-selection, trying to 
explain why it is not always verified in reality. In particular, their focus is on economic migrants 
arriving in Europe from African and Middle East countries: from a theoretical point of view, 
following  the Roy model and given that European countries have much narrower income 
differences, migrants from those areas should come from the lower end of the skill distribution; 
however, empirically is possible to find different results. Even considering Grogger and Hanson 
(2011) extended framework in which selectivity depends simply on the absolute return to skills, 
there are still cases of positive self-selection even from countries with higher return to skill. 
To solve such inconsistency they provide a theoretical model of refugee self-selection (stressing 
how it differs from economic migrants’ selection), adding as key variable the presence of risks 
related to living in an unsafe country. They claim that “extending the Roy-Borjas model to 
account for risks associated with conflict and persecution can explain why migrants from 
countries facing a major conflict or large-scale repression are positively self-selected, even 
when returns to skill in those countries would be higher than in the destination countries”2.  
                                                             




The framework is always Borjas (1987), even if the unobservable skill components are left out 
as in Grogger and Hanson (2011) since they could not be tested in their data.  
Following the literature Aksoy and Poutvaara (2019) develop two equations for the wages in 
the home (k) and destination (d) country: 𝑤𝑖
𝑘 = exp (𝛼𝑘 + 𝑟𝑘ℎ𝑖) and 𝑤𝑖
𝑑 = exp (𝛼𝑑 + 𝑟𝑑ℎ𝑖 −
𝜋𝑘).  
The wage is composed of a fixed return common for all who have at least primary education 
(𝛼𝑘/𝑑), and a second term which captures the return to human capital above primary education 
(r). The wage equation in the destination country is also adjusted for the possibility of loss of 
potential productivity due to the imperfect transferability of human capital (𝜋𝑘).  
Individual’s expected utility however does not simply depend on wages (that enter in the 
logarithmic form); there is a country-specific risk q of losing the wage and suffering additional 
loss L (which instead enters linearly). It is reasonable to expect q to be higher in countries with 
war or conflicts and close to zero in relatively safe countries. In the latter case migrants are 
more motivated by lack of job opportunities rather than conflicts or persecutions. Moreover, 
refugees and irregular migrants face also travel risks, capture by the variable s bounded to be 
between zero and one. Also, in this case there is the possibility of facing a loss L.   
The equations of the expected utility are then the following:  
𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝑘 = (1 − 𝑞𝑘) log(𝑤𝑖
𝑘) − 𝑞𝑘𝐿𝑘 
𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝑑 = (1 − 𝑠𝑘) log(𝑤𝑖
𝑑) − 𝑠𝑘𝐿𝑀 − 𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑘 + 𝑖 
where 𝑖 depicts various costs and benefits related to migration that are not captured by other 
terms, including the valuation of different cultural norms and social networks.  
It is rational to migrate if 𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝑑> 𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝑘  which, with some calculations, leads to:  
𝑖 > 𝑖
∗ = [(1 − 𝑞𝑘)𝑟𝑘 − (1 − 𝑠𝑘)𝑟𝑑]ℎ𝑖 + (1 − 𝑞𝑘)𝛼𝑘 − (1 − 𝑠𝑘)𝛼𝑑 + 𝜋𝑘 − 𝑞𝑘𝐿𝑘 + 𝑠𝑘𝐿𝑀
+ 𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑘 
Migrants are then positive selected if (1 − 𝑞𝑘)𝑟𝑘 < (1 − 𝑠𝑘)𝑟𝑑.  
From these results it follows that self-selection depends also on the risks of staying and of 
migrating, not only on returns of human capital. This implies that for a relatively safe country 
the prediction we can make about selection are still in line with the Borjas model; however if 
the country of origin suffer a sufficiently severe conflict, (whenever  𝑞𝑘 > 1−
(1−𝑠𝑘)𝑟𝑑
𝑟𝑘
  ) the 
self-selection is reversed.  
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To test their model the authors use data of the Flow Monitoring Survey (FMS) obtained from 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The survey aims at providing a sample 
representative of migrants coming to Europe through the Central and Eastern Mediterranean 
route between 2015 and 2016. Then the model tests also for a sample of migrants arrived in 
Turkey between 2016 and 2018. These data are combined with 2009-2014 Gallup World Polls 
to acquire more information on migrants’ countries of origin and its population. It is particular 
precious for comparison between migrating and non-migrating individuals of the same country 
of origin. Finally Aksoy and Poutvaara (2019) use the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) 
battle-related deaths dataset in order to classify countries by their conflict intensity. In 
particular, following the definition provided by UCDP, they divide the countries of origin in 
the dataset in  three main categories: countries at major conflict, at minor and no conflict. Major 
conflict identifies any country that witnessed 1000 or more battle-related deaths in any of the 
years 2009-2014. Minor conflict instead is for all the countries with a number of battle-related 
death in the range of 25 and 999. The no conflict category is instead quite self-explanatory.  
Looking at the descriptive statistics it is already clear that Aksoy and Poutvaara’s intuition is in 
line with the empirical data: a part from few countries (Nigeria, Bangladesh and Senegal), 
migrants are better educated than the source population and 77% of the sample is composed by 
migrants fleeing due to conflict or persecution.  
More specifically the authors find that “both male and female refugees from countries suffering 
from major conflict are positively self-selected with respect to secondary and tertiary 
education” (Aksoy and Poutvaara, 2019, p.4).  
For what concerns instead irregular migrants, female are also positively self-selected while 
male do not differ much from non-migrants in terms of their education. 
This strong positive self-selection is present also if we investigate the predicted earnings of 
refugees and irregular migrants and for all the country groups (major, minor and no conflict), 
suggesting that liquidity/poverty constraints remain important also among refugees.  
In order to find causal relations, a series of multivariate regression models is estimated. Results 
are significant and in line with the theory: refugees who escaped conflict or persecution are 
more likely to have secondary and tertiary level education compared not only to the source 
population, but also to those who cite other reasons for leaving their countries. Estimations with 
predicted individual pre-migration income also point towards the same direction: the effect of 




Interestingly Aksoy and Poutvaara (2019) investigating the sorting of refugees and irregular 
migrants find that they do not substantially differ from other migrants: they respond to 
incentives like social welfare or structure of wages, etc. 
Before Aksoy and Poutvaara (2019), Chin and Cortez (2015) analysed selectivity across 
migrant classes. They wanted to understand if the quantity and quality of refugees might differ 
from that of other types of migrants. However, they were not able to reach a unique solution, 
neither from a theoretical point of view, nor empirically.   
As usual in the literature, they build a model in which a maximizing individual decides to 
migrate if the benefits are higher than the costs. Such decision does not depend only on the 
expected incomes in the different countries, also other considerations play a major role. For 
example: the cultural differences or similarities between two countries, the level of freedom 
and the risks of persecution associated with living in a given country, or again the extension of 
the social network on which someone can rely. Chin and Cortes (2015) defines these factors as 
the amenities of living in a given country (𝐴𝑖0 amenities for individual i of residing in country 
0 and 𝐴𝑖1 of living in country 1).  
An individual decides to move if the difference between the utility of leaving (𝑉𝑖1) and the one 
of staying (𝑉𝑖0) is greater than zero. The different utilities are defined as:  
𝑉𝑖1 ≡ 𝛽1𝐴𝑖1 + 𝛽2(𝑤𝑖1 − 𝐶𝑖01) 
𝑉𝑖0 ≡ 𝛽1𝐴𝑖0 + 𝛽2𝑤𝑖0 
The authors analyse each variable, focusing on what value should be expected when considering 
refugees with respect to other migrant categories.  
Ai0 as said represents the (dis)amenities to live in the home country (0). Since the key defining 
feature of refugees is exactly that they are unsafe living in their home country, we can expect 
Ai0 to be smaller for them with respect to other migrants. It could also be negative, since staying 
in the home country exposes individuals to higher risks. This tells us that the quantity of 
migrants coming from countries where a refugee-producing event suddenly happens, is higher, 
but still does not add anything to the investigation on selectivity. According to the model of 
migration choice, individuals consider also their wage gain. If we imagine that individuals are 
identical except in their wage gain from migrating (𝑔), it is possible to find a threshold ?̅? that 
discriminates the case when everyone migrates from the one where everyone stays. A reduction 
of Ai0 would bring some people with 𝑔 < ?̅? across the threshold to migrate. Consequently, the 
wage gain threshold for refugees is lower or even negative, meaning that refugees are less 
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selected along dimensions associated with economic gain in the destination country, because 
economic gain is less of a factor in their decision.   
Wi0 is the wage individuals earn in country 0. Non-refugee migrants should be more sensible 
to wages. However, low wages can be the result of a refugee-producing event. If this is the case, 
a low Wi0 determines a flow of refugee-migrants, who are now the more likely to migrate. The 
effect on selectivity can be various: if the refugee –producing event reduces Wi0 broadly across 
the population, the marginal migrants are less selected than in a situation of no refugee-
producing event. If the reduction of wages happens only for a subgroup of the population (e.g., 
political dissenters or a persecuted minority), it’s only the migration rate of this subgroup that 
increases, and the effect on selectivity depends on the characteristics of this group.  
Ai1 and Wi1 represent instead the so called pull factors which are expected to play a crucial role 
for non-refugees. It is straightforward to assume that, for example, individuals who migrate to 
reunite with their families, might have only one desired destination, with and Ai1 very high for 
that destination country; or that economic migrants are likely to choose destinations with higher 
Wi1. 
Refugees instead are limited by push factor: the latter can make their utility higher even in 
countries with low or negative wages differentials. Once again, this tell us that refugees have 
higher chances to migrate, since they have more destination countries where it is convenient to 
move. As a matter of fact, most refugees live in neighbouring developing countries which are 
instead undesirable to economic migrants who may decide not to migrate at all.  
Finally, the variable 𝐶𝑖01 captures the costs of migrating. The physical costs can be thought to 
be equal across individuals. Other costs may differ, the authors, for example, consider as in 
Borjas (1987) time cost of migrating (i.e., the opportunity cost of the migration process) which 
are higher for people with higher Wi0. Another factor could be the presence of credit constraints, 
which suggests positive selection also for, or even especially for, refugees. The idea behind it 
is that a conflict or a persecution can aggravate the financial situation of individuals. In 
particular, it can happen that people lose their properties and also their connections once useful 
to borrow money. The consequence is that only the richest can still afford to migrate. In this 
sense, refugees that enter developed countries should be highly selected on wealth, and so 
maybe on education. 
According to the authors, “the model has an ambiguous prediction for the quality of refugees 
relative to other types of migrants—the relative quality depends on a number of variables, 
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including the nature of the refugee-producing event and the nature of selection in “regular” 
migration flows from country 0 to country 1” (Chin and Cortes 2015, p.600).  
As we can see this prediction is quite different from the one of Aksoy and Poutvaara (2019) 
and the reason is that in Aksoy and Poutvaara (2019) the self-selection depends on the risks of 
conflict or persecution faced in the country of origin. A higher risk could actually produce 
stronger selection in migrants. This because the individual face an expected utility and with a 
certain probability not only he/she will lose the possibility of gaining wages, but he/she will 
also suffer a major loss. On the contrary, in Chin and Cortes (2015) persecution is simply a 
disamenity, which does not affect wages in the home country.  
Empirically the authors try to find an answer through the use of the New Immigrant Survey-
2003 (NIS), which provides a nationally representative sample of individuals (8573) gaining 
legal permanent residence in the U.S. in 2003.  
Looking at the descriptive statistics, they find out that refugees fall in the middle of the 
distribution of educational attainment among US immigrants. They are usually more educated 
than family migrants, but less than the economic ones. The same result can be appreciated when 
looking at the individual’s sector of employment prior to the migration: refugees are not the 
class of migrant that brings more low-skilled individuals in the US.  
 
As common in the literature, Chin and Cortez (2015) provide a deeper investigation of their 
early results. They want to understand if the selection of migrants operate within a given source 
country or if the different characteristics that can be observed across migrants’ categories 
actually depend on the fact that these migrants come from different countries of origin, with 
different characteristics and scenarios. If for example countries of conflicts tend to be the less 
developed, an increase in the quantity of their migrants—with no change in quality—can end 
up with the average refugee being less educated.  
The authors check differences in mean after controlling for country of origin fixed effects, 
finding similar results. So, it appears that the variation is due to within-country selection, with 
refugees being selected from the population in a different way than “regular” migration; a key 
factor in this process could be the nature of the refugee-producing event or the wage structure. 
However, at the same time all the coefficients of the variables connected with schooling 
decrease, suggesting that migrants from countries that send more refugees to the U.S. have 




In a later work Dustmann, Fasani, Frattini, Minale, and Schonberg (2016) also stress that the 
differences in migrants’ human capital cannot be fully explained by within-country selectivity: 
cross-country variability plays a role too. In their study, using the data from the 2008 wave of 
the EU Labour Force Survey, they find that refugees in Europe are on average less educated 
than natives and economic immigrants from EU15; however, considering non-European 
immigrants, refugees are actually better educated than economic migrants.  
The problem with these results is that they are very sensitive to the considered dataset: with 
different cohorts or different destination countries, results could vary. For example, Chin and 
Cortes (2015), test also another dataset for their analysis finding quite opposite results. They 
use pooled individual-level data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 U.S. Census of Population and 
Housing and the 2005-2010 American Community Survey (ACS). Specifically, they analyse a 
fixed cohort of immigrants who entered the United States in the years 1975 through 1980. In 
this case, looking at the descriptive statistics, economic immigrants seem to be more 
concentrated in the lower levels of education distribution. The results are confirmed also when 
using regression analysis.  
To find another way to assess the selectivity of refugees with respect to economic migrants, 
Chin and Cortez (2015) consider looking at the investment in human capital after migration. If 
it is true that refugees have a lower endowment of human capital, then to integrate in the 
destination country they need larger investments than economic migrants. However, the 
investment decisions are influenced also by many other factors, first of all the individual time 
horizon in the host country, which is usually quite different among refugees and economic 
migrants. Moreover, it is also to be considered that refugees, due to the experiences they live, 
tend to witness more human capital disruption, which in turn could bring to lower investments.    
Refugees migration has always been a great concern for all developed countries. Since the 
Geneva Convention in 1951, some form of protection for people persecuted in their home 
country has been granted. However, the increase in economic migration has determined a 
screening problem for the host states, unable to detect the “true refugees” from economic 
migrants who mimic them hoping to get better conditions and a more generous treatment. 
Consequently, rich countries have started shading on the performance of their obligations 
increasing the standards of proof for refugee status, in turn harming persecuted people or 
individuals escaping from conflicts (Bubb, Kremer, Levin, 2011). An incentive compatible 
mechanism design is needed to solve the problem: it should become unattractive for economic 
migrants to claim refugee status, while granting the latter full protection.  
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Bubb, Kremer and Levin (2011) look for possible separating mechanisms like tax systems 
leaving refugees with an after-tax income roughly equal to the one they had before migrating, 
or transfer systems that allocate refugees knocking on the doors of wealthier countries to 
developing ones, in exchange for money. Some of these mechanisms could actually solve the 
problem of screening, but will impose negative externalities on developing countries, or will 
involve solutions “morally objectionable”.  
Despite the possibility of finding a solution to the debated question of migrant selectivity, it 
should be asked also if selectivity matters in in the process of integration. The reason behind 
selecting migrants is that more educated individuals fits better into the host society (e.g., 
integrate faster) and, given the fact that they have higher probabilities of finding employment 
and earnings, that they contribute more positively on the fiscal balance of welfare states. 
A paper by Adeymir (2011) challenge this reasoning: it finds that positive selection does not 
automatically translate into greater success in the labour market.  
The first aim of his work is to understand if skill-based selection mechanisms (which are 
common in countries like Canada, Australia, New Zeland) succeed in their purpose of admitting 
immigrants more able to adapt to the host country labour market. Of course, he is able to control 
only for the observed proxies of ability (mainly the education level); nothing can be said about 
self-selection along the unobserved characteristics of individuals.   
Using the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC) Aydemir (2011) finds that the 
Canadian point system mechanism of selection of immigrants actually generates a much higher 
skilled immigrant flow than those admitted through family preferences. This happens not only 
because the point system mechanism changes the skill distribution of migrants towards the 
higher skilled. There is also an indirect effect due to assortative matching: the more educated 
migrants selected through the point system are more likely to have more educated partners who 
later on could be admitted as family migrants.  
It is important to stress that this outcome is generated because the point mechanism changes the 
selection mechanism inside a given country of origin. It is not the case that enforcing a point 
mechanism system change the nationalities mix of migrants who usually applied for entering 
in that country. It does seem to confirm Belot and Hatton (2008) and Chin and Cortes (2015)’s 
findings about within-country selection.  
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At the same time, Aydemir (2011) stresses that there are also other factors that can affect 
migrant selectivity. For example, economic opportunities in destinations countries have a major 
role in attracting high skilled immigrants, in addition to designed immigration policies.  
However, a question still remains unsolved: does this positive selection translate into better 
labour market outcomes? Considering as indicator of success the conditions of being employed 
in the short run and being rewarded with higher wages, Aydemir (2011) finds that high skilled 
migrants do not differ statistically from family migrants and do not show better integration 
paths. Several reasons may explain this result.  
First, it is always necessary to keep in mind that selection mechanisms can operate only on 
observable characteristics of individuals.  
Second, family migrants may be less educated than selected high skilled immigrants, but they 
can count on a richer amount of resources, thanks to their social networks. Not only they can 
arrive at the destination country with better information and benefit of country-specific human 
capital that is already invested by network fellows, but they can also rely on a stronger net for 
all what concern finding an employment in a short time.  
Finally a crucial factor to which pay attention is the transferability of skills across countries. 
Many of the abilities (education, work experience) acquired in the origin country have no return 
in the host country, making it difficult for high skilled migrants to find a job in line with their 
qualifications and forcing them to invest in host country human capital, delaying the entrance 
in the job market.  
Aydemir (2011), neglecting for a moment selectivity, stress a problematic we have already 
discussed in the previous chapter. Governments have to pay attention also to the foreign 
recognition of education, qualifications and skills because mismatches between demand and 
supply of specific skills in the labour market are present even when migrants are highly 
educated. Being able to attract the ‘right’ persons, but failing to value them, it is a waist of effort 
and resources, for migrants but also for citizens.  
Before Adeymir (2011), Cobb-Clark (2004) studied the same phenomenon in Australia. She 
also spots that selective immigration mechanisms are able to attract more skilled individual 
from an educational, linguistic and professional point of view.  
Differently from Aydemir (2011), she finds that the cohort of high skilled migrants, entering in 
Australia after 1999, perform better in the host country labour market3 with respect to previous 
                                                             
3 The variable chosen as mean of comparison are the participation rate, the level of unemployment and the 
employment to population ratio 
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cohorts (when point mechanism was not in place). This is true both in the first survey collected 
six months after entrance, and in a second survey collected eighteen months after the first. It 
then seems that these better performances resist also in the medium run.  
However, it is important to understand the causal factors behind these performances. Is it the 
selection mechanism policy that attract only high skilled migrants who consequently do better 
in the labour market, or are the labour market conditions of the Australian economy that 
determine this difference among cohorts? What is the role of income support policy in these 
results?  
Cobb-Clark (2004) reflects on the fact that even if the greater weight in the differences among 
cohorts is given by differences in the demographic and productivity-related characteristics, still 
the labour market conditions and the income-support policy of a country can play a big role in 
determining the success of high skilled-migrants. Income-support policy change the 
individuals’ incentive to look for a job, while the labour market conditions are responsible for 
affecting the ability to find jobs. As Aydemir (2011), she suggests that screening alone is not 

















CHAPTER THREE: MIGRATION POLICY AS AN INCENTIVE MECHANISM 
 
3.1. The Problem 
 
In the first chapter of this work, we have looked at a general overview of the main integration 
measures implemented in developed countries. Despite the fact that migration policy and its 
management are chaotic, a result on which the literature appears to agree is that tailored 
approaches are a key to efficiency. It seems common sense to avoid the use of equal resources 
for individual with different needs and who can contribute differently, according to their level 
of ability and competences. Governments could save important resources if each migrant was 
allowed and willingness to use fully his/her productivity and put the maximum possible effort 
in the process of integration.  
However, as we have learnt in the second chapter of the literature review, detect migrants’ 
abilities is difficult. More importantly, many empirical works have shown how exploiting 
migrants’ categories to infer on their level of productivity gives no clear results, challenging 
the role of different permits and pathways of integration for the different migrant categories 
(refugees, economic migrants, family reunification). The way to detect migrants’ abilities and 
provide resources consequently should be different.  
What we will try to do in this chapter, is to design a mechanism that reveals migrants’ abilities, 
when hidden, and that organizes government’s resources efficiently. Migration policy will be 
structured as an incentive mechanism.  
The integration problem, designed as we will, can be seen as a public economics’ issues, since 
the interest is to understand how the government should allocate resources to migrants, 
managing the trade-off between efficiency and equity.  
Not integrating migrants, not regulating this activity, leads to a socially inefficient outcome. 
For this reason, the government has to intervene destining some public funds to immigrants. At 
this point, the government’s aim when designing policy is to find “an efficient means of revenue 
collection” (Myles, 1995, p.5). “Having determined that the organization of economic activity 
must generate a revenue requirement, one aspect of the role of public economics is to determine 
how this revenue can be collected at the least cost to the economy” (Myles, 1995, p.5).  
The problem we are modelling is then a problem of finding and optimizing the level of public 
policy instruments. In doing so, the government has also to consider the distribution of 
resources in the economy, since it could be desirable to act on the equity’s dimension. 
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It is important to note that, as in taxation problems, the government’s objective is to maximize 
the social welfare. However, differently from other branches of application of public economic 
problems, in this model there are actors (the migrants) who are not part of the society. Managing 
their integration is an issue for optimizing social welfare, but migrants’ wellness is never in the 
government’s aim. Migrants’ utility functions do not add to the citizens’ ones; they do not 
contribute in any way to the social welfare function. That is the reason why they do not appear 
in the government’s objective, at most they are used as constraints to the problem.  
Finally, it is important to remark that the integration problem is analysed as a problem of 
managing a given number of migrants, already settled in a country. The problem begins when 
migrants are already in that country. The rate of their arrival and all the policies designed to 
contrast immigration are exogenous variables to this model.   
3.2. The Model  
 
We imagine that a given country receive an amount N of migrants, in a given unit of time.  
These migrants differ for their abilities (productivity level) 𝜃. For simplicity, we assume there 
are only two levels of productivity: high and low, indicated respectively as 𝜃𝐻 and 𝜃𝐿 . From 
now on the subscript H will always refer to high skilled migrants and the subscript L to the low-
skilled ones. The proportion of migrants belonging to the type H is common knowledge and it 
is equal to 𝛿. The remaining fraction (1 − 𝛿) is composed of low productivity individuals. 
As mentioned, the rate of migrants’ arrival is considered exogenous to the model, so as the 
policy to contrast immigration. The government has then ‘simply’ to deal with these 𝑁 
migrants, trying to maximize their probability of integration. As seen in the first chapter, there 
can be more than one reason for which governments want or should integrate migrants. 
However, we will not discuss them in this simple model. We assume governments invest in 
integration because not doing so comes at a cost (𝑘). 𝐾 can be thought as the quantification of 
the social disutility connected with a failed integration. It comprises the costs of segregation, 
higher risk of criminality, disqualification of the urban fabric, etc.  
Although investing in the integration of high skills individuals is more rewarding, given their 
higher productivity, the government wants to maximize the probability of integration of both 
types of migrants. The reason is that the cost (𝑘) associated with migrants who are not 




As seen in the literature review, the concept of integration is quite complex and involve more 
than one field. However, it seems that without a proper and quick entry in the labour market, 
migrants fail to integrate also in the society. Consequently, for simplicity, we model the 
probability of integration as the probability of entering the labour market. The latter is a function 
of two variables: the migrant’s effort in integrating (𝑒) and an initial input of resources provided 
by the government (𝑞). Unfortunately, the individual’s effort is not directly observable. What 
can be observed, is the number of hours (𝑡) that an individual dedicate to integration activities 
(language courses, skills assessments, bridging programs, etc.).  
The probability depends also on the type 𝜃, is labelled as 𝜋(𝑡, 𝑞, 𝜃), and quite obviously its 
domain is between zero and one: 0 < 𝜋(𝑡, 𝑞) < 1. Specifically, when 𝑡 or 𝑞 tend to zero, 𝜋 
tends to zero; if 𝑡 or 𝑞 goes to infinity, 𝜋 tends to one.  





Where x can be thought as a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function. It is 
function of two inputs, the observable effort and government’s resources:   
𝑥 = (𝑡𝜌 + 𝑞𝜌)
1
𝜌⁄  
The parameter 𝜌, that belongs to the interval 𝜌 ∈ [−∞;1], indicates the degree of 
substitutability/complementarity of the two inputs.  
The marginal productivity of the individual’s effort and of the government’s resources is 
increasing, but at a decreasing rate. Both the first partial derivatives are positive and both the 
second negative:  
o 𝜋𝑡 > 0;  
o 𝜋𝑡𝑡 < 0;  
o 𝜋𝑞 > 0;  
o 𝜋𝑞𝑞 < 0.  
The sign of the mixed second derivatives depend on the coefficient 𝜌:  
o When 𝜌 < 0  and 𝜌 = 1 => 𝜋𝑡𝑞  𝑒 𝜋𝑞𝑡 < 0;  
o When 0 <  𝜌 < 1/3 => 𝜋𝑡𝑞  𝑒 𝜋𝑞𝑡 > 0.  
 
Both for the government and for the migrants, increasing the probability of integration is far 
from being a free process.  
Government’s resources are collected at a cost. In particular, we define as 𝜆 the marginal cost 
of public funds, which is a positive number. If migrants’ effort and public resources are 
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substitutable (even to a minimum degree), is in the government’s interest that migrants put the 
highest possible effort. This would allow it to cut down the public spending and to have 
integration at the lowest possible cost for native citizens. The fact that the effort is not 
observable could rise a problem of moral hazard. As a matter of fact, although it is also in the 
migrant’s interest to integrate (once entered the labour market the migrant receives an 
exogenous amount of labour income 𝑊), to make an effort is costly for the individual. It is then 
in the migrant’s interest to put the lowest possible level of effort and to exploit government’s 
resources to increase the probability of getting a job.  
 
To complicate further the analysis, we assume that the effort’s cost is not equal among 
individuals. High skilled migrants struggle less when working, and so the disutility that comes 
from making an effort is lower with respect to the one of low skilled individuals. This fact, in 
a scenario in which the type 𝜃 is not observable by the government, rises also a problem of 
adverse selection.  
 
Migrant’s utility is indicated as ?̅? for the high skilled and 𝑈 for the low skilled. Utility depends 
positively on consumption and negatively on the amount of hours dedicated to integration (the 
individual’s effort).  
 
Before defining the utility functions, it is necessary to spend few words on the consumption 
variable. Consumption, that quite surprisingly and innovatively we name 𝐴, is not a certain 
good. As a matter of fact, in a given period of time, two states of the world are possible. The 
best scenarios (𝐵) happens with probability 𝜋, when migrants succeed in integration. With the 
remaining probability (1 − 𝜋) instead, the state of the world with a failed integration, that we 
indicate with 𝑀, comes true.  
In 𝐵, migrants’ consumption is given by the exogenous labour income 𝑊, plus a government 
transfer 𝐶. While in 𝑀, migrants do not integrate, and cannot enjoy the income 𝑊. With 
probability (1 − 𝜋) , 𝐴 is then simply equal to the government’s transfer 𝐶.  
The government’s transfer 𝐶 can be thought as a subsidy given on daily basis to migrants in 
order to provide to their basic needs. As 𝑞, every unit of 𝐶 costs to the governments (1 + 𝜆).  
While we assume that 𝑊 is exogenous and constant for all the individuals, C is a control 
variable for the governments and could be differentiated by types. From now on, we will then 
use the label 𝐶𝐻  to refer to the transfer for high productive migrants, and 𝐶𝐿 to refer to the low 
productivity’s one.  
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To briefly summarize with equations:  
 
𝐴𝐻 = 𝜋𝐻𝐴𝐻
𝐵 + (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝐴𝐻
𝑀 = 𝜋𝐻(𝐶𝐻 +𝑊) + (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝐶𝐻 
 
𝐴𝐿 = 𝜋𝐿𝐴𝐿
𝐵 + (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝐴𝐿
𝑀 = 𝜋𝐿(𝐶𝐿 +𝑊) + (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝐶𝐿 
 
Given that there are two state of the worlds for the individual, also utility is an expected value. 
In particular, with probability 𝜋 the migrant enjoy utility 𝑈𝐵; with probability (1 − 𝜋) (s)he 
does not integrate successfully and consequently his/her utility is equal to 𝑈𝑀. Remember that 
utility differs according to types which in this case are indicated by the upper or lower bar 
(?̅? and 𝑈):   
?̅? = 𝜋𝐻𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ + (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅  
 
𝑈 = 𝜋𝐿𝑈
𝐵 + (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
𝑀  
 
Utility in the best state of the world (𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅  and 𝑈𝐵 ) depends positively on the level of 
consumption 𝐴 which comprehends 𝐶 and W, and negatively on the amount of hours dedicated 
to integration activities, 𝑡: 𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ (𝐶𝐻 , 𝑡𝐻 , 𝜃𝐻 , 𝑊) and 𝑈
𝐵(𝐶𝐿, 𝑡𝐿 , 𝜃𝐿 , 𝑊).  
Utility in the bad state of the world (𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅  and 𝑈𝑀) depends in the same way from 𝐴 and 𝑡; 
however 𝐴 simply consists of 𝐶: 𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ (𝐶𝐻 , 𝑡𝐻 , 𝜃𝐻) and 𝑈
𝑀(𝐶𝐿, 𝑡𝐿 , 𝜃𝐿).  
As conventionally, we assume utility is concave in consumption (transfer):  
o 𝑈𝑐
𝐵/𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
> 0 𝑒 𝑈𝑐𝑐




> 0 𝑒 𝑈𝑐𝑐
𝐵/𝑀
< 0. 
Individual’s effort instead is a cost and procure disutility to the individual:  
o 𝑈𝑡
𝐵/𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
< 0 𝑒 𝑈𝑡𝑡
𝐵/𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
< 0;  
o 𝑈𝑡
𝐵/𝑀
< 0 𝑒 𝑈𝑡𝑡
𝐵/𝑀
< 0. 
Since utility is positive in 𝐶 and negative in 𝑡, we can draw the indifferent curves of the 




Figure 3.1: Migrant’s indifference curve between transfer and hours of activities 
As expressed in the figure, utility increases as we move up to the left.  
3.3. The Setting  
 
As mentioned, government’s interest is to allocate resources (𝑞 and 𝐶) efficiently to H and L, 
and to make them work such that to maximize their integration’s probability. The government 
is a risk neutral actor, while migrants are risk averse individuals.  
 
We delineate two different situations.  
At first, the problem is set assuming there is symmetry of information between the economic 
agents: the government observe the individuals’ type 𝜃 and can provide 𝑞 and 𝐶 consequently, 
exploiting the maximum possible effort from each category. As we will see, when the adverse 
selection problem is absent, also moral hazard is impossible. The government knows exactly 
the amount of hours that a productive and less productive individual can dedicate to integration 
(𝑡 is informative). Once it is able to identify each individual as belonging to a certain type, it 
can force them to put 𝑡𝐻  and 𝑡𝐿, through the control of 𝑞 and 𝐶.  
 
Successively, we will assume that the government is unable to observe migrants’ type. This 
asymmetry of information could allow the high type individuals to mimic the low type, putting 
a level of effort lower than optimal (the one of symmetric information). To avoid bunching at 
the bottom, the government has built an incentive mechanism such that it will never be in the 
high type’s interest to behave as a low skilled. Manipulating the migrant’s choices through the 
use of the policy variable 𝑞 and 𝐶, the government can arrive to a situation of equilibrium better 




The timing of the problem is as follow: nature decides the amount of migrants arriving to a 
country, if a migrant is H or L and the proportion of 𝛿. The government, which is the uniformed 
party, moves first, offering migrants one or more contracts. Migrants choose the contract they 
prefer and the integration process begins. At the end, an outcome realizes and the migrant is 
either in the good or in the bad state of the world.  
 
The contract offered by the government is a combination of 𝐶 and 𝑡. The level of 𝐶 and 𝑡 could 
vary by type. However, as said, the uninformed party does not know the type of individual is 
dealing with. The government plays as in a Stackelberg model: the individual knows that the 
government is committed to the contracts offered and (s)he will choose consequently; the 
government has to anticipate the individual’s behaviour and design contracts accordingly.  
 
The sorting condition for the two groups resides in the marginal rate of substitution between 
𝐶 and 𝑡. As mentioned, for less productive individuals is more costly to make an effort. The 
behaviour of high and low skilled, then, will be different at the margin. Even if the individuals 
are forced to consume the same and to make an effort for the same amount of hours, the 
marginal rate of substitution in that point, for the two groups, is different. The amount of hours 
they are disposed to work more, in order to have more units of the transfer, is different. This 
means that their preferences are different, that the slope of the indifference curves of the 
individuals are not equal in every point, and that the government can exploit this diverse 
behaviour to screen and detect the true ability of individuals.  
 
What we have just described, is asking for the Spence-Mirrlees or single crossing property 
condition. As the name suggests, the property assure that the indifference curves of different 
types of individuals cross only once. The Spence-Mirrlees property is guaranteed by agent 
monotonicity: the marginal rate of substitution between the transfer 𝐶 and the amount of hours 
𝑡 is a decreasing function of the productivity type 𝜃 (Myles, 1995). This states that the slope of 
the indifference curve for high productive individuals is flatter than the one of the low skilled, 






Figure 3.2: Slope of the indifference curves for individuals H and L 
 
We can easily state this property through equations.  








(𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻




















(𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻





























(𝑈𝐵 − 𝑈𝑀) + 𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑈𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐿











(𝑈𝐵 − 𝑈𝑀) + 𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑈𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐿
















(𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻












(𝑈𝐵 −𝑈𝑀) + 𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑈𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐿















(𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻












(𝑈𝐵 − 𝑈𝑀) + 𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑈𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐿











Thanks to this condition, the government can design a menu of contracts that is incentive 
compatible and induce migrants to truthfully reveal their characteristics. The idea is to exploit 
optimally the available information, which regards individual’ preferences and behaviours.  
 
3.4. Symmetric Information  
 
First of all, we write the government’s objective function as:   
 
𝐹(𝑞𝐻, 𝑞𝐿, 𝑡𝐻 , 𝑡𝐿 , 𝐶𝐻 , 𝐶𝐿)
= 𝛿𝜋𝐻 + (1 − 𝛿)𝜋𝐿 − 𝛿𝑘(1 − 𝜋𝐻) − (1 − 𝛿)𝑘(1 − 𝜋𝐿) − (1 + 𝜆)(𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿
+ 𝐶𝐻 + 𝐶𝐿) 
 
In this function, we can see the probabilities of integration that the government wants to 
maximize and also the cost related to failed integration and the cost of public funds. We have 
already inserted the government’s budget constraint in this objective function.  




In symmetric information, the government observe 𝜃 and can assign migrants to different 
integration paths without difficulties. It can use lump-sum transfers and exploit the maximum 
possible effort of the individuals, so that the amount of resources it has to provide to increase 
the probability of integration is minimum. However, even if not citizens of the host country, 
migrants are human beings. The government cannot operate avoiding completely any attention 
at migrants’ wellness and utility.  
For this reason the maximization of 𝐹, even in this context of symmetry, is not free.  
We add two constraints to the problem. We ask the utility of type H and L individuals to be at 
least equal, if not greater, than a given amount 𝑈∗. 𝑈∗ is a parameter in the model and represents 
the minimum level of utility a human being can experience to be called as such.  
 
Given these premises, we can write the problem as follow:  
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑞ℎ,𝑞𝑙,𝑡ℎ ,𝑡𝑙,𝐶𝐻 ,𝐶𝐿    𝛿𝜋𝐻 + (1 − 𝛿)𝜋𝐿 − 𝛿𝑘(1 − 𝜋𝐻) − (1 − 𝛿)𝑘(1 − 𝜋𝐿) − (1 + 𝜆)(𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿
+ 𝐶𝐻 + 𝐶𝐿) 
𝑆. 𝑡.        𝜋𝐻𝑈
𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ + (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈
𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ≥ 𝑈∗  
                                𝜋𝐿𝑈
𝐵 + (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
𝑀 ≥ 𝑈∗ 
 
We can solve it thorough Lagrange’s method. Rewriting the constraints as: 
 −𝜋𝐻𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑈
∗ ≤ 0  
−𝜋𝐿𝑈
𝐵 − (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
𝑀+𝑈∗ ≤ 0  
We obtain the Lagrangian:  
𝐿(𝑞ℎ , 𝑞𝐿 , 𝑡𝐻 , 𝑡𝐿,𝐶𝐻 , 𝐶𝐿 , 𝜇, 𝛽)
=  𝛿𝜋𝐻 + (1 − 𝛿)𝜋𝐿 − 𝛿𝑘(1 − 𝜋𝐻) − (1 − 𝛿)𝑘(1 − 𝜋𝐿)
− (1 + 𝜆)(𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿 + 𝐶𝐻 + 𝐶𝐿) − 𝜇[−𝜋𝐻𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑈
∗]
− 𝛽[−𝜋𝐿𝑈
𝐵 − (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
𝑀+𝑈∗] 
 
As mentioned above, it is clear to see that the government’s aim is not to maximize migrants’ 
utilities. These functions appear only in the constraints.  
We can derive the first order conditions (FOC) of the Lagrangian function and interpret the 
results obtained. At first, we do not consider the input 𝑞 in the problem and concentrate on the 
variable 𝐶 and 𝑡.  
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+ 𝜇(1 − 𝜋𝐻)
𝜕𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻
= 0                                           (3.23)
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝐿
= (1 − 𝛿)
𝜕𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝐿












+ 𝛽(1 − 𝜋𝐿)
𝜕𝑈𝑀
𝜕𝑡𝐿
























= (1 + 𝜆)                                                                                                           (3.26)
𝜇[−𝜋𝐻𝑈
𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈
𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑈∗] = 0                                                                                                                                  (3.27)
𝛽[−𝜋𝐿𝑈
𝐵 − (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
𝑀+𝑈∗] = 0                                                                                                                                    (3.28)
𝜇 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                           (3.29)
𝛽 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                          (3.30)
 
























(𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝜇𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻
+ 𝜇(1 − 𝜋𝐻)
𝜕𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻
= 0                                                          (3.23)
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝐿






(𝑈𝐵 −𝑈𝑀) + 𝛽𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑈𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐿
+ 𝛽(1 − 𝜋𝐿)
𝜕𝑈𝑀
𝜕𝑡𝐿
























) = (1 + 𝜆)                                                                                                                 (3.26)
𝜇[−𝜋𝐻𝑈
𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈
𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑈∗] = 0                                                                                                                                    (3.27)
𝛽[−𝜋𝐿𝑈
𝐵 − (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
𝑀+𝑈∗] = 0                                                                                                                                      (3.28)
𝜇 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                            (3.29)
𝛽 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                            (3.30)
 
 
From the derivatives (3.23) and (3.24) is straightforward to notice that in the absence of the 
utility constraints, the government could exploit at maximum the individual’s effort and 
productivity. It could bring the marginal productivity of 𝑡 close to zero, and 𝑡 close to infinity, 
while offering the lowest possible amount of 𝑞.  
However, since migrants’ utility matter in some form, in this problem, the government is 
constrained to guarantee the minimum level of utility 𝑈∗, but nothing more: at the optimum 
both the constraints are binding. This means that the expected utility of migrants of type H and 
type L are equal.  
However, as we know ?̅? and 𝑈 differ in their relationship with 𝑡. High skill migrants, since 
more productive, have a lower cost of effort (𝑡) and, ceteris paribus, can spend more hours in 
integrating activities with respect to low skill individuals, maintaining the same level of utility.  
At the optimum then, 𝑡𝐻 > 𝑡𝐿 without the need for the government to compensate such different 
effort. Since there is complete information, it can easily provide two different contracts tailored 




From equations (3.23) and (3.24) and (3.25) and (3.26), we can also compute the MRS for both 
types of migrants.   

















































3.5. Asymmetric Information  
 
Now we imagine 𝜃 is private information. The government cannot offer the same transfer to 
individuals and ask for different level of effort. It is in fact in the interest and in the possibility 
of H to pretend to be less productive than what they really are and deviate from the equilibrium 
of symmetric information. The government has to offer two different contracts, one designed 
for the H type and one designed for the low skilled. However, to make sure  
H reveal truthfully their type and choose the contract was designed for them, the government 
needs to add another constraint to the problem. It must be that the utility of individual of type 
H when declaring the truth and accepting the contract designed for type H is at least equal, if 
not greater, than the utility of type H individual who pretend to be of the low type and accept 
the contract designed for type L. In order to achieve this result, the government has to exploit 
the sorting condition: the willingness to make an effort at the margin is different between H and 
L. The contract designed for L, must be unattractive to H.  
This new constraint can be written as:  
 




o 𝑈?̂?(𝐶𝐿, 𝑡𝐿, 𝜃𝐻 ,𝑊) is the utility of individual of type H who mimics type L and succeed 
in integrating; 
o 𝑈?̂?(𝐶𝐿, 𝑡𝐿, 𝜃𝐻) is the utility of individual of type H who mimics type L but do not 
integrate. 
The expected utility ?̂? has the same characteristics of ?̅? and 𝑈:  
o 𝑈𝑐
𝐵/?̂?





< 0 𝑒 𝑈𝑡𝑡
𝐵/?̂?
< 0. 
The Lagrangian can then now be rewritten as:  
𝐿(𝑞ℎ , 𝑞𝐿, 𝑡𝐻 , 𝑡𝐿,𝐶𝐻, 𝐶𝐿, 𝛾, 𝜇, 𝛽)
=  𝛿𝜋𝐻 + (1 − 𝛿)𝜋𝐿 − 𝛿𝑘(1 − 𝜋𝐻) − (1 − 𝛿)𝑘(1 − 𝜋𝐿)
− (1 + 𝜆)(𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿 + 𝐶𝐻 + 𝐶𝐿)
− 𝛾[−𝜋𝐻𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜋𝐿𝑈?̂? + (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈?̂?]
− 𝜇[−𝜋𝐻𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑈
∗] − 𝛽[−𝜋𝐿𝑈
𝐵 − (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
𝑀+𝑈∗] 


























(𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝛾𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻






(𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝜇𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻
+ (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝜇
𝜕𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻
= 0                    (3.33)
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝐿






(𝑈?̂? − 𝑈?̂?) − 𝛾𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑈?̂?
𝜕𝑡𝐿






(𝑈𝐵 − 𝑈𝑀) + 𝛽𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑈𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐿
+ 𝛽(1 − 𝜋𝐿)
𝜕𝑈𝑀
𝜕𝑡𝐿
= 0       (3.34)
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝐶𝐻
= (𝛾 + 𝜇) [𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝐶𝐻
+ (1 − 𝜋𝐻)
𝜕𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝐶𝐻












+ 𝛽(1 − 𝜋𝐿)
𝜕𝑈𝑀
𝜕𝐶𝐿
= 1+ 𝜆                                                                                                                       (3.36)
𝛾[−𝜋𝐻𝑈
𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈
𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜋𝐿𝑈
?̂? + (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
?̂?] = 0                                                                                                                                                             (3.37)
𝜇[−𝜋𝐻𝑈
𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈
𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑈∗] = 0                                                                                                                                                                                               (3.38)
𝛽[−𝜋𝐿𝑈
𝐵 − (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
𝑀+𝑈∗] = 0                                                                                                                                                                                                  (3.39)
𝛾 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       (3.40)
𝜇 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        (3.41)
𝛽 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       (3.42)
 
To understand if the government distorts individuals’ choices with respect to the situation in 
symmetry of information, we have to look at the MRS.  
The derivatives are more complex since the optimization happens under three constraints. By 
assumption, we know the incentive compatible constraint is binding, meaning that the 
lagrangian multiplier 𝛾 is different from zero.  
Also the 𝛽 multiplier is different from zero: note that in equation (3.34) if 𝛽 is equal to zero, 
we will have that: 






(𝑈?̂? −𝑈?̂?) + 𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑈?̂?
𝜕𝑡𝐿






Since the right hand side of the equation is the partial derivative of ?̂? with respect to 𝑡 (which 
is negative) and since 𝛾 and (1 − 𝛿 + 𝑘 − 𝛿𝑘) are positive, it would mean that 
𝜕𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝐿
 is negative. 
By definition, this is impossible.  
We are then left with two possible cases.  
Case 1: 𝛾, 𝛽, 𝜇 ≠ 0 
























(𝑈?̂? − 𝑈?̂?) + 𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑈?̂?
𝜕𝑡𝐿



















































Case 2: 𝛾, 𝛽 ≠ 0 and 𝜇 = 0 




























Looking at the low type, we can see that 𝜇 never enters in equations (3.34) and (3.36), leaving 
𝑀𝑅𝑆𝐿 unchanged.  
For both types of individual, then, the marginal rate of substitution in case one is equal to the 
one in case two. What is interesting is to compare these marginal rates of substitution of H and 
L with the ones in symmetric information, in order to understand if and how the solutions have 
changed.  
We can easily see that the marginal rate of substitution for high skilled individuals has not 
changed in asymmetry, meaning that individual’s choices are not distorted. What has changed 
is the 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝐿. As we expected in this kind of adverse selection problem, to avoid mimicking, the 
government is forced to distort the choices of the low type. The high type has no incentive 
whatsoever to pretend to be someone else.  
However, we are not able to determine the change in the size of the marginal rate of substitution. 
Remember that:  

















In the latter ratio than, the numerator is greater than in symmetry (since the marginal utility of 
the effort is negative), but greater is also the denominator, leaving us with an uncertain results.  
To have a more complete picture, we try now to reflect on the initial input of resources that can 
complement or substitute the individual’s hours of activities.  
3.6. Maximization with the input 𝒒 
 




































= 0                                                                                   (3.21)  
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑞𝐿
= (1 − 𝛿)
𝜕𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑞𝐿
+ (𝑘 − 𝛿𝑘)
𝜕𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑞𝐿






= 0                                                              (3.22)  
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𝜕𝑡𝐻






(𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝜇𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻
+ 𝜇(1 − 𝜋𝐻)
𝜕𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻
= 0                                                           (3.23)
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(𝑈𝐵 − 𝑈𝑀) + 𝛽𝜋𝐿
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𝜕𝑡𝐿
+ 𝛽(1 − 𝜋𝐿)
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) = (1 + 𝜆)                                                                                                                (3.26)
𝜇[−𝜋𝐻𝑈
𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈
𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑈∗] = 0                                                                                                                                     (3.27)
𝛽[−𝜋𝐿𝑈
𝐵 − (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
𝑀+𝑈∗] = 0                                                                                                                                        (3.28)
𝜇 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                              (3.29)
𝛽 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                              (3.30)
 




















(𝛿−𝛿𝑘+𝜇𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅̅−𝜇𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)
 
 
























= (𝛿 + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝛾𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝛾𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜇𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝜇𝑈𝑀)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝜕𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑞𝐻
= (1 + 𝜆)                                                                                                                                               (3.31)
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑞𝐿
= (1 − 𝛿 + 𝑘 − 𝛿𝑘 − 𝛾𝑈?̂? + 𝛾𝑈?̂? + 𝛽𝑈𝐵 − 𝛽𝑈𝑀)
𝜕𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑞𝐿
= (1 + 𝜆)                                                                                                                                (3.32)
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𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅
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(𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝜇𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻
+ (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝜇
𝜕𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻
= 0                    (3.33)
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(𝑈𝐵 − 𝑈𝑀) + 𝛽𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑈𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐿
+ 𝛽(1 − 𝜋𝐿)
𝜕𝑈𝑀
𝜕𝑡𝐿
= 0       (3.34)
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝐶𝐻
= (𝛾 + 𝜇) [𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝐶𝐻
+ (1 − 𝜋𝐻)
𝜕𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝐶𝐻












+ 𝛽(1 − 𝜋𝐿)
𝜕𝑈𝑀
𝜕𝐶𝐿
= 1+ 𝜆                                                                                                                       (3.36)
𝛾[−𝜋𝐻𝑈
𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈
𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜋𝐿𝑈
?̂? + (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
?̂?] = 0                                                                                                                                                             (3.37)
𝜇[−𝜋𝐻𝑈
𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈
𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑈∗] = 0                                                                                                                                                                                               (3.38)
𝛽[−𝜋𝐿𝑈
𝐵 − (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
𝑀+𝑈∗] = 0                                                                                                                                                                                                  (3.39)
𝛾 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       (3.40)
𝜇 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        (3.41)
𝛽 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       (3.42)
 













































(𝛿+𝛿𝑘+𝛾𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅̅−𝛾𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)
 
 
With respect to the situation in symmetry, we can note that:  
o The marginal productivity of 𝑞𝐿 is lower, since 𝑈?̂? and 𝑈?̂? are positive and 𝑈?̂? < 𝑈?̂?. 
This suggest that, if 𝑞 and 𝑡 are substitutable, the government in asymmetric information 
had to compensate with more resources to increase the probability of integration.  
o The marginal productivity of 𝑞𝐻 depends on the value of the multipliers 𝛾 and 𝜇. If 𝜇 is 
different from zero, then also 
𝜕𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑞𝐻
 is lower in asymmetry than in symmetric information. 
If instead, 𝜇 is equal to zero, the difference between the productivity depends on the 





















At the beginning of this work, we have tried to understand what integration is, why is in the 
policy agenda, and how OECD countries deal with it.  
From the general overview of measures described in chapter one, we have learnt what are the 
main problems and challenges that governments face worldwide. At the same time, we have 
seen some interesting solutions and good practises that are, or should be, applied. One, over 
which there seems to be consensus, is the idea of designing integration paths tailored to 
individuals’ needs and characteristics, so that to exploit their full potential, to allocate resources 
efficiently and to improve the coordination and collaboration between the different actors 
involved in the integration process.  
In the second chapter of this work, we tried to understand what the main characteristics of 
migrants coming to western countries were. In particular, the focus has been on migrants’ 
abilities and on how different push and pull factors could have a role in determining migrants’ 
self-selection along this dimension. Unfortunately, the literature both theoretically and 
empirically shows how precise, unique and definite criteria to understand migrants’ abilities are 
hard to find. Looking at the reasons why they left, or at the countries from which they fled, is 
not sufficient to infer on their skills and competences. Their productivities remain unobservable 
to governments, and a proper mechanism to reveal them should be applied.  
In the third and final chapter of this work, we tried to design such mechanism. We imagined 
that governments have to deal with two different types of migrants: the high skilled and the low 
skilled. Their objective is to maximize migrants’ probability of integration, since not including 
them generates costs for the society. However, the process of integration is costly both for the 
governments, who have to subsidize migrants and give them public resources, and for 
individuals, who have to put an effort in the activities for integration. Detecting the effort 
migrants need to put according to their productivity, and assuring they are collaborating at their 
maximum potential, is what governments have to do to spend efficiently public resources.  
We have described two possible situations. At first, there is symmetry of information between 
the economic actors and governments have no difficulties in designing tailored contracts 
(defined by the quantity of public transfers and individual efforts). Later on, migrants’ 
productivity becomes private information. Due to this asymmetry, governments need to distort 
individual choices at the optimum to make sure there is no mimicking between the two types. 
In order to do so and to build an incentive compatible revelation mechanism, they have to 
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exploits the available information they dispose of: the sorting condition is represented by 
individuals’ preferences towards the effort and the transfer they receive. Thanks to the different 
cost migrants perceive when making an effort, the government is able to construct an incentive 
compatible solution. At the optimum it is possible to observe that low skill migrants are the one 
whose choices are distorted with respect to the situation of symmetric information; high skilled 
instead at the margin maintain the same willingness to work, in order to receive a certain amount 
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Human migrations are an imperishable phenomenon: the reasons to migrate are, and will be in 
the future, numerous and variegated.  
Over the past two decades, migration has increased rapidly (Frattini, 2017) and in 2019, the 
number of international migrants reached 272 million of people, up from 153 million in 1990 
(UN DESA, 2019).  
Avoiding or completely preventing human flows is impossible and migrants’ integration and 
inclusion is a key police objective, even if challenging (OECD, 2020). From one side, the need 
of integrating migrants comes from states’ commitments in taking care of people migrating out 
of desperation (UNGA, 2017). From the other, policy intervention is necessary to avoid 
economic and social costs connected with a failed integration. Moreover, a proper social and 
economic inclusion of migrants could bring positive returns to the country that will host them.  
Despite these reasons, the long history of migrations, and the surge in migrant inflows in recent 
years, countries still struggle in managing the phenomenon. All over the world, movements of 
people are often considered as an emergency and legislation and policy lack a structured 
framework. From an overview of the main integration measures adopted in the countries 
involved by migration flows, emerges a scattered patchwork of actions undertaken at the local, 
national or international level, without proper planning, coordination and collaboration. 
Moreover, there is also a lack of data and information to evaluate the measures adopted and 
their casual effects on policy outcomes (Martin et al., 2016; OECD, 2019).  
 
These problematics appear even more urgent considering that governments worldwide, even if 
unaware of the effectiveness of their integration policy, are already destining public resources 
to integration. An inefficient use of resources is detrimental both for migrants and residents 
people and aggravates the already high level of public concern for the effects in the short and 
long run of migrations (OECD, 2020).  
In this work, we will try to address the problems that governments face in allocating resource 
to migrants. Our focus will be on the design of measures responding to specific migrants’ needs 
and according to individual characteristics. The literature on migration seems to agree that 
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tailored approaches can be the key to efficiency: governments could save important resources 
if migrants were helped in reaching their full potential.  
The main problem of individual’s characteristics-policy based, is that usually many of them are 
unobservable to the public planner. As the literature show, trying to detect migrants’ abilities 
based on their reasons to migrate or their geographical origin is not easy neither completely 
possible. Consequently, a problem of adverse selection arise that could be addressed through 
the creation of an incentive mechanism of revelation. In the final part of this work, we will try 
to design such mechanism in the context of migrants’ integration and to derive some 
conclusions.  
The following work is structured as follow: in the first chapter, we will present an overview of 
the main integration problems and measures experienced in western countries. The second 
chapter is dedicated to a literature review on migrants’ self-selection. In the third and last 
chapter, a tentative model of migration policy as an incentive mechanism is presented. Finally 
























CHAPTER ONE: INTEGRATION POLICY MEASURES  
 
1.1. Some Definitions  
 
Before understanding if, why, and how governments deal with migrants’ integration, it is 
important to have clear in mind who migrants are.  
According to the IOM, “migrant” is an umbrella term, which is not defined under international 
law and of which no universally accepted definition exists. As a generic term it reflects “the 
common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual 
residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or 
permanently, and for a variety of reasons” (IOM, 2019, p.132-133).  
For the purpose of our analysis, the focus is on international migrants: individuals willing or 
forced to leave their country of origin. More specifically, we will concentrate on international 
migrants headed to western, industrialized countries. We will often refer interchangeably to the 
latter as ‘destination’ or ‘host’ or ‘receiving’ countries, while the countries from which migrants 
are leaving are named as ‘source’ or ‘origin’ countries.  
 
The term ‘international migrant’ comprehends in itself a number of well-defined legal 
categories of people, or ‘types’ of migrants.  
The main three categories analysed in the literature and based on migrants’ reasons to leave are: 
humanitarian migrants, economic (or labour) migrants and family migrants.  
 
The first category refers to people who have successfully applied for asylum in a country and 
consequently have been granted some sort of protection. Refugee, for example, belong to this 
categories; but different form or status of protection exist. At the same time, the term 
“humanitarian migrants” includes also migrants resettled through humanitarian programmes 
with UNCHR or other private sponsorship (OECD, 2016).  
 
Economic migrants, instead, are “persons who leave their countries of origin purely for 
economic reasons not in any way related to the refugee definition, or in order to seek material 




Finally, with the term family migrants the literature refers to migrants admitted in a foreign 
country thanks to a family reunification process. Family reunification is “the right of non-
nationals to enter into and reside in a country where their family members reside lawfully or of 
which they have the nationality in order to preserve the family unit” (IOM, 2019, p.72). 
 
Clearly, in reality it is often difficult to understand the ultimate reason why a person decided to 
leave his/her own country and the categories defined above are not so tight and often they mixed 
up together. This leads to a series of problems both in everyday life when managing the 
integration processes, and in the literature when conducting an accurate theoretical or empirical 
analysis.  
1.2. Why integration? 
Despite the type, migration has been and, we can say with almost certainty, will be a 
phenomenon connatural of human activity. Migrant flows are hard to die. Over the past two 
decades migration has increased rapidly (Frattini, 2017), and according to OECD projections, 
flows from developing countries to the developed ones will increase, or at least remain constant, 
in the future. It is important to analyse migrants’ pull and push factors and to forecast possible 
global migration scenarios if not to stop flows, to be better prepared in dealing with them 
(OECD, 2009).  
 
Governments of western countries have alternated their effort between preventing migration 
and managing migrants’ integration because for what the first policies cannot reach, the second 
need to be addressed. Even if preventing and mitigating the forces that drive large movements 
of people is useful, governments have also to recognize their duty to assist those who migrate 
out of desperation (UNGA, 2017). 
 
Above all, migrants’ integration is a moral imperative: not all migrants are refugees, but all 
refugees are migrants. In 1951, 196 states entered the Geneva Convention, recognizing their 
duty to admit all the individuals that enter their borders “unable or unwilling to return to their 
country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion” (UNGA, 1951). In 
that occasion was also defined the principle of non-refoulement such that no country could 
expel or return a refugee against his or her will to a territory where he or she fears threats to life 




States’ commitment in taking care of humanitarian migrants does not end with the Geneva 
Convention. Multiple declarations and agreements have been signed to protect and assist 
humanitarian migrants (UNGA, 2017).1  
Moreover, the question of integration has recently appeared on the international policy agenda 
as never before. To make some example: in 2016 was held in Istanbul the World Humanitarian 
Summit, organised by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(UN OCHA); at the European Union level, many coordinated actions have been undertaken to 
respond to the increase in international migration; integration appeared more prominently also 
in the work of the G20 (OECD, 2019). 
Nonetheless, in recent years states have gradually drift away from their commitments, making 
it more difficult for migrants to successfully apply as refugees.  
The reason of such trend has to be found in the constant increase of another type of migration, 
the economic one. Since 1951, due to the growth of welfare states, the increase in inequality 
worldwide and the reduction of migration costs, people willing to migrate in search of better 
economic prospects have increased. As mentioned above, unfortunately is not always easy to 
understand who migrate in search of better opportunity and who migrate out of desperation. 
This gives economic migrants an opportunity to mimic asylum seekers and it presents 
governments with a serious screening problem. The easiest solution to it is to reinforce border 
policies and to augment the burden of proof to obtain refugee status, at the expenses of the most 
vulnerable. The failure of industrialized countries in assisting refugees resides in the very nature 
of international protection. Hospitality is a public good: everyone is better off with a refugee 
protection scheme in place, but the burden of cost is beard only by the host state (Bubb, Kremer, 
Levine, 2011).  
 
The desire to curb migrations comes from the fear of its negative impact on the economy and 
the society of receiving countries. Migration is certainly a challenge and represents a substantial 
financial cost for governments. However, managing migrants’ integration is not only a costly 
                                                             
1 See for example: “the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Human Rights 
Council on the compendium of principles, good practices and policies on safe, orderly and regular migration in 
line with international human rights law (A/HRC/36/42); the 2013 High-level dialogue on International 
Migration and Development; the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030; the New Urban Agenda; the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development; the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants; and the Sustainable Development Goals“ 




activity, but host states are more hesitant about its possible positive contribution to the local 
economy (Backman, Lopez, Rowe, 2020). 
 
Beyond international obligations, migration could be an asset for western states. A rich body of 
literature in economics (micro and macro) investigates theoretically and empirically the impact 
of migration on the host country’s economy (especially for what concern the labour market) 
and society. There is no unanimous consensus on the effects, however, many works stress the 
beneficial impact of migration in the long-run. In particular, immigration can be a key 
component of human capital to address labour and skills shortages, especially for those states 
facing ageing process and falls in the fertility rate (Backman, Lopez, Rowe, 2020).  
 
Also Storesletten (see Bratsber, Raaum and Røed, 2017, p.3) suggests how migration could be 
a solution to the demographic and fiscal challenges faced by European countries due to ageing 
populations.  
Migrants are mainly in their working age, meaning that they usually contribute the host state’ 
finances more than the cost of services they receive. They inject around 85% of their earnings 
into the economies of host societies (UNGA, 2017).  
In many OECD countries actually there is a demand “to replace the declining numbers of young 
workers, replenish retirement funds and raise productivity, as well as demand for caregivers to 
look after the elderly” (OECD, 2009, p.10). For this reason, many countries are actually 
attempting to attract more foreign students in order to successively integrate them into the 
workforce (ibidem).  
 
Not to mention that migrants can fill jobs that natives do not want to do, boosting economic 
activity, and they could also offer expertise and entrepreneurship benefiting the host country 
innovation process (ONU, 2017).  
More in general, since in the world there are countries with large productivity differences, 
unrestricted migrations of people could bring economic gains (Clemens, 2011).  
However, as we will explain, for migration to have positive effects on the receiving countries’ 
economies, a successful integration is crucial, especially in the labour market. Depressing 
effects on the natives’ wages in low-skilled jobs and in the short run, represent one of the 
principal objections to immigration. However, to have a complete evaluation of migrants’ 
performance and contribution, all the potentially productive years spent in the host country 
should be considered. “Simple cross‐sectional comparisons of, say, employment rates between 
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immigrants and natives may not be informative about the ultimate economic consequences of 
immigration” (Bratsber, Raaum and Røed, 2017, p.3).  
 
As mentioned, the debate on migration’s impact in the short and long run is rich and complex. 
It is far from the purpose of this analysis to investigate it. We are more interested in the 
integration challenge that governments has to face, more or less willingly.  
Before providing a general overview of the main integration measures and policies 
implemented nowadays, it is important to reflect on the nature and meaning of integration.  
 
1.3. What is integration?  
 
What does integration mean? What is the objective governments should tend to, and how can 
we measure the progresses or regressions of governments’ policies in reaching it? 
Unfortunately, there is no easy and unique answers to these questions, because “the concept of 
integration with respect to immigrants can take on a number of meanings” (Lemaître, 2007, 
p.10).  
 
Lemaître (2007) explains how from one side we can think at integration simply in terms of 
socio-economic convergence between immigrant and native population. In this case, we are 
interested in the efficacy and efficiency of policies in eliminating or at least reducing the gap 
between the two groups, and the evaluation concerns some key statistical measures such as the 
employment rate, the earnings, the education level, the poverty rate, etc.  
Otherwise, we can think at integration in a broader way as assimilation: “acceptance of, and 
behaviour in accordance with, host countries values and beliefs, including similarity of 
economic and social outcomes” (Lemaître, 2007, p.10).  
In this sense, integration is even more complex since it should arrive to the complete cultural 
adaptation, meaning that the migrant has to abandon its own culture and beliefs. Between these 
two visions of integration, a wide spectrum of interpretations are possible.  
 
The works of Robinson and Castles et al. (see Ager and Strang, 2008, p. 167) also stress how 
integration is a very chaotic concept, which varies by context and of which no commonly 




Not only the definition of integration is contextual, but also the idea of who are the actors 
involved in the integration process has changed over time. At the beginning of integration 
studies, classical theories defined settlement as a linear process: immigrants had to change in 
order to fit with the mainstream culture and society. The process was though as an individual 
one, in which the only actor involved was the migrant. The length of the integration depended 
then on the individual characteristics of the migrant, like for example cultural distance (Garcés-
Mascareñas and Penninx, 2016).  
Successively this view was broadly criticised moving towards a “two-way process of 
integration” in which also the receiving society had to play a major role. The process of 
integration was now an active one, with two distinct actors involved: the migrant and the 
country of his/her destination (Unterreiner, Weinar, 2014).  
This shift is clear also in the empirical research. Before the 1980s, the focus was only at the 
micro-level of individual migrants. It was after the 1990s that research switched also to the 
macro-level analysis of organizations and structural factors. In particular, cross-country 
comparisons of the same immigrant group gave the possibility to examine the contextual factors 
of destination countries (Pennix, 2013; Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx, 2016).  
Finally, even more recently, the approach to integration has changed to the transnationalism 
and development framework. Both theories have brought into the picture a third paramount 
actor: the sending country, even if they have not been able to research its role in the integration 
process (Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx, 2016).  
Even if now the there is a more comprehensive picture of all the actors involved in integration, 
still a unique definition of the concept lacks. The problem is that integration is more than a 
concept, is a policy goal and a target. For this reason, it is important to develop at least an 
operational definition of it, such that is possible to evaluate and range the measures of 
integration adopted by governments (Ager and Strang, 2008).  
 
1.4. Integration measures worldwide  
Shifting from the theoretical debate to the practise, policy makers usually struggle to design 
effective and efficient policy guidelines and strategies for integration. The existing literature 
laments the lack of benchmark integration models and stress the need for further research and 




This lack of benchmark models becomes clear when looking at an overview of the integration 
measures developed in different host countries. For example, Martin et al. (2016) maps the 
different types of labour market integration support measures for refugees in nine EU countries 
(Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom). Although differences across countries, the first problem they highlight, common to 
every state, is the absence of data and information. The solution should be surveys that follow 
migrants over time in order to proper evaluate the integration measures implemented and to 
reflect on impacts and causality. It would mean switching from simply descriptive studies, to 
quantitative ones. The need of quantitative studies investigating causal relationships between 
integration measures and their effects is compelling: governments already spend resources for 
integration; if they operate without the necessary planning or knowledge of the measures’ 
effectiveness, it is detrimental for everyone, migrants and native citizens (Martin et al., 2016; 
OECD, 2019).  
 
Another gap in the literature, is the absence of a proper analysis of the programmes 
implemented. Even if integration measures are designed after a proper evaluation of goals, 
means, benefits and costs, once implemented there is no explanation of “the mechanisms 
through which the designed activities lead to better labour market integration” (Martin et. al, 
2016, p.19). To add complexity, migrants are usually part of “multi-component programmes” 
(ibidem) and it is difficult to evaluate the impact of a single measure. Finally, the optimal 
mechanism design is challenging because of a lack of external validity of the measures already 
undertaken: single policies or experimental measures are often implemented with a very low 
number of beneficiaries, leaving out any possibility of further analysis.   
Absent any benchmark model and taking into account that immigration has always been 
considered by many European countries has an emergency, there is not a clear and unique policy 
of integration, and also countries’ legislation lacks a structured framework.  
The problem is that in receiving countries we assist at many different actions undertaken at the 
local, regional or national level, without any coordination. This leads to a patchwork of 
measures missing any strategy or coherence (Martin et al., 2016).  
For this reason there is an urgent need of coordination across government levels and between 
the various actors involved, such that common minimum standards, at least in the same country, 





1.5. Integration in and through the labour market  
Despite the debate on the nature of integration, surely the success in the labour market is one 
of the most important and investigated aspect of migrants’ inclusion. It is possible to affirm that  
without integration in the labour market, it is extremely difficult for migrants to blend in any 
other aspect of the host country’s society. The literature stresses how the sooner is the access 
to the labour market, the easier the process of integration (see for example Lemaitre 2007; Ayer 
et al, 2016; OECD, 2016). 
Moreover, labour market integration can be the key to unleash migrants’ full potential, to make 
them self-reliant and productive citizens, with positive effects on the local economic 
productivity. This success in the labour market cannot happen and it is not beneficial if not 
coordinated with a serious investment in migrant’s education and human capital formation 
(Backman, Lopez, Rowe, 2020).  
However, the labour market participation in itself can be an optimal way to prevent the 
depreciation of the human capital migrants are already in possess of. Not to mention that 
through the labour market success, migrants become less reliant on the welfare state (Fasani, 
Frattini, Minale, 2018).  
In this sense, an early entry in the labour market, upon arriving in the country, is beneficial also 
for the host country: migrants lower their welfare dependency and are not forced to join the 
informal labour market, incrementing a vicious circle of exploitation and criminality (Aiyar et 
al. 2016).  
Finally, integration into the labour market is also crucial for the host country citizens’ 
predisposition to accept immigrants since it seems to depend on migrants’ potential economic 
contribution (Bansak et al. 2016).  
 
Naturally, migrants’ success in the labour market bring along also perverse effects on the native 
population, especially in the short run. As we mentioned, if large numbers of migrants rapidly 
enter a labour market, they can have a destabilizing impact on jobs and wages (UNGA, 2017). 
In particular, the competitive pressure is on low-earning workers.  
However, it is not the purpose of this analysis to investigate these effects since they belong to 
the issue of whether migration should be contrasted. We are interested in finding an efficient 
way to manage migrants’ integration, given that they already are in a country and governments 
need to deal with them, if not with the hope of profitable gains, at least to avoid the costs of 




Given the importance assigned to the labour market, among the first policies to be inquired in 
order to find an efficient model of integration there are labour market ones. How to build a 
system of incentives for migrants to integrate in the host country’s labour market and for natives 
to help that process?  
 
Before analysing the most common policies that have been enforced in western countries to 
facilitate the economic assimilation of migrants, it is important to understand the legal 
framework with whom immigrants have to confront and its implication for the integration 
process. Do migrants have full access to the labour market of the host country? At which 
conditions? How they can operate in it? How all these affect their incentives to integrate? 
Not to all types of migrants is granted full access to the labour market (often there are legal 
barriers that make them turn into informal jobs). The situation is particularly critical for 
migrants who require asylum. In almost all OECD countries they cannot access immediately 
the labour market during the pendency of their asylum procedure (OECD, 2016). The times for 
processing a request of asylum vary from country to country, but it can arrive to last even an 
entire year. The European Union with Directive 2013/33/EU on Reception Condition of 
humanitarian migrants has fixed the limit of nine months, after which, even if the application 
is still ongoing, the asylum seeker can enter the labour market.  
Beyond waiting periods, it is also common that the right to work is granted only after having 
met certain conditions (e.g. labour market tests, restriction to certain sectors, wage and priority 
check, no self-employment). It is quite clear the reason behind these restrictions: granting an 
unconditional access to labour market for asylum seekers would “leave the asylum channel 
prone to abuse by those seeking a job rather than international protection” (OECD, 2016, p.18). 
The consequences on the employment of the domestic workforce could be too negative.  
 
Contrary to its major purpose, in some countries the labour market access is used as an incentive 
for asylum seekers to co-operate in their application procedure. In Norway and Sweden for 
example, labour market access is granted if asylum seekers actively assist in the procedure for 
obtaining valid documents (OECD, 2016).  
More in general the legal framework for accessing the labour market is crucial for all the 
categories of migrants: not only it influence the incentives to integrate, but also determine the 
level of uncertainty with whom migrants have to cope. The idea behind temporary protection 
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is that it may facilitate returns to the origin country once the conditions improve. However, “it 
conveys the message that migrants are not expected to stay” (OECD, 2016, p.8).  
It creates a situation of uncertainty, detrimental for taking on any activity: the incentives to 
invest in host country-specific human capital and to socially integrate are reduced (Adda, 
Dustmann, Gorlach, 2014). The uncertainty itself can be psychological distracting (Brell, 
Dustmann, Preston 2020). Most importantly, uncertainty deters also employers from hiring and 
training migrants.  
 
Despite the legal framework, what are the labour market integration policy measures 
implemented by industrialized countries? 
For what concerns European policies, despite differences across countries (social contexts, 
labour market structures, support measures), a sort of standard package of measures is often 
implemented. The four key elements of this package are: early skills assessment; introduction 
programmes including general cultural orientation, socio-professional one and even some 
training; language courses; access to job intermediation services (Martin et al., 2016).  
 
1.5.1.  Early skills assessment 
 
This measure is often implemented and analysed also in countries outside of Europe. It is one 
of the main challenges and good policy practises to support the lasting integration of immigrants 
in all OECD countries: it is essential for a better integration to assess promptly foreign 
qualifications and individual skills and to take stock of them (OECD, 2016).  
As one can imagine, assessing foreign qualification is a phenomenon involving the majority of 
immigrants: OECD-wide, almost two out of three immigrants have obtained their qualifications 
abroad (OECD, 2020).  
The latter are broadly discounted in the labour market because of informational asymmetries. 
Since local employers’ unfamiliarity with foreign education systems and skills assessments, 
foreign credentials do not send the same positive signal as domestic qualification. The 
consequences of this problem of adverse selection for immigrants are a higher risk of 
unemployment, of lower wages and of over-qualification (OECD, 2019). Over-qualification 
occurs when individuals work in occupations that do not match their skill levels. Since the main 
measure of skills is usually education, the literature recognizes as measure of over-qualification 
a measure of over-education that compare the worker’s educational attainment to his/her 
occupation. In particular, migrants’ educational level is compared with the mean or median one 
in the native population for a given occupation (Damas de Matos, 2014).  
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For these reasons, skills assessment is a key measure of interest if governments want to support 
the economic assimilation of migrants. However, the assessments should regard not only the 
formal recognition of foreign qualification (to reduce the risk of over-qualification), but also all 
the informal skills and previous job experiences. An instrument adopted in many OECD 
countries is the recognition of prior learning which can be a signal used to reduce uncertainties 
among employers in valuing qualifications. This method can vary by country, but usually 
involve interviews or aptitude tests and practical demonstrations in the workplace or in 
simulated scenarios. It is fundamental for grasping migrants’ professional skills and 
experiences and present them to employers (OECD, 2016).   
The recognition of prior learning helps migrant to enter the labour market and it is also a “quick, 
cost-effective mean to identify needs for further training and to prevent the duplication of 
training content for migrants whose foreign qualifications are not found to be equivalent to 
domestic ones” (OECD, 2016, p.31). 
The duplication of training content is a major problem in migrants’ integration. Courses and 
workshop are almost never designed according to individual needs and stock of abilities. In this 
way it is quite common that the immigrant spends time and resources on developing 
competencies (s)he already has and (s)he should only translate in order to better fit the 
peculiarity of the host country labour market. A cost-effective solution to this problem is 
bridging courses that enable immigrants to fill their specific gaps (OECD, 2016).  
Offering tailored courses is difficult and expensive, but divide them in modules and exploit 
distance-learning programmes could be a solution. The latter in particular may help labour 
migrants to prepare for the receiving country’ s labour market even before the departure, so that 
they could be immediately active at the arrival. It is crucial if recruitment of foreign workers is 
to play a role in responding to skills shortages needs of domestic employers (OECD, 2020).  
More than migrants themselves, crucial stakeholders to consider when designing early skills 
assessments measures are employers. Employers know the skills they need and the specific 
pieces of information they are looking for when assessing credentials and they can provide 
valuable feedback for improving the procedures. If employers are consulted during this process, 
the risks of designing inefficient or unnecessary measures is reduced and it is easier to meet 
everyone’s needs. Alongside OECD countries, there are good examples of engagement of 
employers in the process of recognition. For example, in Austria the Chamber of Commerce is 
involved in skills assessments and mentorship programs. In Sweden, both employers and unions 




Important is also sharing information: create platforms with publicly available information 
concerning foreign qualifications and how to value them, can help employers in the decision of 
hiring migrants (OECD, 2016; OECD 2019).  
 
Unfortunately, it is not always the case that the recognition of qualifications speeds up the 
labour market integration. Correa-Velez et al. (2013) states that (see Martin et al., p. 18) per se 
it could not help employers to overcome their doubts on foreign education. Moreover, migrants 
with recognised qualification might delay their entrance in the labour market because they are 
focused on finding a job in line with their qualifications and home country experiences. 
Employers on the other side reward host country work experience and this postpones migrants 
employment at least in the short run.  
1.5.2. Introduction Programmes and Language Courses 
All migrants should acquire the basic knowledge and skills necessary to find and maintain a job 
in the long run in the host country. Introduction programmes consisting of language courses, 
civic orientation courses and general overview of the host country labour market’s rules and 
practises are one of the main instruments used by countries to help the process of integration 
(OECD, 2016).  
According to the literature, the knowledge of the host country’s language is crucial: it is 
associated with higher attainments in the labour market and so it may be important to support 
the process of economic assimilation (Dustmann and Fabbri, 2003).  
The same consideration has emerged during an online survey conducted by the OECD, the 
German Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the association of German Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry concerning the labour market integration of migrants. Over 2000 
German employers participated to the survey in 2017 whose main finding was that, regardless 
the company size and the type of work, employers consider a good knowledge of German 
language a fundamental competence, also for low-skilled jobs (OECD, 2017a). It seems to be 
the most important skill migrants need to acquire as soon as possible. From the same survey, 
insufficient language skills were shown to be the most frequently stated reason for not hiring 
refugees and asylum seekers (OECD, 2017a).  
At the same time, also from the side of migrants, language difficulties are cited as the principal 
obstacle to employability (Fasani, Frattini, Minale, 2018).  
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In Europe, publicly financed language programmes are common practise and there is consensus 
on their benefits. However, they are not free from some downturns. The heart of the debate 
concern the slowness of theoretical studies and the benefits of learning by doing. If it is true 
that employment is in itself a way to acquire the language, all the formal requirements of a 
certain level of language, simply prevent migrants from getting a job. The question is then “if 
integration is powered by language acquisition or if it is the language acquisition a consequence 
of integration” (Martin et al., p.46). The same reasoning can be applied to introduction 
programmes: “as a kind of waiting period, they might contribute to delaying the integration of 
beneficiaries into the labour market rather than facilitating it” (ibid). Lemaitre in his work 
(2007) points out the same concern: since a long absence from work is associated with human 
capital depreciation, language instruction completed over a relatively short period of time has 
to be preferred.  
 
Another solution to this problem could be language programmes alternated to workplace 
experience (see Lemaitre, 2007; OECD, 2016). The advantage of this type of programs is that 
migrants can have real-life language practise becoming familiar with work-related terms, while 
building relationships useful for finding a job. It is also a way to acquire the missing skills to 
obtain full recognition of job qualifications, as we have seen before (Martin et al, 2016). From 
this example is once again clear that co-operation with employer is crucial for developing highly 
effective measures.  
 
New technologies can be a fundamental tool to increase the cost-effectiveness of courses for 
migrants. First of all, they have the advantage, with respect to face-to-face learning, of reaching 
everyone, even if in the most remote place. Moreover, they can be used pre-departure, 
anticipating the acquisition of the additional skills specific to the host-country human capital 
and they ease the design of more targeted contents.  
Most importantly, technologies allow continuous learning, helping migrants to maintain skills 
in the long-run. This is crucial, because to equip migrants with the basic skills necessary in the 
host country labour market and society, multi-years investment in training and education are 
needed. The latter are costly, and they pay off only in the long-run. For this reason, learning 
should be continuous, but immigrants are usually underrepresented in adult education and 





1.5.3. Job intermediation services 
Job intermediation services can be helpful in alleviating labour market frictions typical of 
migrants’ experience: lack of information of the host country labour market, limited social 
networks, uncertainty about residence status, legal barriers, etc (Battisti, Giesing, Laurentsyeva, 
2019).  
 
In European countries, there is a clear tendency to extend to migrants those job services offered 
to the general population, instead of setting up specific services (Martin et al., 2016).  
There is no doubt that a customised approach is beneficial for an effective labour market 
integration and not only (Hagelund, 2005). Government policies should go in the direction of 
specific, individually tailored integration pathways (OECD, 2016).  
However, it is often difficult for the public employment services, often already overwhelmed 
by high level of unemployment, to provide customised services for the specific needs of 
immigrants (Martin et al., 2016).  
1.5.4. The role of employers  
Of course, a key figure in the process of integration are employers. As mentioned, they are in a 
better position with respect to the government to value which foreign qualifications and work 
experiences are more useful. They are precious in designing what content should go into 
bridging programmes or vocational training (OECD, 2016).  
Simultaneously they are key actors in the social-cultural integration of migrants and in their life 
beyond the labour market. For this reason, it is important to try to align their incentives with 
the ones of the integration policies and reduce the perceived higher costs that discourage them 
from hiring migrants (OECD, 20016; OECD, 2019).  
According with certain studies, subsidise private sector employment with wage subsidy 
increase the employment probability. At the same time, other studies look at the effectiveness 
of wage subsidies as a signal that high entry wages are a significant barrier to immigrant 
integration: targeted and temporal exemptions from minimum wages may help at the beginning 
to reduce the disadvantages migrants face in the labour market (Ayer et al., 2016).   
1.5.5. The role of labour market demand  
No need to say that the basis for labour market integration is the labour demand in the host 
country. This can explain why labour market integration seems more difficult in Southern 
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European countries with respect to the Nordic ones, where actually also native workers emigrate 
in search of better employment opportunities. Already in 2014, an OECD study on labour 
market integration in Italy showed how unemployment rate for immigrants were quite high, but 
at the same time in line with the ones of native-born. This condition questions integration 
policy, if also natives are facing difficulties in integrating in the labour market. It may be useful 
to investigate transversal policies: think at solutions for both categories or design measures in 
which integration is not only a goal, but becomes a tool to solve long lasting problems of the 
host country (OECD, 2014).  
The reflection on labour market demand opens up considerations on the geographical 
distribution of migrants across countries and within the same country. If labour market 
conditions influence the process of integration, the distribution of migrants along the country 
should reflect the distribution of the labour demand. It would be helpful granting them freedom 
of movement, not only within the country, but even in the European Union (Martin et al., 2016).  
According to Ayer et al. (2016), geographical mobility by migrants is useful to balance eventual 
asymmetric shocks in the labour market and by so contributing to the growth of the host 
country. Reducing restrictions on their geographical mobility would allow them to move to 
where labour demand is high.  
The problem gets even more complicated when considering refugees. As already mention, 
hosting refugees can be considered as having the characteristics of a public good since the 
humanitarian benefit is non-rival and non-excludable (Hatton, 2016). Refugees in fact are 
admitted to satisfy basic humanitarian motives. Consequently, when a country hosts a refugee 
it is the only to bear the economic and social costs of this action, but also residents of another 
country benefit since refugees have been hosted. For this reason European countries struggle in 
distributing evenly refugees. Hatton (2016) suggest to create a market for tradable refugee 
quotas so that the costs of each state are taken into account.  
 
The same happens also within a single country. Many governments want to distribute refugees 
and asylum seekers evenly across the country in order to share costs and avoid segregation 
(OECD, 2016). If these dispersal policies do not take into account labour market conditions and 
the so called “secondary migration” is not allowed, it can be quite detrimental on migrants’ 
outcome.  
 
At the same time, freedom of movement has some downturns. There can be concentration of 
migrants where housing is cheaper or where other migrants of the same nationality are already 
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located. This aggravated the problems of segregation, of uneven conditions of centres and 
peripheries and of anti-migration views (Darling, 2016; OECD, 2018; OECD, 2019).  
1.6.  Integration in and through social networks 
“Without civil society organizations, a welcoming business environment and the support of 
local communities, integration policies are likely to be ineffective” (OECD, 2016, p.49).  
The host society must be involved in the process of integration, or the latter is never going to 
happen and despite the effort, policies would be ineffective. From the mapping of good practises 
alongside OECD countries, it seems that a cost-effective way of promoting integration and 
together increasing interactions between immigrants and citizens could be mentorship 
programmes. They bring closer locals and migrants while helping the latter preparing for the 
labour market (OECD, 2016).  
More in general all the activities that bring together locals and migrants are beneficial in the 
integration process. Galera, Giannetto, Noya (2018) analyse four different integration pathways 
developed by third sector organisations in four European countries, that had beneficial impact 
not only on the recipients, but also on the host community.  
In all four cases, it has been crucial the creation of meetings and opportunity of cooperation 
between migrants and locals. Thanks to this collaboration, often locals change their mind-set 
towards immigrants. Moreover, since their local nature, these models of integration are often 
able to benefit the host territory with profits redistribution and to revitalise activities and places 
that were dying. The key to succeed is to engage the community in the design and management 
of the integration process, so that the integration policy is incorporated with the  others 
territorial, educational, social, housing policies. This is helpful because allows to respond 
simultaneously to multiple challenges and migrants are usually empowered thanks to the fact 
that are not segregated with their problems (Galera, Giannetto, Noya, 2018).  
 
Furthermore, volunteer initiatives help migrants entering the labour market because they are a 
boost for learning the host country language and strengthening social networks’ formation 
(OECD, 2019).  
 
Moreover, these organizations are usually able to find new approaches or innovative tools in 
the integration process: they are not mere implementer of public policies, but they are also able 
to identify the specific needs of migrants and local communities (Galera, Giannetto, Noya, 
2018).  Sometimes their ideas contribute to shape future policy measures: they are in the perfect 
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position to valuate whether policies work and they can give precious feedbacks on how 
integration measures should be adapted to better address migrants’ needs. Migrants association 
should be a key interlocutor for policy makers so that policies would be designed not only for 
migrants, but also with them (OECD, 2019).  
 
These experiences are not free from problematic issues. Third sector organizations and 
volunteers can play a positive role in a community. However, at the same time, they aggravate 
the already huge problem of coordination and fragmentation in managing migrants’ integration. 
For this reason, they should be a precious instrument for governments to provide welfare, but 
should not be independent organizers. Governments should ex ante design the policy objective 
function, and then in it consider the role that NGOs can play locally. There is a need of tailored 
regulations and a deeper exploration and study of public-private partnership: they can have a 
big potential, but also become ineffective tools (Martin et al., 2016).  
 
Moreover, it has to be considered that often these experiences born because of the inability of 
the State to quickly respond to pressing problems in local communities. “Expecting volunteers 
to take over tasks that are the responsibility of the state is not going to be viable in the medium 
or long run. […] Investing in the capacity of volunteers is therefore important, but the right 
balance must be found between supporting volunteers and continuing to offer professional, 

















Migrant integration is a complex subject: too many factors and variables take a role and too 
little is known about policies’ effectiveness. In the literature, many studies have tried to analyse 
the phenomenon of integration from each possible angle. Governments and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) deal with this challenge and have to face and manage migration flows 
often unpredictable.  
 
Even if no golden rules or perfect schemes have been found to tackle the question, the literature 
seems to agree that the key to a successful integration is to personalize the path of integration. 
It is vital to implement policy measures designed in accordance with individual characteristics 
and abilities (see for example Aiyar et al., 2016; Brell et al., 2020; OECD 2019; OECD 2020).  
The first thing governments have to do is to understand the characteristics of the migrants 
knocking at the doors of their countries. Knowing migrants’ skills and motivations gives the 
possibility to assign them to the more adapted integration programme, allowing a more efficient 
use of resources and a more successful process of integration.  
Moreover, understanding how to detect migrants’ abilities and motivations is crucial for 
governments wanting to attract, through their immigration policies, high-skill individuals. The 
reasoning behind such a consideration is quite simple: the higher the individual’s skills, the 
higher the probability of employment, the larger migrants’ net fiscal contribution and so the 
less negative is the sentiment of natives towards immigration (Boeri, 2010).  
Also Cobb-Clark (2004) stresses the role of selection policy in influencing the formation of 
attitudes towards immigrants, and she also notes that by altering the skills of the migration 
flows, these policy can affect macroeconomic variables such as employment and wages 
(because they change the complementarity/substitutability of immigrants and natives).  
Finally investigating migrant selection is fundamental in the discussion on brain drain. Increase 
in migration has given rise to concerns about countries with high emigration rates, especially 
developing ones: if only the more skilled and able individuals leaves for a better life, then their 
home country will face greater difficulties in developing and growing (Belot, Hatton, 2012). 
The same argument stands for countries generating high numbers of refugees: if the latter have 
better skills, once the country enters the reconstruction stage, it will be harder for it to regain 
prosperity and stability (Aksoy and Poutvaara, 2019).   
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These considerations lead the literature to argue in terms of determinants of migration, 
individual choices and human capital theory. What economic considerations affect the 
individual’s decision to move? Are there personal characteristics that influence differently the 
costs and benefits of leaving a country?  
If it is true that individual characteristics affect the migrating decision, then migrants are not a 
random sample of the population in their origin country, but they are systematically self-
selected along certain characteristics, some observables and others not. Western countries are 
particularly interested in the analysis of migrant self-selection along the dimension of ability: 
are they high or low skilled? In other words, countries receiving migrants witness a 
phenomenon of positive or negative selection? Positive selectivity occurs when migrants 
entering a host state come from the upper skills distribution in their country of origin‘s 
population. The reverse is true for negative selectivity.  
Despite the relevance of the subject, unfortunately “migrants’ self-selection has been one of the 
most controversial topics in the migration literature” (Fernandez-Huertas, 2011, p.73).  
2.2. Asymmetry of information and patterns of selectivity  
 
At the very beginning of this stream of literature, Kwok and Leland (1982) introduced the 
debate on selectivity developing a model of asymmetric information to investigate the problem 
of brain drain in less developed countries (in particular, they looked at high-skilled colleges 
graduates who left their country for advanced studies in the Western countries).  
Their focus is Taiwan’s situation, where “more than 50,000 college graduates left the country 
for advanced studies overseas during the period from 1960 to 1979, but only 6,000 of them 
returned” (Kwow and Leland, 1982, p. 91). Since the economic conditions in Taiwan are far 
from justify this exodus, neither individual preferences can explain such high flows, Kwok and 
Leland (1982) suggests that the cause of these high numbers of migrants who do not return, is 
the presence of asymmetric information in the labour market.  
 
In particular, in order to explain migration, they place the asymmetry in Taiwan. How to justify 
such a phenomenon? They imagine employers in the destination country (USA) are familiar 
with their national education system (where Taiwanese high skilled individuals are studying) 
and they already have experiences with foreign workers. These facts translate in a better 
knowledge of potential employees’ abilities (which instead are not so clear for Taiwanese 
employers, mainly because its young trained abroad). Consequently, only foreign employers 
are able to offer a wage in line with the true productivity of the individual, while in the home 
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country employers have to base their wages on average productivity, meaning that their wage 
offers will be higher than true productivity for someone and lower for others. In particular, best 
workers who could aspire at higher wages, they would prefer not to come back. That is how the 
brain drain problem is generated and how western countries experience positive selectivity 
among migrants.  
Interestingly Kwok and Leland (1982) underline the fact that market imperfection may drive 
individuals to leave their country even if originally they did not want to. This happens even 
when individuals face competitive wages in the two countries and have preferences for working 
home rather than abroad.  
 
Few years later the publication of this paper, Katz and Stark (1984) commented it, underlining 
the fact that this positive selectivity is one of the possible equilibria with asymmetric of 
information. It could also happen that low skills individual migrate abroad. Crucial in 
determining the type of selectivity experienced is the location of the asymmetry of information: 
there is no reason why only Taiwanese employers should not be able to detect individuals’ true 




Figure 2.1. Source: Katz and Stark (1984), p. 534. 
In this figure it is represented the productivity (𝜃) of the individual on the horizontal axis, while 
in the vertical axis it is pictured the wage (W) they can gain. Productivity is distributed on the 
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interval [0, 1] with distribution functions 𝐹𝑈𝑆(𝜃) and 𝐹𝑇(𝜃). 𝑊𝑈𝑆(𝜃) and 𝑊𝑇(𝜃) are wages paid 
to workers of productivity 𝜃 respectively in the Unites States and in Taiwan. However, these 
two are not the wages the individual compare when deciding where to live. Katz and Stark 
(1984), as in Kwow and Leland (1982), assume individuals have a preference for their home 
country, meaning that they discount US wages by a parameter k<1. When making migration 
decision, they compare 𝑘𝑊𝑈𝑆(𝜃) to 𝑊𝑇(𝜃). Furthermore, they assume that in a given 
occupation the wage differential between the two states does not vary with the productivity. 
Two cases can be distinguished.  
Looking at the graph it is clear that if the difference between the U.S. and Taiwanese wage is 
sufficiently large, so that the 𝑘𝑊𝑈𝑆(𝜃) line lies above the 𝑊𝑇(𝜃) line, with perfect information 
all individuals will move to the USA. The situation, however, could change considering the 
effect of information asymmetry. If USA employers cannot perfectly detect 𝜃, they could only 
offer wages equal to the average productivity: 𝑊𝑈𝑆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜃). Then, comparing 𝑊𝑇(𝜃) to 𝑊𝑈𝑆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜃), 
only the less skilled individuals with 𝜃<𝜃1 migrate. If however, also in Taiwan the true 
productivity is not observable, Taiwan employers are forced to offer an average wage 𝑊𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜃) 
and the situation would come back to a complete exodus.  
A different scenario is depicted when the difference between the U.S. and Taiwanese wage is 
small so that the 𝑘𝑊𝑈𝑆(𝜃) line lies below the 𝑊𝑇(𝜃) line, as it can be seen in this second figure.  
 
Figure 1.2. Source: Katz and Stark (1984), p. 534. 
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The notation is the same as Figure 1, and it is possible to observe that now, in the scenario with 
perfect information 𝑊𝑇(𝜃) is always higher than 𝑘𝑊𝑈𝑆(𝜃), meaning that migration does not 
occur. The same it is true if we compare 𝑘𝑊𝑈𝑆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜃) to 𝑊𝑇(𝜃) when there is asymmetry of 
information in the USA. When instead also Taiwanese employers offer the average wage 
𝑊𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜃), there is migration for the high skilled individuals, the one with 𝜃>𝜃2. This is actually 
the case described by Kwow and Leland (1982), but it is only one of the possible scenarios.  
The concept that Katz and Stark (1984) want to stress is that several situations can verify, and 
the critical point is to understand if and especially where asymmetries of information are 
present. They claim that the pattern of labour migration with asymmetries differs substantially 
from the perfect information and interesting paths can rise.  
After this first short analysis, born as a comment on Kwow and Leland (1982), Katz and Stark 
(1987) developed their own model of international migration under asymmetric information, 
maintaining Kwok and Leland (1982)’s framework. The main results of the model are that 
several scenarios of migrant selection are possible and asymmetric information tends to reduce 
the skill level of migrants. However, they introduce also the possibility for workers to signal 
their ability. In this case, a U shaped pattern of migration can be an equilibrium: individuals 
both from the top and the bottom of the skill distribution may migrate, while individuals from 
the middle part of the distribution stay in the home country.  
Finally, Katz and Stark (1987) underline how risk aversion of employers or of employees could 
also be a critical factor in determining the migration equilibria. It is a topic that should be further 
explored, together with the role of government in migration policy, which could be crucial for 
the different equilibrium patterns and should be incorporated in the model.  
2.3. Migration as investment decision 
 
Another strand of literature models migration as an investment decision, following the seminal 
contribution of Sjaasstad (1962) who introduced the human capital approach in the migration 
framework. Income-maximizing individuals compare the expected utilities they can reach 
worldwide and decide to move wherever their utility is higher. Since earnings and costs 
expectations depend on individual characteristics, the latter play a key role in migration choice 
and consequently in migrant selectivity: only individuals with higher returns to migration will 
migrate, considering their observable and unobservable characteristics. Therefore, in order to 




A milestone in this strand of literature is Borjas (1987)’s model, developed looking at Roy 
(1951)’s model on occupational decisions.  
His analysis starts from the weakness of what he defines the “first generation” studies of the 
literature on migrant selection (Chiswick, 1978; Carliner, 1980; De- Freitas, 1980).  
These papers concentrated their reasoning on the fact that the age-earnings profile of 
immigrants is steeper than the one of natives, so that after an initial period of adaptation, 
immigrant earnings overtake the earnings of comparable natives. The explanation behind these 
results, according to them, can be discovered looking at the human capital theory: earnings of 
immigrant grow faster because migrants have stronger investment incentives. Chiswick (1978) 
states that migrants are actually a self-selected group and so immigrants may be more able and 
highly motivated.  
Borjas (1987) challenges these results: they come from the use of a single cross-section dataset, 
which cannot allow for the distinctive identification of aging effects and cohort effects. 
Consequently, a series of questions remains unsolved: are cohort quality and immigrants self-
selection related? Is there positive or negative selection among migrants? If the selection 
mechanism changes over time, what is the reason behind it? 
Borjas (1987) tries to answer these questions through the construction of a theoretical model in 
which individuals decide if to migrate looking at income differential in alternative countries, 
net of the migration costs. The characteristics of income distribution determine the type of 
selection that arises when individuals maximize their utility.  
In the model citizens of country 0 choose whether to migrate to country 1 on the basis of the 
wages they can earn in each respective country. Earnings are distributed as ln𝑤0 = 𝜇0 + 0 in 
country 0 and as ln𝑤1 = 𝜇1 + 1 in country 1. So individual earnings are in both cases 
decomposed in a part of observables socioeconomic variables (𝜇0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜇1) and a part of 
unobserved characteristics ( 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 1). The latter variables are distributed as a normal with 
zero mean and variance 𝜎0
2 and 𝜎1
2 respectively.  
The individual decides to migrate when the index function 𝐼 =  ln
𝑤1
(𝑤0+𝐶)
 is positive (C stands 
for the mobility costs). The latter can be rewritten as: (𝜇1 − 𝜇0 − 𝜋) + ( 1 − 0) , where 𝜋 
represents the “time-equivalent” measure of migration costs, defined as 𝜋 = 𝐶 𝑤0⁄ .  𝜋 is 
constant across all individuals in the country of origin, since it express a fraction of the home 
forgone earnings, and it represents the cost of the time spent migrating.  
From this simple model, Borjas (1987) draws the conclusion that the selection of migrants 
depends entirely on the ratio of variances in the income distributions of the country of origin 
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and destinations, while differences in mean incomes, or migration costs do not affect it. 
Particularly:  
 If income is more dispersed in the country of origin (𝜎0
2 > 𝜎1
2), it is as if the destination 
country “insures low-income workers against poor labour market outcomes while taxing 
high-income workers (relative to the country of origin)” (Borjas 1987, p. 534). This 
leads to negative selectivity, since the low-income workers have greater incentives to 
migrate;  
 On the contrary, if income distribution is more unequal in the destination country, 
positive selectivity happens.  
Since, according to Borjas (1987), income is more unequally distributed in the large number of 
Third World countries, income-maximizing behaviour is inconsistent with the positive selection 
of migrants.  
Borjas (1987) is a seminal contribution of the literature on migrant selectivity and has been 
questioned and tested from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view by several 
subsequent papers.   
Chiswick (1999), for example, harshly criticize Borjas (1987). His model amends Borjas’ and 
reaches the exactly opposite conclusion on selectivity.  





where 𝑊𝑏represents earnings in the destination and 𝑊𝑎  in the origin. 𝐶𝑑 are the direct costs of 
migration, which include not only the cost of the journey, but also the cost of relocating once 
arrived (cost of adjusting consumption and work to the new destination). 𝐶𝑓 represents the cost 
of foregone earnings, a sort of opportunity cost of migration: it is the money the individual 
could have gained remaining in his/her country during the period of migration. It is composed 
of the value of time in the origin country (the wage) multiplied by the time units necessary for 
the migration (which includes also the adjustment period). 
The individual migrates “if the rate of return from the investment in migration (𝑟) is greater 
than the interest cost of funds for investment in human capital. The interest cost of fund is lower, 
the greater the person’s wealth and access to the capital market” (Chiswick, 1999, p. 181).  
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In the first place, Chiswick (1999) assumes that there are two categories of individuals: high 
skilled (h) and low skilled (l), and that both the individuals and the employers know these 
abilities; hence, there is no asymmetric information. He also assumes that wages in the origin 
and destination countries for the high skilled workers are a fixed multiple of wages of low-
skilled workers: 
𝑊𝑏,ℎ = (1 + 𝑘)𝑊𝑏,𝑙 
𝑊𝑎,ℎ = (1 + 𝑘)𝑊𝑎,𝑙 
It follows that the gain/loss of wages when moving to the destination country is always (1+k) 
and is independent of the level of ability. Contrary to Borjas (1987), there are no differences 
between low and high skilled in income dispersion between origin and destination country.   
For what concerns costs, Chiswick (1999) first assumes that the direct ones do not varies with 
ability. He also assumes that there are no differences in managing the costs between high and 
low skilled individuals, meaning that abilities do not affect in efficiency the whole migration 
and adaptation processes. However, even if ability does not directly affect the costs, the latter 
variate among the two types of individuals. The reason is that the costs of foregone earnings 
(𝐶𝑓) are higher for the high skilled individuals. Since wages of high skilled are higher than the 
wages of low skilled, and 𝐶𝑓 is computed as the individual’s wage multiplied by the time units 
of the migration period, it follows that 𝐶𝑓,ℎ is higher than 𝐶𝑓,𝑙. More specifically, 𝐶𝑓,ℎ = (1 +
𝑘)𝐶𝑓,𝑙.  
The rates of return are:  
𝑟ℎ =
(1 + 𝑘)𝑊𝑏,𝑙 − (1 + 𝑘)𝑊𝑎,𝑙











Thus, 𝑟ℎ > 𝑟𝑙 (implying positive self-selection), as long as earnings increase with ability (k>0) 
and there are positive direct costs of migration (𝐶𝑑 > 0). If there are no direct costs or there is 
no labour market premium for higher abilities, there would not be selectivity in migration, since 
return would be equal for high and low skilled. High direct costs reduce the overall incentive 
to migrate, but they increase the probability of positive selection: high-skilled workers have 
larger margins to compensate migration costs, because of their greater earnings.  
29 
 
However, it is not reasonable to assume that abilities do not affect efficiency. As high-skilled 
individuals are more productive in the labour market (for which they are compensated with 
higher wages), it is reasonable to assume, according to Chiswick (1999), that they are more 
efficient also in migration, in the investment in human capital. There are several reasons to 
justify such an assumption, for example the investment in migration requires less time for abler 
individuals, or direct costs for them are lower.  
In the first example, the effect of greater abilities operates through the opportunity cost of 
migration. As already seen, 𝐶𝑓 is equal to the wage in the origin country multiplied by the time 
units (t) necessary for migrating. If high skilled individuals have a shorter migration period, 
they have a lower t (𝑡ℎ < 𝑡𝑙), and it follows that their opportunity cost is lower. 𝐶𝑓,𝑙 and 𝐶𝑓,ℎ 
can be written as:   
 
𝐶𝑓,𝑙 = 𝑡𝑙𝑊𝑎,𝑙 
𝐶𝑓,ℎ = 𝑡ℎ𝑊𝑎,ℎ = 𝑡ℎ(1 + 𝑘)𝑊𝑎,𝑙 
 
Due to this difference in the value of t, migrants would be positive selected even in the absence 
of direct cost. If then it is also assumed that migrants with greater abilities are more efficient in 
travelling or in relocating once arrived in a new country (𝐶𝑑,ℎ < 𝐶𝑑,𝑙), the difference in rate of 
return among high and low skilled is even greater. Assuming a direct cost efficiency parameter 
𝜆<0 , which differentiates 𝐶𝑑,ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑑,𝑙 such that 𝐶𝑑,ℎ = (1 + 𝜆)𝐶𝑑,𝑙, the rate of return for high 








Meaning that the higher the efficiency in handling direct costs (higher lambda in absolute 
value), the larger the return for the high skilled with respect to the low skilled.  
As mentioned before, Chiswick (1999)’s model differs from Borjas (1987) since it assumes that 
the distribution of wages is equal in the origin and destination countries (the ratio of variances 
in the income distribution is always equal to one). The model can be extended in order to 
consider that different countries have different wages differentials relative to abilities.  
To align perfectly to Borjas (1987) framework, Chiswick (1999) also refrains momentarily from 
considering efficiency in migration.  























Under these assumptions, the driver of migration incentives is the ratio of wages in destination 
and origin countries and so results similar to Borjas (1987) are reached. However, Chiswick 
(2000) underlines that if the ratio of wages is greater for low skilled, positive selectivity will be 
less intense, but not absent. He in fact imagines that in reality efficiency in migration is present, 
meaning that greater income inequalities in the country of origin determines no positive 
selection only if this effect offsets the effect of efficiency in costs. In this framework huge wage 
differentials across countries between high and low skilled are requested to have negative 
selection.  
Chiswick (1999) is important also because introduces the problem in selectivity across migrant 
categories. A rich field of the self-selection’s literature discusses the distributions of abilities 
among migrants belonging to different categories (mainly economic and humanitarian 
migrants). However, this line of discrimination does not seem to better enlighten the problem 
and no consensus is found.  
Chiswick (1999)’s model described above, explains the behaviour of economic migrants who 
base their decision to migrate on measured returns; it is not suitable for migrants that leave for 
non-economic reasons. For them “the favourable self-selectivity for labour market success 
would be expected to be less intense” (Chiswick, 1999, p. 184). Nations can affect migrants’ 
self-selectivity through their immigration policies. Screening can be made dependent on skills 
or not (as for refugees) and depending on the criteria that are used, the pool of immigrants 
arriving in a country will be more or less educated.  
These early studies highlight that the theoretical prediction about the type of selectivity 
(positive or negative) depends ultimately on the assumptions made and the way in which 
migration costs are designed plays a central role. For example, Borjas (1987) arrives to the 
conclusion that selectivity depends on the dispersion of wages in the countries. This result 
derives from the fact that wages depend on an unobservable component with a certain variance 
and from his assumption of constant migration costs. Chiswick (1999) instead thinks migration 
costs as different among individuals and shows how huge wage differentials among countries 
are required in order to witness negative selection. Both models have reasonable assumptions 
and that is the reason why Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2011) affirms: “studying the selection 
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of migrants thus becomes an empirical question” (ibid, p.73). Unfortunately, the problem is not 
solved through the use of data; it is actually magnified: since Borjas (1987) there has been many 
studies that using different (or even the same) datasets reached very different results.  
Several papers have focused on the controversial issue of migration flows from Mexico to the 
United States. According to Borjas (1987) theory (and empirics), migrants from Mexico should 
be negatively selected. However, many empirical studies found the opposite results, for 
example Chiquiar and Hanson (2002) and Orrenius and Zavodny (2005). While Ibarraran and 
Lubotsky (2007) found negative selection.  
In a later paper, McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) claim that these contrasting results can be 
explained through the role of migration networks that can alter substantially the pattern of self-
selection. Communities in which migration networks (number of individuals who already 
migrated) are weak favour migration of higher skilled workers and vice versa for communities 
with strong migration networks. This element has not been usually considered in empirical 
models; consequently, such models suffer of a relevant omitted variable problem, which 
explains why different datasets yield different results on the sign of selectivity.  
The role of migration networks directly descends from the interpretation of migration costs. As 
seen in Borjas (1987), and in many interpretations of this model, costs are proportional to wages 
at home, but there is no efficiency in migrating; costs are assumed to be decreasing in skills in 
Chiswick (1999). According to McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) migration is costly, involving 
not only upfront monetary costs, but also search and information and psychological costs. All 
these costs varies with education level (fixed costs can be met by high skilled individuals with 
less hours of work or with lower borrowing costs; collect information is easier for more 
educated) and if they are large enough (and credit constraints binding), positive selection should 
emerge. The focus of all the debate on self-selection should then be on determining the 
migration costs of given “communities”. In this sense, networks play a role: they diminish 
migration costs since they provide information (on border crossing, smugglers, etc.), they 
provide housing services or help relaxing the credit constraints. According to the authors, these 
effects are more beneficial to low-skilled individuals, leading to a negative selection wherever 
these networks are particularly strong.   
They develop their intuition first through the design of a theoretical model, which is based on 
Chiquiar and Hanson (2002), to allow for network effects. Then, they empirically test the model 
using survey data from Mexico. Their work suggests that negative selection is more probable 
where there are stronger networks effect, in line with the hypothesis that a critical factor in 
determining who migrate is high costs of migration.  
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The crucial role of networks in migration decision is stressed also by Hatton (2020). He 
concentrates on asylum migration to the developed world and he finds that “the most powerful 
single variable influencing asylum-seeker flows to a country is the stock of previous migrants 
from the same origin” (Hatton, 2020, p. 85).  
These findings help in part to reconcile the conflicting results about Mexicans’ selection found 
in the literature and at the same time suggests that the more migration, the more negatively 
selected migrants are.  
Another effort to address conflicting results on migrant selectivity was made by Grogger and 
Hanson (2011). They aim at reconciling all the empirical findings of the literature on migrant 
selectivity with the Roy’s income maximization framework. According to them the key is 
focusing on absolute wage differences, consistent with linear utility, rather than on the relative 
ones, consistent with log utility.  
Since Borjas (1987) migrants’ self-selection has been explained looking at the variances in 
income distributions across countries. No role is played by differences in mean incomes. And 
as Borjas (1987) correctly pointed out, usually in less developed countries wage differentials 
by skill level are higher than in developed countries. Only individuals at the bottom of skills 
distribution are encouraged to migrate, while the incentive for high skilled individuals is not so 
strong.  
Grogger and Hanson (2011), testing empirically different model specifications, find that the 
data reject log utility, suggesting migration actually responds to absolute rewards to skill. Since 
absolute skill-related earning differences are instead much larger in destination than in source 
countries, positive selection of migrants is a rational outcome. Through this specification is 
possible to reconcile the Roy model with strong positive selectivity. Moreover, Grogger and 
Hanson (2011) stress that many factors can affect the selection of migrants and that could be 
the reason of the divergence in the empirical findings. 
 
Their work is not limited to the analysis of migrant selectivity, but it explores also the scale of 
migration, and the phenomenon of positive sorting (i.e., migrants are more likely to settle in 
destination countries with high reward to skills). This interest comes from the simple 
observation of data on OECD migration flows: US and Canada, although receive 51.4% of 
OECD’s immigrants, attract the 65.5% of those with tertiary schooling (more than 13 years of 
education). On the contrary, Europe is able to attract only the 23.6% of tertiary-educated OECD 
immigrants, on a total percentage of 38.4 OECD immigrants. 
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Both positive selection and positive sorting, according to Grogger and Hanson (2011), can be 
explained by a simple model of income maximization.  
Individuals compare wage differentials in order to decide whether to migrate. Differently from 
Borjas (1987) the wage depends entirely on the return on education investment- primary (𝜇ℎ), 
secondary (𝛿ℎ
2), or tertiary (𝛿ℎ
3)- and there is no room for the unobserved characteristics of the 
individual. According to this framework, the individual i with skill level j migrating to 
destination country h from the source country s, gain: 
 𝑊𝑖𝑠ℎ
𝑗








 is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual has schooling level j.  
The individual also faces migration costs: 
 𝐶𝑖𝑠ℎ
𝑗









The authors assume that costs have two components: a fixed one, 𝑓𝑠ℎ  (cost of moving), and one 
that varies by skill level, 𝑔𝑠ℎ
𝑗
 (we can think about costs influenced by linguistic and geographic 
proximity among the countries or by the destination country’s immigration policies) which can 
both be positive or negative. 
The model uses a linear utility function dependent on the difference between wages and 
migration costs and also on an unobserved idiosyncratic term ( 𝑖𝑠ℎ
𝑗
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(2.3) 
Assuming individuals choose whether and where to migrate maximizing their utility, it is 



















is the population share of education group j in s that migrate to h, while 𝐸𝑠
𝑗
 the one 
that reamins. Already from this equation it is possible to see that the skill group-specific log 
odds of migrating should depend positively on the wage difference in skill-specific wages and 
negatively on costs. To understand emigrant selection the authors look at the difference of this 
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(2.5) 
On the left side of equation (2.5) there is the difference in skill mix between migrants and non-
migrants: if it is positive, then there is positive selectivity. Since 𝛼 >0, this happens if the wage 
difference between the source and destination, net of skill varying migration costs, is greater 
for high-skill workers.  
To investigate instead migrants’ sorting across destinations, it is sufficiently to collect the terms 


















Equation (2.6) shows that migrants sort themselves across destinations on the basis of skill 
rewards, meaning that if a country h has higher return to skills than country k, it will have more 
skilled migrants with respect to the mix of country k.  
Equations (2.4), (2.5) and (2.6) highlight the role of fixed costs and absolute wage differences 
in driving the pattern of selectivity. Since Borjas (1987) much of the literature looks instead at 
relative returns and costs proportional to income. As if, individuals look at the variances and 
not at the means of income distributions across skill levels, when deciding if and where to 
migrate. Moreover, costs are interpreted as opportunity ones, meaning that migration is more 
expensive for individuals with higher skills.  
To compare the two settings, Grogger and Hanson (2011) adapt their model using logarithmic 
utility and an error term that is proportional and not additive. To test their model with linear 
utility and the one with relative returns to skills, they use the data collected by Docquier, Lowell 
and Marfouk (2009) from the national statistical offices of OECD countries.  
In line with their theory they find positive and significant coefficient for the selection and 
sorting of migrants, showing that absolute wage gap can be higher for skilled emigrants, even 
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if the relative gap is not. This is particularly true when considering the post-tax wages, which 
can also contribute to explain the great attractiveness of North America: not only these countries 
have relatively large pre-tax skill-related wages difference, but also the tax systems are less 
progressive. 
According to Grogger and Hanson (2011) absolute wage differences are a better predictor of 
migration pattern because linear utility model is free from the restriction that the decreasing 
marginal returns to income are comparable among source-destination countries. It is unlikely 
that they “matter equally when comparing incomes of $3000 a year in Ecuador to $15,000 a 
year in Spain as when comparing $8000 a year in Turkey to $40,000 a year in Germany, yet 
log-linear requires that they do” (Grogger and Hanson, 2011, p. 45). Using linear utility 
marginal returns are not considered at all. However, given that among the analysed countries 
there are huge differences in income, Grogger and Hanson (2011) believe their restriction 
abuses the reality less than the strong curvature required by logarithmic utility.  
Grogger and Hanson (2011) recognize that numerous other factors can influence selectivity and 
sorting, e.g., geographic, linguistic, and political relationships between countries. Testing for 
these “exogenous” factors they find that:  
 English-speaking countries receive more migrants than others, ceteris paribus, and that 
their migrants are also better educated. At the same time, given a certain country of 
origin, its migrants are higher in destination countries that share with it a common 
language. These migrants are also better educated than non-migrants of the same origin 
country and also than migrants from the same source country leaning towards other 
destinations. This phenomenon seems to suggest that migrants are aware of language 
being a strategical tool to gain higher rewards to skill.  
 Contiguity increases the scale of migration, but reduces the skills of migrants. The 
interpretation of this fact, according to Grogger and Hanson (2011)’s conjecture, may 
be that migrating is easier between neighbouring, especially the illegal one.  
 A negative effect characterises also countries with colonial past. Recent literature 
(Pedersen et.al, 2004; Mayda, 2010) points out the role of the economic and social 
networks between a country and its former colonies in increasing bilateral migration 
flows. The results found “are consistent with these linkages disproportionately affecting 
migration of the less-skilled” (Grogger and Hanson, 2011 p.51).  
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In their study, Grogger and Hanson (2011) focus on the question of if migrants are more skilled 
than the population remaining in its origin country. They do not investigate if different types of 
migrants (economic and humanitarian ones), presents systematic differences in their skill levels.  
However, in the empirical analysis they find an important role of immigration policy in 
affecting selectivity. Generous asylum policies seem to reduce immigrants’ skills with respect 
to the rest of the population remaining in its home country (non-migrants). Moreover, a 
generous asylum policy in a certain host country reduces the skills of migrants in that country 
with respect to migrants directed towards other destinations. Grogger and Hanson (2011) 
explain this finding suggesting that destinations that allocate higher share of visas to refugees 
may limit opportunities to entry to more skilled migrants. However, they are not able to provide 
a deeper and more complete analysis due to the absence of data.   
All the results described above derive from the model with linear utility (absolute wage 
differences).Testing the same regressions on the basis of the log-utility model brings to different 
results.  
 
Belot and Hatton (2012) use the same dataset of Grogger and Hanson (2011) for the empirical 
estimation, and build on the Roy-Borjas model, focusing on why the education content of 
emigrants to OECD countries differs so much among countries of origin. The migration 
literature has deeply discussed the mechanisms involved in the self-selection of migrants, 
especially looking at the economic incentives and constraints of individuals. However, still few 
has been said on why the selection of migrants is so different from source country to source 
country. 
 
According to Belot and Hatton (2012) a simple glimpse at OECD data on the stock of foreign-
born in 2001 can explain the interest in exploring migrants’ selection from such an angle.  
The percentage of highly educated migrants by country of origin varies consistently across 
regions. If for many countries in Asia and Africa the high-educated share among migrants is far 
higher than the one of the overall population in the country of origin (positive educational 
selection), for many others in Central America, Southern Europe and North America, the gap 
is much smaller.    
This variance is present also looking at the different destination countries: the percentage of 
highly educated foreign-born in each OECD country differs considerably. As already pointed 
out by Grogger and Hanson (2011), there are huge variations across countries and not in line 
with their migrant quotas. Canada, for example, which is a country with a highly selective 
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immigration policy (point system mechanism), has a population of foreign born that for the 
almost 60% is highly educated; in many European countries it does not reach 20%.  
 
Since Borjas (1987), migrants’ self-selection has been explained resorting to the diverse 
distributions of income between different countries. Even if it is true that differences in returns 
to skills between source and destination countries affect the individual’s decision to migrate 
and have a role in migrants’ self-selection, according to Belot and Hatton (2012) many other 
factors, that could also vary by skill levels, affect the decision to migrate. To cite some of these 
factors: the individual’s home country bias, the costs of gaining admission in a country (which 
could vary by individuals and skill levels) and the poverty constraints which allow only the 
richer to migrate. The presence of these other factors could explain the huge variations in skilled 
content by countries of origin outlined above. Moreover, according to Belot and Hatton (2012), 
it is responsible of the contrasting results found by migrants’ selection literature.   
This statement can easily be explained by the following figure, which captures the essence of 
Roy model:  
 
Figure 2.2: Destination and origin wage-by-skill schedules. 
Source: Belot and Hatton (2012), p. 1107. 
Here 𝑤(𝑦) is the destination-country wage schedule, whose slope represents the return on 
education, while 𝑤(𝑥)1 and 𝑤(𝑥)2 are two possible wage schedules in the country of origin. In 
the first case, there is positive selection: only individuals with education level higher than 𝑠1 
have an incentive to migrate. On the contrary, if the wage schedule of the country of origin is 
designed as 𝑤(𝑥)2, there will be negative selection since only those with education level below 
𝑠2 have an incentive to leave.  
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The real problem, according to Belot and Hatton (2012), is the identification of home country’s 
wage schedule. Its position depends on several factors, many of which can differ across 
individuals (e.g., individual’s preferences for home country, credit constraints, direct and 
indirect costs of migration, etc.). This introduces even greater heterogeneity in the selection 
such that the wage schedule in itself might not be a good predictor of the skill selectivity of 
migrants. That is the reason why so many studies in the literature have found contrasting results 
even if referring to the same framework (Roy-Borjas model).  
It is important to focus on the driver of selectivity and “on what explains the educational 
selectivity of outmigration across source countries and what combination of incentives and 
policy determines the skill content of immigration among the main destinations” (Belot and 
Hutton, 2012, p. 1106). As a result, they will stress the role of credit constraints: despite skill 
returns, migrants from poor countries are positive selected because the low-skill individuals are 
incapacitated to leave.  
Belot and Hatton (2012)’s theoretical model starts from the usual characterization of wages in 
source (x) and destination (y) countries for individual i.  
Wages in the origin country (𝑤𝑥𝑖) depend on the return to education 𝛼1 (𝑠𝑖 is individual i’s 
education level) and on a random unobserved productivity component with zero mean and 
uncorrelated with the individual’s preference for migration ( 𝑥𝑖).  
ln𝑤𝑥𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑠𝑖 + 𝑥𝑖 
In the destination country, wages (𝑤𝑦𝑖) depend once again on the return of education and the 
unobserved productivity (respectively 𝛽1𝑠𝑖  and 𝑦𝑖), but also on the cultural distance between 
the origin and destination country (𝑢) which affects the transferability of educational skills. 
This term is related to the human capital of the individual in two different ways. From one side 
the higher the education, the easier for the individual to overcome the cultural difference; for 
this reason the term 𝛽3𝑠𝑖 reduce the negative effect of cultural difference. On the other side, 
cultural differences can have smaller effects on productivity for jobs that require lower skills, 
where little human capital has to be transferred; this effect is captured by the term 𝛽2.  
ln𝑤𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑖 − 𝑢(𝛽2 − 𝛽3𝑠𝑖) + 𝑦𝑖  
The incentive for the individual to migrate is the difference in earnings between destination and 
origin country, net of direct migration costs (c) and net of the individual’s non-economic 
preferences (𝑧𝑖 which is a random variable with mean greater than zero such that the average 
preference for the country of origin is positive).  
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𝐼𝑖 = ln𝑤𝑦𝑖 − ln(𝑤𝑥𝑖 + 𝑐) − 𝑧𝑖 
The direct migration costs can be better specified as 𝑑(1 − 𝛾𝑠𝑖). d is a measure of the direct 
costs and is inversely related to the educational level, as previously suggested by Chiswick 
(1999). However, direct costs are not the only one affecting the individual’s decision to leave. 
Other factors can increase the costs of migrating. For example immigration policy, can make it 
difficult for migrants to enter quickly in the destination country. For this reason Belot and 
Hatton (2012) add to the index function also a variable of individual policy cost, 𝑃𝑖. It can be 
written as 𝑃𝑖 = 𝛿0 − 𝛿1𝑠𝑖, where the second term captures the possibility for immigrant policy 
to be skill-selective (as for example in Canada). Finally, since the authors guess that credit 
constraints are a key element in explaining selection across countries, the term 𝑅𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖𝑟(1 −
𝑠𝑖) is inserted. 𝐶𝑖  represents the total cost of migration (both the direct and the policy one) and 
𝑟 is the general poverty rate. The poverty constraint is then proportional to the total costs, and 
again varies by skill-level. Substituting in 𝐶𝑖 the definition of direct and policy costs, 𝑅𝑖  
becomes equal to: 𝑅𝑖 = [𝑑 + 𝛿0 − (𝑑𝛾 + 𝛿1)𝑠𝑖]𝑟(1 − 𝑠𝑖).  
Combining the incentive to migrate with the various cost items described above, the following 
probability to migrate (for individual i) is obtained:  
Pr(𝑚𝑖 = 1) = 𝑃𝑟{𝛽0 − 𝛼0 − 𝑑 − 𝛿0 − 𝛽2𝑢 + (𝛽1 − 𝛼1 + 𝛽3𝑢 + 𝑑𝛾 + 𝛿1)𝑠𝑖
− [𝑑 + 𝛿0 + (𝑑𝛾 + 𝛿1)𝑠𝑖]𝑟(1 − 𝑠𝑖) > 𝑧𝑖 + 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖} 
Assuming that there are two education level (high educated with 𝑠𝑖=1 and low educated with 
𝑠𝑖=0), they write the migration rate for high-educated (H) and low educated (L) as: 
𝑀𝐻
𝑁𝐻
= 𝛽0 − 𝛼0 − 𝑑 − 𝛿0 − 𝛽2𝑢 + 𝛽1 − 𝛼1 + 𝛽3𝑢 + 𝑑𝛾 + 𝛿1 − 𝑧̅ 
𝑀𝐿
𝑁𝐿
= 𝛽0 − 𝛼0 − 𝑑 − 𝛿0 − 𝛽2𝑢 − (𝑑 + 𝛿0)𝑟 − 𝑧̅ 






= 𝛽1 − 𝛼1 + 𝛽3𝑢 + 𝑑𝛾 + 𝛿1 + (𝑑 + 𝛿0)𝑟 
Looking at the first two terms of this equation, we can appreciate the same result of Roy’s 
model: an increase in the return to skills in the destination country, relative to the home one, 
increases positive selection. However, many other variables are present: cultural distance can 
affect selection, even if its sign is not known; direct costs of migration and policy selectivity 
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modify migrants’ abilities. Finally, it is reasonable to think that the degree of poverty, r, reduces 
unskilled migration, affecting selection directly and through the interaction with migration 
costs. 
Belot and Hatton (2012) test their model empirically through regression equations. The dataset 
used is the same of Grogger and Hanson (2011), which in turn is the same of Docquier et al. 
(2009). However, the specification of the model is different since they use logarithmic utility. 
Successively, they also test linear utility, adapting their model to the framework of Grogger and 
Hanson (2011). With this specification they find that absolute wage differences indeed induce 
positive selection, but only when omitting the liquidity constraints. If the credit constraint 
variable is inserted, the latter is still significant and positive, while the coefficient of the absolute 
wage gap becomes negative.  
Besides the comparison of models, interesting results are found.  
First of all, it seems that poverty constraint is a key variable in explaining selectivity: when 
excluded from the model the effect of the wage premium is negative and insignificant; 
considering instead also the poverty trap, results turn in line with the Roy-Borjas model.   
In the second place Belot and Hatton (2012) tests many factors for sorting, that we have already 
seen also in Grogger and Hanson (2011). They analyse cultural distance finding a positive effect 
on selection, and the presence of colonial history, which instead increase the number of low 
skilled. Contrary to Grogger and Hanson (2011) they do not find a clear positive effect of 
language proximity, suggesting that linguistic distance may be less of a barrier for lower 
educated, whose jobs require less transferability of human capital.  
Overall, it seems that costs and constraints are important in shaping the selectivity of migration.  
An important factor they inquire is the effect of immigration policy in the destination country. 
Not only as we have seen, screening mechanism at the border can have an effect on the costs 
of migration, differentiating them by skill level, but also behind-border policies can affect self-
selection. In particular, Belot and Hatton (2012) presume that some factors are crucial, such as 
the generosity of the welfare state, the flexibility towards foreigners in the labour market and 
the ease of recognition of foreign qualification to work in the labour market. The latter actually 
seems to be the most important effect, both in magnitude and significance. The generosity of 




This analysis, differently from Grogger and Hanson (2011), leaves out policy towards asylum 
seekers and family reunification migrants, which actually could have a large effect on selection.  
2.4. Selectivity differences and migrants’ classes  
 
A study specifically focused on the differences in selectivity between classes of migrants is 
carried out by Aksoy and Poutvaara (2019), who investigate the self-selection of refugees and 
irregular migrants arrived in Europe in 2015 and 2016.  
Borjas (1987) already investigated the case of self-selection among refugees in his model. 
However, it was a peculiar case of sorting for “countries that have recently experienced a 
Communist takeover” (Borjas, 1987, p. 534). The idea was that the regime change from the 
market economy to Communism would have brought changes in income distribution among 
the individuals, especially for entrepreneurs’ wealth. Migrant escaping from that regime would 
have been persons unable to match with the new political structure, but not necessarily low –
income or low-skill individuals. In the new regime, with the new income distribution, they 
would have been low-income individuals, figuring as below-average immigrants in terms of the 
country of origin. However, they would outperform the average U.S. native worker, fitting well 
in a market economy.  
Aksoy and Poutvaara (2019) also start from the Roy-Borjas model of self-selection, trying to 
explain why it is not always verified in reality. In particular, their focus is on economic migrants 
arriving in Europe from African and Middle East countries: from a theoretical point of view, 
following  the Roy model and given that European countries have much narrower income 
differences, migrants from those areas should come from the lower end of the skill distribution; 
however, empirically is possible to find different results. Even considering Grogger and Hanson 
(2011) extended framework in which selectivity depends simply on the absolute return to skills, 
there are still cases of positive self-selection even from countries with higher return to skill. 
To solve such inconsistency they provide a theoretical model of refugee self-selection (stressing 
how it differs from economic migrants’ selection), adding as key variable the presence of risks 
related to living in an unsafe country. They claim that “extending the Roy-Borjas model to 
account for risks associated with conflict and persecution can explain why migrants from 
countries facing a major conflict or large-scale repression are positively self-selected, even 
when returns to skill in those countries would be higher than in the destination countries”2.  
                                                             




The framework is always Borjas (1987), even if the unobservable skill components are left out 
as in Grogger and Hanson (2011) since they could not be tested in their data.  
Following the literature Aksoy and Poutvaara (2019) develop two equations for the wages in 
the home (k) and destination (d) country: 𝑤𝑖
𝑘 = exp (𝛼𝑘 + 𝑟𝑘ℎ𝑖) and 𝑤𝑖
𝑑 = exp (𝛼𝑑 + 𝑟𝑑ℎ𝑖 −
𝜋𝑘).  
The wage is composed of a fixed return common for all who have at least primary education 
(𝛼𝑘/𝑑), and a second term which captures the return to human capital above primary education 
(r). The wage equation in the destination country is also adjusted for the possibility of loss of 
potential productivity due to the imperfect transferability of human capital (𝜋𝑘).  
Individual’s expected utility however does not simply depend on wages (that enter in the 
logarithmic form); there is a country-specific risk q of losing the wage and suffering additional 
loss L (which instead enters linearly). It is reasonable to expect q to be higher in countries with 
war or conflicts and close to zero in relatively safe countries. In the latter case migrants are 
more motivated by lack of job opportunities rather than conflicts or persecutions. Moreover, 
refugees and irregular migrants face also travel risks, capture by the variable s bounded to be 
between zero and one. Also, in this case there is the possibility of facing a loss L.   
The equations of the expected utility are then the following:  
𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝑘 = (1 − 𝑞𝑘) log(𝑤𝑖
𝑘) − 𝑞𝑘𝐿𝑘 
𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝑑 = (1 − 𝑠𝑘) log(𝑤𝑖
𝑑) − 𝑠𝑘𝐿𝑀 − 𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑘 + 𝑖 
where 𝑖 depicts various costs and benefits related to migration that are not captured by other 
terms, including the valuation of different cultural norms and social networks.  
It is rational to migrate if 𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝑑> 𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝑘  which, with some calculations, leads to:  
𝑖 > 𝑖
∗ = [(1 − 𝑞𝑘)𝑟𝑘 − (1 − 𝑠𝑘)𝑟𝑑]ℎ𝑖 + (1 − 𝑞𝑘)𝛼𝑘 − (1 − 𝑠𝑘)𝛼𝑑 + 𝜋𝑘 − 𝑞𝑘𝐿𝑘 + 𝑠𝑘𝐿𝑀
+ 𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑘 
Migrants are then positive selected if (1 − 𝑞𝑘)𝑟𝑘 < (1 − 𝑠𝑘)𝑟𝑑.  
From these results it follows that self-selection depends also on the risks of staying and of 
migrating, not only on returns of human capital. This implies that for a relatively safe country 
the prediction we can make about selection are still in line with the Borjas model; however if 
the country of origin suffer a sufficiently severe conflict, (whenever  𝑞𝑘 > 1−
(1−𝑠𝑘)𝑟𝑑
𝑟𝑘
  ) the 
self-selection is reversed.  
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To test their model the authors use data of the Flow Monitoring Survey (FMS) obtained from 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The survey aims at providing a sample 
representative of migrants coming to Europe through the Central and Eastern Mediterranean 
route between 2015 and 2016. Then the model tests also for a sample of migrants arrived in 
Turkey between 2016 and 2018. These data are combined with 2009-2014 Gallup World Polls 
to acquire more information on migrants’ countries of origin and its population. It is particular 
precious for comparison between migrating and non-migrating individuals of the same country 
of origin. Finally Aksoy and Poutvaara (2019) use the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) 
battle-related deaths dataset in order to classify countries by their conflict intensity. In 
particular, following the definition provided by UCDP, they divide the countries of origin in 
the dataset in  three main categories: countries at major conflict, at minor and no conflict. Major 
conflict identifies any country that witnessed 1000 or more battle-related deaths in any of the 
years 2009-2014. Minor conflict instead is for all the countries with a number of battle-related 
death in the range of 25 and 999. The no conflict category is instead quite self-explanatory.  
Looking at the descriptive statistics it is already clear that Aksoy and Poutvaara’s intuition is in 
line with the empirical data: a part from few countries (Nigeria, Bangladesh and Senegal), 
migrants are better educated than the source population and 77% of the sample is composed by 
migrants fleeing due to conflict or persecution.  
More specifically the authors find that “both male and female refugees from countries suffering 
from major conflict are positively self-selected with respect to secondary and tertiary 
education” (Aksoy and Poutvaara, 2019, p.4).  
For what concerns instead irregular migrants, female are also positively self-selected while 
male do not differ much from non-migrants in terms of their education. 
This strong positive self-selection is present also if we investigate the predicted earnings of 
refugees and irregular migrants and for all the country groups (major, minor and no conflict), 
suggesting that liquidity/poverty constraints remain important also among refugees.  
In order to find causal relations, a series of multivariate regression models is estimated. Results 
are significant and in line with the theory: refugees who escaped conflict or persecution are 
more likely to have secondary and tertiary level education compared not only to the source 
population, but also to those who cite other reasons for leaving their countries. Estimations with 
predicted individual pre-migration income also point towards the same direction: the effect of 




Interestingly Aksoy and Poutvaara (2019) investigating the sorting of refugees and irregular 
migrants find that they do not substantially differ from other migrants: they respond to 
incentives like social welfare or structure of wages, etc. 
Before Aksoy and Poutvaara (2019), Chin and Cortez (2015) analysed selectivity across 
migrant classes. They wanted to understand if the quantity and quality of refugees might differ 
from that of other types of migrants. However, they were not able to reach a unique solution, 
neither from a theoretical point of view, nor empirically.   
As usual in the literature, they build a model in which a maximizing individual decides to 
migrate if the benefits are higher than the costs. Such decision does not depend only on the 
expected incomes in the different countries, also other considerations play a major role. For 
example: the cultural differences or similarities between two countries, the level of freedom 
and the risks of persecution associated with living in a given country, or again the extension of 
the social network on which someone can rely. Chin and Cortes (2015) defines these factors as 
the amenities of living in a given country (𝐴𝑖0 amenities for individual i of residing in country 
0 and 𝐴𝑖1 of living in country 1).  
An individual decides to move if the difference between the utility of leaving (𝑉𝑖1) and the one 
of staying (𝑉𝑖0) is greater than zero. The different utilities are defined as:  
𝑉𝑖1 ≡ 𝛽1𝐴𝑖1 + 𝛽2(𝑤𝑖1 − 𝐶𝑖01) 
𝑉𝑖0 ≡ 𝛽1𝐴𝑖0 + 𝛽2𝑤𝑖0 
The authors analyse each variable, focusing on what value should be expected when considering 
refugees with respect to other migrant categories.  
Ai0 as said represents the (dis)amenities to live in the home country (0). Since the key defining 
feature of refugees is exactly that they are unsafe living in their home country, we can expect 
Ai0 to be smaller for them with respect to other migrants. It could also be negative, since staying 
in the home country exposes individuals to higher risks. This tells us that the quantity of 
migrants coming from countries where a refugee-producing event suddenly happens, is higher, 
but still does not add anything to the investigation on selectivity. According to the model of 
migration choice, individuals consider also their wage gain. If we imagine that individuals are 
identical except in their wage gain from migrating (𝑔), it is possible to find a threshold ?̅? that 
discriminates the case when everyone migrates from the one where everyone stays. A reduction 
of Ai0 would bring some people with 𝑔 < ?̅? across the threshold to migrate. Consequently, the 
wage gain threshold for refugees is lower or even negative, meaning that refugees are less 
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selected along dimensions associated with economic gain in the destination country, because 
economic gain is less of a factor in their decision.   
Wi0 is the wage individuals earn in country 0. Non-refugee migrants should be more sensible 
to wages. However, low wages can be the result of a refugee-producing event. If this is the case, 
a low Wi0 determines a flow of refugee-migrants, who are now the more likely to migrate. The 
effect on selectivity can be various: if the refugee –producing event reduces Wi0 broadly across 
the population, the marginal migrants are less selected than in a situation of no refugee-
producing event. If the reduction of wages happens only for a subgroup of the population (e.g., 
political dissenters or a persecuted minority), it’s only the migration rate of this subgroup that 
increases, and the effect on selectivity depends on the characteristics of this group.  
Ai1 and Wi1 represent instead the so called pull factors which are expected to play a crucial role 
for non-refugees. It is straightforward to assume that, for example, individuals who migrate to 
reunite with their families, might have only one desired destination, with and Ai1 very high for 
that destination country; or that economic migrants are likely to choose destinations with higher 
Wi1. 
Refugees instead are limited by push factor: the latter can make their utility higher even in 
countries with low or negative wages differentials. Once again, this tell us that refugees have 
higher chances to migrate, since they have more destination countries where it is convenient to 
move. As a matter of fact, most refugees live in neighbouring developing countries which are 
instead undesirable to economic migrants who may decide not to migrate at all.  
Finally, the variable 𝐶𝑖01 captures the costs of migrating. The physical costs can be thought to 
be equal across individuals. Other costs may differ, the authors, for example, consider as in 
Borjas (1987) time cost of migrating (i.e., the opportunity cost of the migration process) which 
are higher for people with higher Wi0. Another factor could be the presence of credit constraints, 
which suggests positive selection also for, or even especially for, refugees. The idea behind it 
is that a conflict or a persecution can aggravate the financial situation of individuals. In 
particular, it can happen that people lose their properties and also their connections once useful 
to borrow money. The consequence is that only the richest can still afford to migrate. In this 
sense, refugees that enter developed countries should be highly selected on wealth, and so 
maybe on education. 
According to the authors, “the model has an ambiguous prediction for the quality of refugees 
relative to other types of migrants—the relative quality depends on a number of variables, 
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including the nature of the refugee-producing event and the nature of selection in “regular” 
migration flows from country 0 to country 1” (Chin and Cortes 2015, p.600).  
As we can see this prediction is quite different from the one of Aksoy and Poutvaara (2019) 
and the reason is that in Aksoy and Poutvaara (2019) the self-selection depends on the risks of 
conflict or persecution faced in the country of origin. A higher risk could actually produce 
stronger selection in migrants. This because the individual face an expected utility and with a 
certain probability not only he/she will lose the possibility of gaining wages, but he/she will 
also suffer a major loss. On the contrary, in Chin and Cortes (2015) persecution is simply a 
disamenity, which does not affect wages in the home country.  
Empirically the authors try to find an answer through the use of the New Immigrant Survey-
2003 (NIS), which provides a nationally representative sample of individuals (8573) gaining 
legal permanent residence in the U.S. in 2003.  
Looking at the descriptive statistics, they find out that refugees fall in the middle of the 
distribution of educational attainment among US immigrants. They are usually more educated 
than family migrants, but less than the economic ones. The same result can be appreciated when 
looking at the individual’s sector of employment prior to the migration: refugees are not the 
class of migrant that brings more low-skilled individuals in the US.  
 
As common in the literature, Chin and Cortez (2015) provide a deeper investigation of their 
early results. They want to understand if the selection of migrants operate within a given source 
country or if the different characteristics that can be observed across migrants’ categories 
actually depend on the fact that these migrants come from different countries of origin, with 
different characteristics and scenarios. If for example countries of conflicts tend to be the less 
developed, an increase in the quantity of their migrants—with no change in quality—can end 
up with the average refugee being less educated.  
The authors check differences in mean after controlling for country of origin fixed effects, 
finding similar results. So, it appears that the variation is due to within-country selection, with 
refugees being selected from the population in a different way than “regular” migration; a key 
factor in this process could be the nature of the refugee-producing event or the wage structure. 
However, at the same time all the coefficients of the variables connected with schooling 
decrease, suggesting that migrants from countries that send more refugees to the U.S. have 




In a later work Dustmann, Fasani, Frattini, Minale, and Schonberg (2016) also stress that the 
differences in migrants’ human capital cannot be fully explained by within-country selectivity: 
cross-country variability plays a role too. In their study, using the data from the 2008 wave of 
the EU Labour Force Survey, they find that refugees in Europe are on average less educated 
than natives and economic immigrants from EU15; however, considering non-European 
immigrants, refugees are actually better educated than economic migrants.  
The problem with these results is that they are very sensitive to the considered dataset: with 
different cohorts or different destination countries, results could vary. For example, Chin and 
Cortes (2015), test also another dataset for their analysis finding quite opposite results. They 
use pooled individual-level data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 U.S. Census of Population and 
Housing and the 2005-2010 American Community Survey (ACS). Specifically, they analyse a 
fixed cohort of immigrants who entered the United States in the years 1975 through 1980. In 
this case, looking at the descriptive statistics, economic immigrants seem to be more 
concentrated in the lower levels of education distribution. The results are confirmed also when 
using regression analysis.  
To find another way to assess the selectivity of refugees with respect to economic migrants, 
Chin and Cortez (2015) consider looking at the investment in human capital after migration. If 
it is true that refugees have a lower endowment of human capital, then to integrate in the 
destination country they need larger investments than economic migrants. However, the 
investment decisions are influenced also by many other factors, first of all the individual time 
horizon in the host country, which is usually quite different among refugees and economic 
migrants. Moreover, it is also to be considered that refugees, due to the experiences they live, 
tend to witness more human capital disruption, which in turn could bring to lower investments.    
Refugees migration has always been a great concern for all developed countries. Since the 
Geneva Convention in 1951, some form of protection for people persecuted in their home 
country has been granted. However, the increase in economic migration has determined a 
screening problem for the host states, unable to detect the “true refugees” from economic 
migrants who mimic them hoping to get better conditions and a more generous treatment. 
Consequently, rich countries have started shading on the performance of their obligations 
increasing the standards of proof for refugee status, in turn harming persecuted people or 
individuals escaping from conflicts (Bubb, Kremer, Levin, 2011). An incentive compatible 
mechanism design is needed to solve the problem: it should become unattractive for economic 
migrants to claim refugee status, while granting the latter full protection.  
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Bubb, Kremer and Levin (2011) look for possible separating mechanisms like tax systems 
leaving refugees with an after-tax income roughly equal to the one they had before migrating, 
or transfer systems that allocate refugees knocking on the doors of wealthier countries to 
developing ones, in exchange for money. Some of these mechanisms could actually solve the 
problem of screening, but will impose negative externalities on developing countries, or will 
involve solutions “morally objectionable”.  
Despite the possibility of finding a solution to the debated question of migrant selectivity, it 
should be asked also if selectivity matters in in the process of integration. The reason behind 
selecting migrants is that more educated individuals fits better into the host society (e.g., 
integrate faster) and, given the fact that they have higher probabilities of finding employment 
and earnings, that they contribute more positively on the fiscal balance of welfare states. 
A paper by Adeymir (2011) challenge this reasoning: it finds that positive selection does not 
automatically translate into greater success in the labour market.  
The first aim of his work is to understand if skill-based selection mechanisms (which are 
common in countries like Canada, Australia, New Zeland) succeed in their purpose of admitting 
immigrants more able to adapt to the host country labour market. Of course, he is able to control 
only for the observed proxies of ability (mainly the education level); nothing can be said about 
self-selection along the unobserved characteristics of individuals.   
Using the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC) Aydemir (2011) finds that the 
Canadian point system mechanism of selection of immigrants actually generates a much higher 
skilled immigrant flow than those admitted through family preferences. This happens not only 
because the point system mechanism changes the skill distribution of migrants towards the 
higher skilled. There is also an indirect effect due to assortative matching: the more educated 
migrants selected through the point system are more likely to have more educated partners who 
later on could be admitted as family migrants.  
It is important to stress that this outcome is generated because the point mechanism changes the 
selection mechanism inside a given country of origin. It is not the case that enforcing a point 
mechanism system change the nationalities mix of migrants who usually applied for entering 
in that country. It does seem to confirm Belot and Hatton (2008) and Chin and Cortes (2015)’s 
findings about within-country selection.  
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At the same time, Aydemir (2011) stresses that there are also other factors that can affect 
migrant selectivity. For example, economic opportunities in destinations countries have a major 
role in attracting high skilled immigrants, in addition to designed immigration policies.  
However, a question still remains unsolved: does this positive selection translate into better 
labour market outcomes? Considering as indicator of success the conditions of being employed 
in the short run and being rewarded with higher wages, Aydemir (2011) finds that high skilled 
migrants do not differ statistically from family migrants and do not show better integration 
paths. Several reasons may explain this result.  
First, it is always necessary to keep in mind that selection mechanisms can operate only on 
observable characteristics of individuals.  
Second, family migrants may be less educated than selected high skilled immigrants, but they 
can count on a richer amount of resources, thanks to their social networks. Not only they can 
arrive at the destination country with better information and benefit of country-specific human 
capital that is already invested by network fellows, but they can also rely on a stronger net for 
all what concern finding an employment in a short time.  
Finally a crucial factor to which pay attention is the transferability of skills across countries. 
Many of the abilities (education, work experience) acquired in the origin country have no return 
in the host country, making it difficult for high skilled migrants to find a job in line with their 
qualifications and forcing them to invest in host country human capital, delaying the entrance 
in the job market.  
Aydemir (2011), neglecting for a moment selectivity, stress a problematic we have already 
discussed in the previous chapter. Governments have to pay attention also to the foreign 
recognition of education, qualifications and skills because mismatches between demand and 
supply of specific skills in the labour market are present even when migrants are highly 
educated. Being able to attract the ‘right’ persons, but failing to value them, it is a waist of effort 
and resources, for migrants but also for citizens.  
Before Adeymir (2011), Cobb-Clark (2004) studied the same phenomenon in Australia. She 
also spots that selective immigration mechanisms are able to attract more skilled individual 
from an educational, linguistic and professional point of view.  
Differently from Aydemir (2011), she finds that the cohort of high skilled migrants, entering in 
Australia after 1999, perform better in the host country labour market3 with respect to previous 
                                                             
3 The variable chosen as mean of comparison are the participation rate, the level of unemployment and the 
employment to population ratio 
50 
 
cohorts (when point mechanism was not in place). This is true both in the first survey collected 
six months after entrance, and in a second survey collected eighteen months after the first. It 
then seems that these better performances resist also in the medium run.  
However, it is important to understand the causal factors behind these performances. Is it the 
selection mechanism policy that attract only high skilled migrants who consequently do better 
in the labour market, or are the labour market conditions of the Australian economy that 
determine this difference among cohorts? What is the role of income support policy in these 
results?  
Cobb-Clark (2004) reflects on the fact that even if the greater weight in the differences among 
cohorts is given by differences in the demographic and productivity-related characteristics, still 
the labour market conditions and the income-support policy of a country can play a big role in 
determining the success of high skilled-migrants. Income-support policy change the 
individuals’ incentive to look for a job, while the labour market conditions are responsible for 
affecting the ability to find jobs. As Aydemir (2011), she suggests that screening alone is not 

















CHAPTER THREE: MIGRATION POLICY AS AN INCENTIVE MECHANISM 
 
3.1. The Problem 
 
In the first chapter of this work, we have looked at a general overview of the main integration 
measures implemented in developed countries. Despite the fact that migration policy and its 
management are chaotic, a result on which the literature appears to agree is that tailored 
approaches are a key to efficiency. It seems common sense to avoid the use of equal resources 
for individual with different needs and who can contribute differently, according to their level 
of ability and competences. Governments could save important resources if each migrant was 
allowed and willingness to use fully his/her productivity and put the maximum possible effort 
in the process of integration.  
However, as we have learnt in the second chapter of the literature review, detect migrants’ 
abilities is difficult. More importantly, many empirical works have shown how exploiting 
migrants’ categories to infer on their level of productivity gives no clear results, challenging 
the role of different permits and pathways of integration for the different migrant categories 
(refugees, economic migrants, family reunification). The way to detect migrants’ abilities and 
provide resources consequently should be different.  
What we will try to do in this chapter, is to design a mechanism that reveals migrants’ abilities, 
when hidden, and that organizes government’s resources efficiently. Migration policy will be 
structured as an incentive mechanism.  
The integration problem, designed as we will, can be seen as a public economics’ issues, since 
the interest is to understand how the government should allocate resources to migrants, 
managing the trade-off between efficiency and equity.  
Not integrating migrants, not regulating this activity, leads to a socially inefficient outcome. 
For this reason, the government has to intervene destining some public funds to immigrants. At 
this point, the government’s aim when designing policy is to find “an efficient means of revenue 
collection” (Myles, 1995, p.5). “Having determined that the organization of economic activity 
must generate a revenue requirement, one aspect of the role of public economics is to determine 
how this revenue can be collected at the least cost to the economy” (Myles, 1995, p.5).  
The problem we are modelling is then a problem of finding and optimizing the level of public 
policy instruments. In doing so, the government has also to consider the distribution of 
resources in the economy, since it could be desirable to act on the equity’s dimension. 
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It is important to note that, as in taxation problems, the government’s objective is to maximize 
the social welfare. However, differently from other branches of application of public economic 
problems, in this model there are actors (the migrants) who are not part of the society. Managing 
their integration is an issue for optimizing social welfare, but migrants’ wellness is never in the 
government’s aim. Migrants’ utility functions do not add to the citizens’ ones; they do not 
contribute in any way to the social welfare function. That is the reason why they do not appear 
in the government’s objective, at most they are used as constraints to the problem.  
Finally, it is important to remark that the integration problem is analysed as a problem of 
managing a given number of migrants, already settled in a country. The problem begins when 
migrants are already in that country. The rate of their arrival and all the policies designed to 
contrast immigration are exogenous variables to this model.   
3.2. The Model  
 
We imagine that a given country receive an amount N of migrants, in a given unit of time.  
These migrants differ for their abilities (productivity level) 𝜃. For simplicity, we assume there 
are only two levels of productivity: high and low, indicated respectively as 𝜃𝐻 and 𝜃𝐿 . From 
now on the subscript H will always refer to high skilled migrants and the subscript L to the low-
skilled ones. The proportion of migrants belonging to the type H is common knowledge and it 
is equal to 𝛿. The remaining fraction (1 − 𝛿) is composed of low productivity individuals. 
As mentioned, the rate of migrants’ arrival is considered exogenous to the model, so as the 
policy to contrast immigration. The government has then ‘simply’ to deal with these 𝑁 
migrants, trying to maximize their probability of integration. As seen in the first chapter, there 
can be more than one reason for which governments want or should integrate migrants. 
However, we will not discuss them in this simple model. We assume governments invest in 
integration because not doing so comes at a cost (𝑘). 𝐾 can be thought as the quantification of 
the social disutility connected with a failed integration. It comprises the costs of segregation, 
higher risk of criminality, disqualification of the urban fabric, etc.  
Although investing in the integration of high skills individuals is more rewarding, given their 
higher productivity, the government wants to maximize the probability of integration of both 
types of migrants. The reason is that the cost (𝑘) associated with migrants who are not 




As seen in the literature review, the concept of integration is quite complex and involve more 
than one field. However, it seems that without a proper and quick entry in the labour market, 
migrants fail to integrate also in the society. Consequently, for simplicity, we model the 
probability of integration as the probability of entering the labour market. The latter is a function 
of two variables: the migrant’s effort in integrating (𝑒) and an initial input of resources provided 
by the government (𝑞). Unfortunately, the individual’s effort is not directly observable. What 
can be observed, is the number of hours (𝑡) that an individual dedicate to integration activities 
(language courses, skills assessments, bridging programs, etc.).  
The probability depends also on the type 𝜃, is labelled as 𝜋(𝑡, 𝑞, 𝜃), and quite obviously its 
domain is between zero and one: 0 < 𝜋(𝑡, 𝑞) < 1. Specifically, when 𝑡 or 𝑞 tend to zero, 𝜋 
tends to zero; if 𝑡 or 𝑞 goes to infinity, 𝜋 tends to one.  





Where x can be thought as a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function. It is 
function of two inputs, the observable effort and government’s resources:   
𝑥 = (𝑡𝜌 + 𝑞𝜌)
1
𝜌⁄  
The parameter 𝜌, that belongs to the interval 𝜌 ∈ [−∞;1], indicates the degree of 
substitutability/complementarity of the two inputs.  
The marginal productivity of the individual’s effort and of the government’s resources is 
increasing, but at a decreasing rate. Both the first partial derivatives are positive and both the 
second negative:  
o 𝜋𝑡 > 0;  
o 𝜋𝑡𝑡 < 0;  
o 𝜋𝑞 > 0;  
o 𝜋𝑞𝑞 < 0.  
The sign of the mixed second derivatives depend on the coefficient 𝜌:  
o When 𝜌 < 0  and 𝜌 = 1 => 𝜋𝑡𝑞  𝑒 𝜋𝑞𝑡 < 0;  
o When 0 <  𝜌 < 1/3 => 𝜋𝑡𝑞  𝑒 𝜋𝑞𝑡 > 0.  
 
Both for the government and for the migrants, increasing the probability of integration is far 
from being a free process.  
Government’s resources are collected at a cost. In particular, we define as 𝜆 the marginal cost 
of public funds, which is a positive number. If migrants’ effort and public resources are 
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substitutable (even to a minimum degree), is in the government’s interest that migrants put the 
highest possible effort. This would allow it to cut down the public spending and to have 
integration at the lowest possible cost for native citizens. The fact that the effort is not 
observable could rise a problem of moral hazard. As a matter of fact, although it is also in the 
migrant’s interest to integrate (once entered the labour market the migrant receives an 
exogenous amount of labour income 𝑊), to make an effort is costly for the individual. It is then 
in the migrant’s interest to put the lowest possible level of effort and to exploit government’s 
resources to increase the probability of getting a job.  
 
To complicate further the analysis, we assume that the effort’s cost is not equal among 
individuals. High skilled migrants struggle less when working, and so the disutility that comes 
from making an effort is lower with respect to the one of low skilled individuals. This fact, in 
a scenario in which the type 𝜃 is not observable by the government, rises also a problem of 
adverse selection.  
 
Migrant’s utility is indicated as ?̅? for the high skilled and 𝑈 for the low skilled. Utility depends 
positively on consumption and negatively on the amount of hours dedicated to integration (the 
individual’s effort).  
 
Before defining the utility functions, it is necessary to spend few words on the consumption 
variable. Consumption, that quite surprisingly and innovatively we name 𝐴, is not a certain 
good. As a matter of fact, in a given period of time, two states of the world are possible. The 
best scenarios (𝐵) happens with probability 𝜋, when migrants succeed in integration. With the 
remaining probability (1 − 𝜋) instead, the state of the world with a failed integration, that we 
indicate with 𝑀, comes true.  
In 𝐵, migrants’ consumption is given by the exogenous labour income 𝑊, plus a government 
transfer 𝐶. While in 𝑀, migrants do not integrate, and cannot enjoy the income 𝑊. With 
probability (1 − 𝜋) , 𝐴 is then simply equal to the government’s transfer 𝐶.  
The government’s transfer 𝐶 can be thought as a subsidy given on daily basis to migrants in 
order to provide to their basic needs. As 𝑞, every unit of 𝐶 costs to the governments (1 + 𝜆).  
While we assume that 𝑊 is exogenous and constant for all the individuals, C is a control 
variable for the governments and could be differentiated by types. From now on, we will then 
use the label 𝐶𝐻  to refer to the transfer for high productive migrants, and 𝐶𝐿 to refer to the low 
productivity’s one.  
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To briefly summarize with equations:  
 
𝐴𝐻 = 𝜋𝐻𝐴𝐻
𝐵 + (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝐴𝐻
𝑀 = 𝜋𝐻(𝐶𝐻 +𝑊) + (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝐶𝐻 
 
𝐴𝐿 = 𝜋𝐿𝐴𝐿
𝐵 + (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝐴𝐿
𝑀 = 𝜋𝐿(𝐶𝐿 +𝑊) + (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝐶𝐿 
 
Given that there are two state of the worlds for the individual, also utility is an expected value. 
In particular, with probability 𝜋 the migrant enjoy utility 𝑈𝐵; with probability (1 − 𝜋) (s)he 
does not integrate successfully and consequently his/her utility is equal to 𝑈𝑀. Remember that 
utility differs according to types which in this case are indicated by the upper or lower bar 
(?̅? and 𝑈):   
?̅? = 𝜋𝐻𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ + (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅  
 
𝑈 = 𝜋𝐿𝑈
𝐵 + (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
𝑀  
 
Utility in the best state of the world (𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅  and 𝑈𝐵 ) depends positively on the level of 
consumption 𝐴 which comprehends 𝐶 and W, and negatively on the amount of hours dedicated 
to integration activities, 𝑡: 𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ (𝐶𝐻 , 𝑡𝐻 , 𝜃𝐻 , 𝑊) and 𝑈
𝐵(𝐶𝐿, 𝑡𝐿 , 𝜃𝐿 , 𝑊).  
Utility in the bad state of the world (𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅  and 𝑈𝑀) depends in the same way from 𝐴 and 𝑡; 
however 𝐴 simply consists of 𝐶: 𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ (𝐶𝐻 , 𝑡𝐻 , 𝜃𝐻) and 𝑈
𝑀(𝐶𝐿, 𝑡𝐿 , 𝜃𝐿).  
As conventionally, we assume utility is concave in consumption (transfer):  
o 𝑈𝑐
𝐵/𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
> 0 𝑒 𝑈𝑐𝑐




> 0 𝑒 𝑈𝑐𝑐
𝐵/𝑀
< 0. 
Individual’s effort instead is a cost and procure disutility to the individual:  
o 𝑈𝑡
𝐵/𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
< 0 𝑒 𝑈𝑡𝑡
𝐵/𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
< 0;  
o 𝑈𝑡
𝐵/𝑀
< 0 𝑒 𝑈𝑡𝑡
𝐵/𝑀
< 0. 
Since utility is positive in 𝐶 and negative in 𝑡, we can draw the indifferent curves of the 




Figure 3.1: Migrant’s indifference curve between transfer and hours of activities 
As expressed in the figure, utility increases as we move up to the left.  
3.3. The Setting  
 
As mentioned, government’s interest is to allocate resources (𝑞 and 𝐶) efficiently to H and L, 
and to make them work such that to maximize their integration’s probability. The government 
is a risk neutral actor, while migrants are risk averse individuals.  
 
We delineate two different situations.  
At first, the problem is set assuming there is symmetry of information between the economic 
agents: the government observe the individuals’ type 𝜃 and can provide 𝑞 and 𝐶 consequently, 
exploiting the maximum possible effort from each category. As we will see, when the adverse 
selection problem is absent, also moral hazard is impossible. The government knows exactly 
the amount of hours that a productive and less productive individual can dedicate to integration 
(𝑡 is informative). Once it is able to identify each individual as belonging to a certain type, it 
can force them to put 𝑡𝐻  and 𝑡𝐿, through the control of 𝑞 and 𝐶.  
 
Successively, we will assume that the government is unable to observe migrants’ type. This 
asymmetry of information could allow the high type individuals to mimic the low type, putting 
a level of effort lower than optimal (the one of symmetric information). To avoid bunching at 
the bottom, the government has built an incentive mechanism such that it will never be in the 
high type’s interest to behave as a low skilled. Manipulating the migrant’s choices through the 
use of the policy variable 𝑞 and 𝐶, the government can arrive to a situation of equilibrium better 




The timing of the problem is as follow: nature decides the amount of migrants arriving to a 
country, if a migrant is H or L and the proportion of 𝛿. The government, which is the uniformed 
party, moves first, offering migrants one or more contracts. Migrants choose the contract they 
prefer and the integration process begins. At the end, an outcome realizes and the migrant is 
either in the good or in the bad state of the world.  
 
The contract offered by the government is a combination of 𝐶 and 𝑡. The level of 𝐶 and 𝑡 could 
vary by type. However, as said, the uninformed party does not know the type of individual is 
dealing with. The government plays as in a Stackelberg model: the individual knows that the 
government is committed to the contracts offered and (s)he will choose consequently; the 
government has to anticipate the individual’s behaviour and design contracts accordingly.  
 
The sorting condition for the two groups resides in the marginal rate of substitution between 
𝐶 and 𝑡. As mentioned, for less productive individuals is more costly to make an effort. The 
behaviour of high and low skilled, then, will be different at the margin. Even if the individuals 
are forced to consume the same and to make an effort for the same amount of hours, the 
marginal rate of substitution in that point, for the two groups, is different. The amount of hours 
they are disposed to work more, in order to have more units of the transfer, is different. This 
means that their preferences are different, that the slope of the indifference curves of the 
individuals are not equal in every point, and that the government can exploit this diverse 
behaviour to screen and detect the true ability of individuals.  
 
What we have just described, is asking for the Spence-Mirrlees or single crossing property 
condition. As the name suggests, the property assure that the indifference curves of different 
types of individuals cross only once. The Spence-Mirrlees property is guaranteed by agent 
monotonicity: the marginal rate of substitution between the transfer 𝐶 and the amount of hours 
𝑡 is a decreasing function of the productivity type 𝜃 (Myles, 1995). This states that the slope of 
the indifference curve for high productive individuals is flatter than the one of the low skilled, 






Figure 3.2: Slope of the indifference curves for individuals H and L 
 
We can easily state this property through equations.  








(𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻




















(𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻





























(𝑈𝐵 − 𝑈𝑀) + 𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑈𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐿











(𝑈𝐵 − 𝑈𝑀) + 𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑈𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐿
















(𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻












(𝑈𝐵 −𝑈𝑀) + 𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑈𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐿















(𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻












(𝑈𝐵 − 𝑈𝑀) + 𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑈𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐿











Thanks to this condition, the government can design a menu of contracts that is incentive 
compatible and induce migrants to truthfully reveal their characteristics. The idea is to exploit 
optimally the available information, which regards individual’ preferences and behaviours.  
 
3.4. Symmetric Information  
 
First of all, we write the government’s objective function as:   
 
𝐹(𝑞𝐻, 𝑞𝐿, 𝑡𝐻 , 𝑡𝐿 , 𝐶𝐻 , 𝐶𝐿)
= 𝛿𝜋𝐻 + (1 − 𝛿)𝜋𝐿 − 𝛿𝑘(1 − 𝜋𝐻) − (1 − 𝛿)𝑘(1 − 𝜋𝐿) − (1 + 𝜆)(𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿
+ 𝐶𝐻 + 𝐶𝐿) 
 
In this function, we can see the probabilities of integration that the government wants to 
maximize and also the cost related to failed integration and the cost of public funds. We have 
already inserted the government’s budget constraint in this objective function.  




In symmetric information, the government observe 𝜃 and can assign migrants to different 
integration paths without difficulties. It can use lump-sum transfers and exploit the maximum 
possible effort of the individuals, so that the amount of resources it has to provide to increase 
the probability of integration is minimum. However, even if not citizens of the host country, 
migrants are human beings. The government cannot operate avoiding completely any attention 
at migrants’ wellness and utility.  
For this reason the maximization of 𝐹, even in this context of symmetry, is not free.  
We add two constraints to the problem. We ask the utility of type H and L individuals to be at 
least equal, if not greater, than a given amount 𝑈∗. 𝑈∗ is a parameter in the model and represents 
the minimum level of utility a human being can experience to be called as such.  
 
Given these premises, we can write the problem as follow:  
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑞ℎ,𝑞𝑙,𝑡ℎ ,𝑡𝑙,𝐶𝐻 ,𝐶𝐿    𝛿𝜋𝐻 + (1 − 𝛿)𝜋𝐿 − 𝛿𝑘(1 − 𝜋𝐻) − (1 − 𝛿)𝑘(1 − 𝜋𝐿) − (1 + 𝜆)(𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿
+ 𝐶𝐻 + 𝐶𝐿) 
𝑆. 𝑡.        𝜋𝐻𝑈
𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ + (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈
𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ≥ 𝑈∗  
                                𝜋𝐿𝑈
𝐵 + (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
𝑀 ≥ 𝑈∗ 
 
We can solve it thorough Lagrange’s method. Rewriting the constraints as: 
 −𝜋𝐻𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑈
∗ ≤ 0  
−𝜋𝐿𝑈
𝐵 − (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
𝑀+𝑈∗ ≤ 0  
We obtain the Lagrangian:  
𝐿(𝑞ℎ , 𝑞𝐿 , 𝑡𝐻 , 𝑡𝐿,𝐶𝐻 , 𝐶𝐿 , 𝜇, 𝛽)
=  𝛿𝜋𝐻 + (1 − 𝛿)𝜋𝐿 − 𝛿𝑘(1 − 𝜋𝐻) − (1 − 𝛿)𝑘(1 − 𝜋𝐿)
− (1 + 𝜆)(𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿 + 𝐶𝐻 + 𝐶𝐿) − 𝜇[−𝜋𝐻𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑈
∗]
− 𝛽[−𝜋𝐿𝑈
𝐵 − (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
𝑀+𝑈∗] 
 
As mentioned above, it is clear to see that the government’s aim is not to maximize migrants’ 
utilities. These functions appear only in the constraints.  
We can derive the first order conditions (FOC) of the Lagrangian function and interpret the 
results obtained. At first, we do not consider the input 𝑞 in the problem and concentrate on the 
variable 𝐶 and 𝑡.  
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+ 𝜇(1 − 𝜋𝐻)
𝜕𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻
= 0                                           (3.23)
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝐿
= (1 − 𝛿)
𝜕𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝐿












+ 𝛽(1 − 𝜋𝐿)
𝜕𝑈𝑀
𝜕𝑡𝐿
























= (1 + 𝜆)                                                                                                           (3.26)
𝜇[−𝜋𝐻𝑈
𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈
𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑈∗] = 0                                                                                                                                  (3.27)
𝛽[−𝜋𝐿𝑈
𝐵 − (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
𝑀+𝑈∗] = 0                                                                                                                                    (3.28)
𝜇 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                           (3.29)
𝛽 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                          (3.30)
 
























(𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝜇𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻
+ 𝜇(1 − 𝜋𝐻)
𝜕𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻
= 0                                                          (3.23)
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝐿






(𝑈𝐵 −𝑈𝑀) + 𝛽𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑈𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐿
+ 𝛽(1 − 𝜋𝐿)
𝜕𝑈𝑀
𝜕𝑡𝐿
























) = (1 + 𝜆)                                                                                                                 (3.26)
𝜇[−𝜋𝐻𝑈
𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈
𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑈∗] = 0                                                                                                                                    (3.27)
𝛽[−𝜋𝐿𝑈
𝐵 − (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
𝑀+𝑈∗] = 0                                                                                                                                      (3.28)
𝜇 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                            (3.29)
𝛽 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                            (3.30)
 
 
From the derivatives (3.23) and (3.24) is straightforward to notice that in the absence of the 
utility constraints, the government could exploit at maximum the individual’s effort and 
productivity. It could bring the marginal productivity of 𝑡 close to zero, and 𝑡 close to infinity, 
while offering the lowest possible amount of 𝑞.  
However, since migrants’ utility matter in some form, in this problem, the government is 
constrained to guarantee the minimum level of utility 𝑈∗, but nothing more: at the optimum 
both the constraints are binding. This means that the expected utility of migrants of type H and 
type L are equal.  
However, as we know ?̅? and 𝑈 differ in their relationship with 𝑡. High skill migrants, since 
more productive, have a lower cost of effort (𝑡) and, ceteris paribus, can spend more hours in 
integrating activities with respect to low skill individuals, maintaining the same level of utility.  
At the optimum then, 𝑡𝐻 > 𝑡𝐿 without the need for the government to compensate such different 
effort. Since there is complete information, it can easily provide two different contracts tailored 




From equations (3.23) and (3.24) and (3.25) and (3.26), we can also compute the MRS for both 
types of migrants.   

















































3.5. Asymmetric Information  
 
Now we imagine 𝜃 is private information. The government cannot offer the same transfer to 
individuals and ask for different level of effort. It is in fact in the interest and in the possibility 
of H to pretend to be less productive than what they really are and deviate from the equilibrium 
of symmetric information. The government has to offer two different contracts, one designed 
for the H type and one designed for the low skilled. However, to make sure  
H reveal truthfully their type and choose the contract was designed for them, the government 
needs to add another constraint to the problem. It must be that the utility of individual of type 
H when declaring the truth and accepting the contract designed for type H is at least equal, if 
not greater, than the utility of type H individual who pretend to be of the low type and accept 
the contract designed for type L. In order to achieve this result, the government has to exploit 
the sorting condition: the willingness to make an effort at the margin is different between H and 
L. The contract designed for L, must be unattractive to H.  
This new constraint can be written as:  
 




o 𝑈?̂?(𝐶𝐿, 𝑡𝐿, 𝜃𝐻 ,𝑊) is the utility of individual of type H who mimics type L and succeed 
in integrating; 
o 𝑈?̂?(𝐶𝐿, 𝑡𝐿, 𝜃𝐻) is the utility of individual of type H who mimics type L but do not 
integrate. 
The expected utility ?̂? has the same characteristics of ?̅? and 𝑈:  
o 𝑈𝑐
𝐵/?̂?





< 0 𝑒 𝑈𝑡𝑡
𝐵/?̂?
< 0. 
The Lagrangian can then now be rewritten as:  
𝐿(𝑞ℎ , 𝑞𝐿, 𝑡𝐻 , 𝑡𝐿,𝐶𝐻, 𝐶𝐿, 𝛾, 𝜇, 𝛽)
=  𝛿𝜋𝐻 + (1 − 𝛿)𝜋𝐿 − 𝛿𝑘(1 − 𝜋𝐻) − (1 − 𝛿)𝑘(1 − 𝜋𝐿)
− (1 + 𝜆)(𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿 + 𝐶𝐻 + 𝐶𝐿)
− 𝛾[−𝜋𝐻𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜋𝐿𝑈?̂? + (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈?̂?]
− 𝜇[−𝜋𝐻𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑈
∗] − 𝛽[−𝜋𝐿𝑈
𝐵 − (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
𝑀+𝑈∗] 


























(𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝛾𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻






(𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝜇𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻
+ (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝜇
𝜕𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻
= 0                    (3.33)
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝐿






(𝑈?̂? − 𝑈?̂?) − 𝛾𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑈?̂?
𝜕𝑡𝐿






(𝑈𝐵 − 𝑈𝑀) + 𝛽𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑈𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐿
+ 𝛽(1 − 𝜋𝐿)
𝜕𝑈𝑀
𝜕𝑡𝐿
= 0       (3.34)
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝐶𝐻
= (𝛾 + 𝜇) [𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝐶𝐻
+ (1 − 𝜋𝐻)
𝜕𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝐶𝐻












+ 𝛽(1 − 𝜋𝐿)
𝜕𝑈𝑀
𝜕𝐶𝐿
= 1+ 𝜆                                                                                                                       (3.36)
𝛾[−𝜋𝐻𝑈
𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈
𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜋𝐿𝑈
?̂? + (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
?̂?] = 0                                                                                                                                                             (3.37)
𝜇[−𝜋𝐻𝑈
𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈
𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑈∗] = 0                                                                                                                                                                                               (3.38)
𝛽[−𝜋𝐿𝑈
𝐵 − (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
𝑀+𝑈∗] = 0                                                                                                                                                                                                  (3.39)
𝛾 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       (3.40)
𝜇 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        (3.41)
𝛽 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       (3.42)
 
To understand if the government distorts individuals’ choices with respect to the situation in 
symmetry of information, we have to look at the MRS.  
The derivatives are more complex since the optimization happens under three constraints. By 
assumption, we know the incentive compatible constraint is binding, meaning that the 
lagrangian multiplier 𝛾 is different from zero.  
Also the 𝛽 multiplier is different from zero: note that in equation (3.34) if 𝛽 is equal to zero, 
we will have that: 






(𝑈?̂? −𝑈?̂?) + 𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑈?̂?
𝜕𝑡𝐿






Since the right hand side of the equation is the partial derivative of ?̂? with respect to 𝑡 (which 
is negative) and since 𝛾 and (1 − 𝛿 + 𝑘 − 𝛿𝑘) are positive, it would mean that 
𝜕𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝐿
 is negative. 
By definition, this is impossible.  
We are then left with two possible cases.  
Case 1: 𝛾, 𝛽, 𝜇 ≠ 0 
























(𝑈?̂? − 𝑈?̂?) + 𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑈?̂?
𝜕𝑡𝐿



















































Case 2: 𝛾, 𝛽 ≠ 0 and 𝜇 = 0 




























Looking at the low type, we can see that 𝜇 never enters in equations (3.34) and (3.36), leaving 
𝑀𝑅𝑆𝐿 unchanged.  
For both types of individual, then, the marginal rate of substitution in case one is equal to the 
one in case two. What is interesting is to compare these marginal rates of substitution of H and 
L with the ones in symmetric information, in order to understand if and how the solutions have 
changed.  
We can easily see that the marginal rate of substitution for high skilled individuals has not 
changed in asymmetry, meaning that individual’s choices are not distorted. What has changed 
is the 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝐿. As we expected in this kind of adverse selection problem, to avoid mimicking, the 
government is forced to distort the choices of the low type. The high type has no incentive 
whatsoever to pretend to be someone else.  
However, we are not able to determine the change in the size of the marginal rate of substitution. 
Remember that:  

















In the latter ratio than, the numerator is greater than in symmetry (since the marginal utility of 
the effort is negative), but greater is also the denominator, leaving us with an uncertain results.  
To have a more complete picture, we try now to reflect on the initial input of resources that can 
complement or substitute the individual’s hours of activities.  
3.6. Maximization with the input 𝒒 
 




































= 0                                                                                   (3.21)  
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑞𝐿
= (1 − 𝛿)
𝜕𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑞𝐿
+ (𝑘 − 𝛿𝑘)
𝜕𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑞𝐿






= 0                                                              (3.22)  
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝐻






(𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝜇𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻
+ 𝜇(1 − 𝜋𝐻)
𝜕𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻
= 0                                                           (3.23)
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝐿






(𝑈𝐵 − 𝑈𝑀) + 𝛽𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑈𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐿
+ 𝛽(1 − 𝜋𝐿)
𝜕𝑈𝑀
𝜕𝑡𝐿
























) = (1 + 𝜆)                                                                                                                (3.26)
𝜇[−𝜋𝐻𝑈
𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈
𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑈∗] = 0                                                                                                                                     (3.27)
𝛽[−𝜋𝐿𝑈
𝐵 − (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
𝑀+𝑈∗] = 0                                                                                                                                        (3.28)
𝜇 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                              (3.29)
𝛽 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                              (3.30)
 




















(𝛿−𝛿𝑘+𝜇𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅̅−𝜇𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)
 
 
























= (𝛿 + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝛾𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝛾𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜇𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝜇𝑈𝑀)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝜕𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑞𝐻
= (1 + 𝜆)                                                                                                                                               (3.31)
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑞𝐿
= (1 − 𝛿 + 𝑘 − 𝛿𝑘 − 𝛾𝑈?̂? + 𝛾𝑈?̂? + 𝛽𝑈𝐵 − 𝛽𝑈𝑀)
𝜕𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑞𝐿
= (1 + 𝜆)                                                                                                                                (3.32)
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝐻






(𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝛾𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻






(𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝜇𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻
+ (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝜇
𝜕𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝑡𝐻
= 0                    (3.33)
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝐿






(𝑈?̂? − 𝑈?̂?) − 𝛾𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑈?̂?
𝜕𝑡𝐿






(𝑈𝐵 − 𝑈𝑀) + 𝛽𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑈𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐿
+ 𝛽(1 − 𝜋𝐿)
𝜕𝑈𝑀
𝜕𝑡𝐿
= 0       (3.34)
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝐶𝐻
= (𝛾 + 𝜇) [𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝐶𝐻
+ (1 − 𝜋𝐻)
𝜕𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅
𝜕𝐶𝐻












+ 𝛽(1 − 𝜋𝐿)
𝜕𝑈𝑀
𝜕𝐶𝐿
= 1+ 𝜆                                                                                                                       (3.36)
𝛾[−𝜋𝐻𝑈
𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈
𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜋𝐿𝑈
?̂? + (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
?̂?] = 0                                                                                                                                                             (3.37)
𝜇[−𝜋𝐻𝑈
𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ − (1 − 𝜋𝐻)𝑈
𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑈∗] = 0                                                                                                                                                                                               (3.38)
𝛽[−𝜋𝐿𝑈
𝐵 − (1 − 𝜋𝐿)𝑈
𝑀+𝑈∗] = 0                                                                                                                                                                                                  (3.39)
𝛾 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       (3.40)
𝜇 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        (3.41)
𝛽 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       (3.42)
 













































(𝛿+𝛿𝑘+𝛾𝑈𝐵̅̅ ̅̅̅−𝛾𝑈𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)
 
 
With respect to the situation in symmetry, we can note that:  
o The marginal productivity of 𝑞𝐿 is lower, since 𝑈?̂? and 𝑈?̂? are positive and 𝑈?̂? < 𝑈?̂?. 
This suggest that, if 𝑞 and 𝑡 are substitutable, the government in asymmetric information 
had to compensate with more resources to increase the probability of integration.  
o The marginal productivity of 𝑞𝐻 depends on the value of the multipliers 𝛾 and 𝜇. If 𝜇 is 
different from zero, then also 
𝜕𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑞𝐻
 is lower in asymmetry than in symmetric information. 
If instead, 𝜇 is equal to zero, the difference between the productivity depends on the 





















At the beginning of this work, we have tried to understand what integration is, why is in the 
policy agenda, and how OECD countries deal with it.  
From the general overview of measures described in chapter one, we have learnt what are the 
main problems and challenges that governments face worldwide. At the same time, we have 
seen some interesting solutions and good practises that are, or should be, applied. One, over 
which there seems to be consensus, is the idea of designing integration paths tailored to 
individuals’ needs and characteristics, so that to exploit their full potential, to allocate resources 
efficiently and to improve the coordination and collaboration between the different actors 
involved in the integration process.  
In the second chapter of this work, we tried to understand what the main characteristics of 
migrants coming to western countries were. In particular, the focus has been on migrants’ 
abilities and on how different push and pull factors could have a role in determining migrants’ 
self-selection along this dimension. Unfortunately, the literature both theoretically and 
empirically shows how precise, unique and definite criteria to understand migrants’ abilities are 
hard to find. Looking at the reasons why they left, or at the countries from which they fled, is 
not sufficient to infer on their skills and competences. Their productivities remain unobservable 
to governments, and a proper mechanism to reveal them should be applied.  
In the third and final chapter of this work, we tried to design such mechanism. We imagined 
that governments have to deal with two different types of migrants: the high skilled and the low 
skilled. Their objective is to maximize migrants’ probability of integration, since not including 
them generates costs for the society. However, the process of integration is costly both for the 
governments, who have to subsidize migrants and give them public resources, and for 
individuals, who have to put an effort in the activities for integration. Detecting the effort 
migrants need to put according to their productivity, and assuring they are collaborating at their 
maximum potential, is what governments have to do to spend efficiently public resources.  
We have described two possible situations. At first, there is symmetry of information between 
the economic actors and governments have no difficulties in designing tailored contracts 
(defined by the quantity of public transfers and individual efforts). Later on, migrants’ 
productivity becomes private information. Due to this asymmetry, governments need to distort 
individual choices at the optimum to make sure there is no mimicking between the two types. 
In order to do so and to build an incentive compatible revelation mechanism, they have to 
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exploits the available information they dispose of: the sorting condition is represented by 
individuals’ preferences towards the effort and the transfer they receive. Thanks to the different 
cost migrants perceive when making an effort, the government is able to construct an incentive 
compatible solution. At the optimum it is possible to observe that low skill migrants are the one 
whose choices are distorted with respect to the situation of symmetric information; high skilled 
instead at the margin maintain the same willingness to work, in order to receive a certain amount 

























Adda, Jerome, Dustmann Christian, Gorlach, Joseph-Simon, 2014. "Migrant Wages, Human 
Capital Accumulation and Return Migration". Meeting Papers 679, Society for Economic 
Dynamics. 
Ager, Alastair, and Alison Strang. 2008. “Understanding Integration: A Conceptual 
Framework.” Journal of Refugee Studies 21 (2): 166–91. 
Aiyar, Shekhar, Barkbu, Bergljot, Batini, Nicoletta, Berger, Helge, Detragiache, Enrica, 
Dizioli, Allan, Ebeke, Christian, Lin, Huidan, Kaltani, Linda, Sosa, Sebastian, Spilimbergo, 
Antonio, Topalova, Petia, 2016. “The refugee surge in Europe: economic challenges”. IMF 
Discussion Note No.16/02. 
Aksoy, Cevat Giray, and Poutvaara, Panu, 2019. “Refugees’ Self-Selection into Europe: Who 
Migrates Where?” ifo Institute Working Paper 289.  
Aydemir, Abdurrahman, 2011. “Immigrant selection and short-term labour market outcomes 
by visa category”. Journal of Population Economics 24(2):451–475 
Backman, Mikaela, Lopez, Esteban, Rowe, Francisco, 2020. “The occupational trajectories and 
outcomes of forced migrants in Sweden. Entrepreneurship, employment or persistent 
inactivity?” Small Bus Econ (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-019-00312-z 
Bansak, Kirk, Hainmueller, Jens, Hangartner, Dominik, 2016. “How economic, humanitarian, 
and religious concerns shape European attitudes toward asylum seekers”. Science, 354(6309), 
217–222. 
Battisti, Michele, Giesing, Yvonne, Laurentsyeva, Nadzeya, 2019. “Can job search assistance 
improve the labour market integration of refugees? Evidence from a field experiment”. Labour 
Economics, Volume 61, December 2019, 101745.  
Belot, Michele, Hatton, Timothy, 2012. “Immigrant Selection in the OECD”. Scand. J. of 
Economics 114(4), 1105–1128, 2012. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2012.01721.x 
Bevelander, Pieter, 2016. “Integrating refugees into labour markets”. IZA World of Labor, 269. 
Bratsberg, Brent, Røed, Knut, Raaum, Oddbjørn, 2017. “Immigrant Labor Market Integration 
across Admission Classes.” IZA DP No. 10513. 
Boeri, Tito, 2010. “Immigration to the Land of Redistribution”, Economica New Series, Vol. 
77, No. 308 (October 2010), pp. 651- 687.  
71 
 
Borjas, George J., 1987. “Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants.” American Economic 
Review Vol. 77, No. 4 (Sep., 1987), pp. 531- 553. 
Brell, Courtney, Dustmann, Christian, Preston, Ian, 2020. “The Labour Market Integration of 
Refugee Migrants in High-Income Countries”. Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 34, 
Number 1—Winter 2020—Pages 94–121.  
Bubb, Ryan, Kremer, Michael, Levine, David, 2011. “The Economics of International Refugee 
Law”. Journal of Legal Studies 40 (2): 367-404. 
Chin, Aimee and Cortes, Kalena E. (2015). “The Refugee/Asylum Seeker”. In Handbook of the 
Economics of International Migration, Volume 1, Edited by Chiswick, B.R. and Miller, P.W. 
Pages 585-658. 
Chiquiar, Daniel, Hanson, Gordon, 2002. “International migration, self-selection, and the 
distribution of wages: evidence from Mexico and the United States”. NBER Working Paper 
No. 9242.  
Chiswick, Barry, 1978. “The Effect of Americanization on the Earnings of Foreign-born Men”. 
Journal of Political Economy , Oct., 1978, Vol. 86, No. 5, pp. 897-921 
Chiswick, Barry, 1999. “Are Immigrants Favorably Self-Selected?”. The American Economic 
Review, May, 1999, Vol. 89, No. 2, pp. 181-185.  
Cobb-Clark, Deborah A., 2004. “Selection Policy and the Labour Market Outcomes of New 
Immigrants”. IZA Discussion Paper No.1380.  
Clemens, Michael A., 2011. “Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the 
Sidewalk?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 25, Number 3, Summer 2011, Pages 
83-106.  
Damas de Matos, A., 2014. “Immigrant skills, their measurement, use and return: A review of 
literature” in OECD/European Union (2014), Matching Economic Migration with Labour 
Market Needs, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264216501-en.  
Darling, Jonathan, 2016. “Asylum in Austere Times: Instability, Privatization and 
Experimentation within the UK Asylum Dispersal System”. Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 
29, No. 4, Oxford University Press.  
DeBono, Daniela, 2018. “In Defiance of the Reception Logic: The Case for Including NGOs 
as Human Rights Monitors in the EU’s Policies of First Reception of Irregular Migrants”. Peace 
72 
 
and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 2018, Vol. 24, No. 3, 291–295. American 
Psychological Association.  
DIRECTIVE 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection.  
Docquier, Frédéric, Lowell, B. Linsday, and Marfouk, Abdeslam, 2009. “A Gendered 
Assessment of Highly Skilled Migration” Population and Development Review 35, 297–321. 
Dustmann, Christian, and Francesca Fabbri. 2003. “Language Proficiency and Labour Market 
Performance of Immigrants in the UK.” Economic Journal 113 (489): 695–717. 
Dustmann, Christian, Fasani, Francesco, Frattini, Tommaso, Minale, Luigi and Schönberg, Uta, 
2017. “On the Economics and Politics of Refugee Migration”. IZA Discussion Paper No. 
10234. 
Fasani, Francesco, Tommaso Frattini, and Luigi Minale. 2018. “(The Struggle for) Refugee 
Integration into the Labour Market: Evidence from Europe.” IZA Discussion Paper 11333. 
Fernandez-Huertas, Jesus, 2011. “New Evidence on Emigration Selection.” Review of 
Economics and Statistics 93 (1), 72–96. 
Galera, Giulia, Giannetto, Leila and Noya, Antonella, 2018. “The Role of Non-state Actors in 
the Integration of Refugees and Asylum Seekers”, OECD Local Economic and Employment 
Development (LEED) Working Papers, No. 2018/02, OECD Publishing, Paris, 
https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/434c3303-en. 
Garcés-Mascareñas, Blanca and Penninx Rinus, 2016. “Integration as a Three-Way Process 
Approach?” in Garcés-Mascareñas, B. and Penninx R. (eds.), Integration Processes and 
Policies in Europe, IMISCOE Research Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-21674-4_1.  
Grogger, Jeffrey, Hanson, Gordon H., 2011. “Income maximization and the selection and 
sorting of international migrants”. Journal of Development Economics 95 (2011) 42–57.  
Hatton, Timothy J. 2016. “Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Policy in OECD Countries.” 
American Economic Review 106 (5): 441–5. 
Hatton, Timothy J., 2020. “Asylum Migration to the Developed World: Persecution, Incentives, 




Ibarraran, Pablo, Lubotsky, Darren, 2007. “Mexican Immigration and Self-Selection. New 
Evidence from the 2000 Mexican Census”. In Mexican Immigration to the United States, Edit 
by Borjas, George J., University of Chicago Press.  
IOM, 2019. “Glossary on Migration”, International Migration Law, N.34.  
Katz, Eliakim, Stark, Oded, 1984. “Migration and Asymmetric Information: Comment”. The 
American Economic Review, Jun., 1984, Vol. 74, No. 3 (Jun., 1984), pp. 533- 534 
Katz, Eliakim, Stark, Oded, 1987. “International Migration Under Asymmetric Information”. 
The Economic Journal , Sep., 1987, Vol. 97, No. 387 (Sep., 1987), pp. 718-726 
Kwok, Viem and Leland, Hayne, 1982. "An Economic Model of the Brain Drain," American 
Economic Review, March 1982, 72, 91-100 
Lemaître Georges, 2007. “The integration of immigrants into the labour market: The case of 
Sweden”. OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 48. 
Martín, Ivàn , Arcarons, Albert, Aumüller, Jutta, Bevelander, Pieter, Emilsson, Henrik, 
Kalantaryan, Sona, MacIver, Alastair , Mara, Isilda, Scalettaris, Giulia, Venturini, Alessandra, 
Vidovic, Hermine, van der Welle, Inge, Windisch, Michael, Wolffberg, Rebecca, Zorlu, Aslan, 
2016. “From Refugees to Workers: Mapping Labour-Market Integration Support Measures for 
Asylum Seekers and Refugees in EU Member States. Volume I: Comparative Analysis and 
Policy Findings”. Migration Policy Centre, Bertelsmann Stiftung.  
Mayda, Anna Maria, 2010. “International migration: a panel data analysis of the determinants 
of bilateral flows”. Journal of Population Economics 23, 1249–1274. 
McKenzie, David, Rapoport, Hillel, 2010. “Self-Selection Patterns in Mexico US Migration: 
The Role of Migration Networks”. Review of Economics and Statistics 92 (4), 811-821. 
Myles, Gareth D., 1995. Introduction. In Public Economics (pp. 3-17). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139170949.002  
OECD, 2014. “Jobs for Immigrants (Vol. 4): Labour Market Integration in Italy”. OECD 
Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264214712-en 
OECD, 2016. “Making integration work: Refugees and others in need of protection”. OECD 
Publishing, Paris. DOI. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264251236-en. 
OECD (2017a). “Finding their Way: Labour Market Integration of Refugees in Germany”. 
OECD Publishing, Paris.  
74 
 
OECD, 2017b. “Making Integration Work: Assessment and Recognition of Foreign 
Qualifications”. OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264278271-en 
OECD, 2018. “Working Together for Local Integration of Migrants and Refugees”. OECD 
Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264085350-en 
OECD, 2019. “Ready to Help?: Improving Resilience of Integration Systems for Refugees and 
other Vulnerable Migrants”. OECD Publishing, Paris. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264311312-
en.  
OECD, 2020. Migration Policy Debates OECD N°21.  
Orrenius, Pia M., Zavodny, Madeline, 2005. “Self-selection among undocumented immigrants 
from Mexico”. Journal of Development Economics 78 (2005) 215– 240. 
Pedersen, Peder J., Pytlikova, Mariola, Smith, Nina, 2004. Selection or Network Effects? 
Migration Flows into 27 OECD Countries, 1990–2000”. IZA Discussion paper 1104. 
Pennix, Rinus, 2013. “Research on Migration and Integration in Europe. Achievements and 
Lessons”. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
Roy, Andrew D., 1951. “Some thoughts on the distribution of earnings”. Oxford Economic 
Papers 3, 135–146 June. 
UNHCR Master Glossary of Terms, June 2006, Rev.1, available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/42ce7d444.html [accessed 31 October 2020] 
UN DESA, 2019. Population Division. International Migration 2019: Report 
(ST/ESA/SER.A/438). 
UNGA, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees”, 28 July, 1951, UN Treaty Series, vol. 
189.  
UNGA, 72nd Sess, Agenda Items 14 and 117, UN Doc A/72/643, 12 December 2017.  
Unterreiner, Anne, Weinar, Agnieszka, 2014. “The Conceptual Framework of the INTERACT 
Project”, INTERACT RR 2014/01, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San 
Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2014. 
Verdier, Thierry, 2019. “Review Essay on Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage 
Societies by Claire Adida, David Laitin and Marie-Anne Valfort”. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 57(1), 96–119. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20171415 
75 
 
 
